DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.

Decision Date19 August 2003
Docket Number(AC 22682).
PartiesGAIL DECORSO v. WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL.
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals

Bishop, Mihalakos and Dupont, Js.

John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Mario F. Moreno and Charles A. Deluca, with whom, on the brief, was Dierdre A. Murray, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

DUPONT, J.

The plaintiff, Gail DeCorso, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court following the granting of the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants1 as to both counts of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The questions for resolution are whether (1) the conduct of the individual defendants, elders of Jehovah's Witnesses, was extreme and outrageous during the relevant periods of time, as alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, for purposes of sustaining a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and (2) the first amendment to the United States constitution bars the plaintiff's cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

I PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The operative complaint is dated November 13, 2000, and alleges that certain incidents took place beginning in 1975 and continuing through the plaintiff's disfellowship2 from the Jehovah's Witnesses in April, 1996. It was filed "pro se" and "in lieu of John R. Williams," who is appellate counsel for her.3

The plaintiff was baptized into the Jehovah's Witnesses religion in 1972. She alleges that, as such, and according to teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses, she was under the control and supervision of the defendants. In October, 1975, the plaintiff married Michael DeCorso, who also was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses. From the beginning of their marriage through their divorce in November, 1994, the plaintiff allegedly suffered continual emotional, physical and sexual abuse by her husband.

The plaintiff further alleged that throughout the duration of the problems within her marriage, she sought the guidance and instruction of the defendants, as was required by teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses. At all times, the counseling she received from the defendant elders was spiritual in nature, and based on the writings and teachings of the scriptures as interpreted by the religion of the Jehovah's Witnesses.

The plaintiff alleged that she had conversations with each of the individual defendants regarding the alleged abuse she suffered and nothing was done by them to alleviate it. She alleged that the defendants counseled her to continue to endure the alleged abuse. Throughout her complaint, the plaintiff cites various writings and scripture of the Jehovah's Witnesses, alleging that the defendant elders did not act in conformity with their own religious teachings. The plaintiff additionally alleged that the defendants voiced derogatory remarks about her throughout that time and continuing until her disfellowship in April, 1996.

After deposing the plaintiff, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendants claimed that the alleged acts of misconduct were insufficient as elements of an action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The motion also claimed that the first amendment barred the plaintiff's action because inquiry into her allegations would constitute excessive entanglement of the state into religious affairs. The court granted the defendants' motion as to both counts of her complaint.

The court granted the motion as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress count because one of the elements of that cause of action, extreme and outrageous conduct, was not established by the plaintiff's allegations in her complaint. The court granted the motion as to negligent infliction of emotional distress because the first amendment precludes the court from involvement or excessive entanglement in the religious tenets of Jehovah's Witnesses.

The plaintiff filed her original complaint in three counts on March 25, 1998, including a third count of breach of contract. That complaint alleged acts and omissions occurring from early 1976 to 1995. A subsequent revised compliant contained the same three counts, but made additional factual allegations including allegations of events occurring through her disfellowship in March, 1996, and even more specific references to teachings and scriptures of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The plaintiff next filed an amended complaint on August 2, 1999. It contained essentially the same factual allegations as the prior complaints, but added an additional fourth count of breach of fiduciary duty.

On October 12, 1999, in accordance with Practice Book § 10-39 et seq., the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint because the applicable statute of limitations had expired as to each count and because the causes of action were barred by the first amendment. The court, in a memorandum of decision dated March 21, 2000, granted the defendants' motion on statute of limitations grounds as to counts one, two and four, and on first amendment grounds as to count three.

Subsequently, on April 5, 2000, the plaintiff, pro se, filed another amended complaint. The defendant filed an objection to that complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to file a substitute complaint within the prescribed time and also filed a motion for judgment because the amended complaint did not overcome the deficiencies of the previous revised complaint. The court sustained the defendants' objection to the amended complaint and gave the plaintiff fifteen days to file a substitute pleading. The court denied the defendants' motion for judgment.

On June 2, 2000, the plaintiff filed a substitute complaint. The complaint alleged the same four counts and contained similar allegations as were stated in the August, 1999 complaint, as well as more detailed allegations regarding the events leading to her disfellowship in April, 1996.

On July 7, 2000, the defendants filed a motion to strike, arguing that counts one, two and four were barred by the statute of limitations, counts one, three and four failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that the entire complaint was barred by the first amendment. The court, in its October 16, 2000 decision, did not address the statute of limitations issue on the motion to strike because the plaintiff had alleged additional dates in her substitute complaint and the parties no longer agreed that the relevant dates were accurate. See Forbes v. Ballaro, 31 Conn. App. 235, 239, 624 A.2d 389 (1993) (motion to strike raising statute of limitations defense improper when parties do not agree complaint sets forth all pertinent facts). The court, therefore, addressed the merits of the motion to strike and granted it as to the third and fourth counts. The third count was stricken on first amendment grounds, and the fourth count was stricken because the court concluded that the complaint did not establish facts sufficient to show that a fiduciary relationship existed. The court did not strike the first and second counts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Thereafter, on November 13, 2000, the plaintiff filed a second substitute complaint. The complaint contained essentially the same allegations as appeared in the previous complaint of June, 2000, but alleged only intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as the other two counts had been stricken. It is the complaint that is the subject of this appeal.

The defendants filed their answers and special defenses to that complaint. As special defenses, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the applicable statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claims, the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, the first amendment barred the claims, and the alleged conduct was not extreme and outrageous. The defendants, in their answer and in their special defense of the statute of limitations, stated that the time frame of the plaintiff's allegations encompassed October, 1975, to November, 1994, the length of her marriage. The court, in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, which is the subject of this appeal, concluded that as a matter of law, the individual defendants' alleged conduct was not extreme and outrageous and, therefore, did not support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also concluded that the first amendment barred the litigation of the plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress count.

"The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . .

"The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence.... If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof. . . . When a party files a motion for summary judgment and there [are] no...

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