Waggoner v. State
| Decision Date | 02 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 18249,18249 |
| Citation | 828 P.2d 321,121 Idaho 758 |
| Parties | Vincent R. WAGGONER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Vincent R. Waggoner, Boise, pro se.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Gates, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Vincent Waggoner, a prisoner who escaped by stealing a state car, was returned to the South Idaho Correctional Institution (SICI) and served with disciplinary offense reports for escape and for theft. Following a disciplinary hearing, Waggoner was sanctioned with detention, loss of good time and restitution. In this appeal, he seeks review of the district court order affirming the magistrate's order which denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Waggoner's petition alleged that his due process rights were violated by the Department of Correction's failure to provide him timely notice and to grant him a timely disciplinary hearing as provided by the department's policies and procedures manual (manual). The magistrate found that due process had been fully satisfied and that the petition had been frivolously brought, and he awarded costs to the state under I.C. § 12-122. The district court affirmed the magistrate's order. We likewise affirm.
At the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate, Waggoner argued that he had been charged with escape and theft as described in the manual in existence at the time he committed the offenses, i.e., March, 1987. 1 The disciplinary hearing regarding those offenses, however, was conducted in accordance with policy set forth in the manual as amended on June 8, 1987. Waggoner contends that the amended rules were not applicable in his case. Specifically, Waggoner relied upon a letter, dated September 11, 1987, from the Warden, notifying prisoners and staff that the effective date of the rule changes was September 28, 1987.
The disciplinary hearing officer, who handled the hearing, disputed Waggoner's contentions and stated emphatically that those portions of the manual discussing procedures to be followed in disciplinary hearings went into effect upon approval by the Board and were not at issue in the Warden's letter. The new procedures were implemented during Waggoner's absence from the prison, stated the officer, and they were properly applied in this case. The officer explained that the September 28th date was relevant only to the amended definitions in the offense code under which prisoners could be charged.
The magistrate considered Waggoner's allegations that his due process rights were violated when he received notice of the disciplinary offenses more than twenty-four hours after he became available and when his disciplinary hearing was held beyond the time prescribed in the manual. The magistrate found that the disciplinary hearing was governed by the manual as revised on June 8, 1987. 2 He also found that the necessary documentation in support of the extension of time limits for delivery of notice and for hearing of the disciplinary offense reports was attached to Waggoner's central file. He denied the habeas corpus petition.
It is incumbent on us, when we review a decision by a district court made in its appellate capacity, to examine the record of the trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 906, 781 P.2d 241, 243 (Ct.App.1989). In applying constitutional standards to the facts found, however, we exercise free review. See Sandpoint Convalescent Services, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 756 P.2d 398 (1988).
Waggoner's contentions concerning the disciplinary proceedings are not unlike those raised in Sivak v. Ada County, 115 Idaho 766, 769 P.2d 1138 (Ct.App.1989). In resolving the untimeliness of the disciplinary hearing in Sivak, we stated:
Although a deviation from statutory or regulatory standards does not establish a constitutional violation per se, it is a factor to be considered when determining whether a habeas corpus petitioner has suffered a significant deprivation.
Sivak, supra at 767, 769 P.2d at 1139, citing Wilson v. State, 113 Idaho 563, 567, 746 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Ct.App.1987). Wilson dealt with health standards promulgated by the legislature and a claim of cruel and unusual punishment in enforcing these standards in prison. While the case before us is distinguishable in that the rules challenged by Waggoner are derived exclusively from the Board of Correction, 3 the conclusion above stated is nevertheless still valid. More recently, our Supreme Court reiterated that a habeas corpus petition must demonstrate not only that some procedure was unconstitutional, but also that the petitioner was adversely affected or prejudiced by the constitutional violation. Coleman v. State, 114 Idaho 901, 762 P.2d 814 (1988).
We do not find that the evidence at the hearing before the magistrate reflects that Waggoner was deprived of due process protections by the timing of his hearing or his notice of the offenses. He was accorded the extent of due process rights to which a prison inmate is entitled in a prison disciplinary proceeding, as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) and adopted in Idaho in Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402, 545 P.2d 1008 (1976). The magistrate concluded that Waggoner was given written notice of the charges, an opportunity to call witnesses or present evidence, an inmate representative to assist him in the preparation of briefs, an impartial hearing officer, and a written statement of the basis of the finding by the hearing officer. We conclude that a delay in the service of the hearing date was not proscribed when the reasons for the delay were attached to the notice to Waggoner. We agree with the magistrate and the district court that due process was satisfied, and accordingly, we affirm.
Waggoner has contended that the award of fees to the respondent pursuant to I.C. § 12-122 was in error. Although the exact amount of fees had not been specified in a judgment at the time of Waggoner's appeal, 4 he disputes the award of fees, regardless of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bowman
...trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. Waggoner v. State, 121 Idaho 758, 760, 828 P.2d 321, 323 (Ct.App.1991); Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 906, 781 P.2d 241, 243 A. DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS. The......
-
Searcy v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr.
...to make and adopt rules and regulations for the management of prison administration and discipline. Waggoner v. State, 121 Idaho 758, 760 n.3, 828 P.2d 321, 323 n.3 (Ct. App. 1991). Because the legislature cannot foresee all the practical difficulties that state agencies will encounter whil......
-
Lopez v. State
...prejudiced--by the constitutional violation." Coleman v. State, 114 Idaho 901, 902, 762 P.2d 814, 815 (1988); Waggoner v. State, 121 Idaho 758, 760, 828 P.2d 321, 323 (Ct.App.1991). Lopez's petition and affidavit identify no information helpful to his defense that would have been revealed b......
-
Hoene v. Barnes
... ... The only issue presented is whether the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment on the ground that the claimant's out-of-state medical expert was not competent to testify. We conclude that under the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court should not have granted ... ...