Turner v. Fransen

• Decision Date: 13 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0055.,12–0055.
• Parties: Kaydon M. TURNER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Bobbi Ann FRANSEN, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

829 N.W.2d 190

Kaydon M. TURNER, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Bobbi Ann FRANSEN, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–0055.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Feb. 13, 2013.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, David H. Sivright Jr., Judge.

The plaintiff appeals a district court ruling denying her motion for new trial following a jury verdict in favor of the defendant in a personal injury action. AFFIRMED.

Joseph C. Creen of Bush, Motto, Creen, Koury & Halligan, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellant.

Heather L. Carlson and Patrick L. Woodward of McDonald, Woodward & Carlson, P.C., Davenport, for appellee.

Heard by VOGEL, P.J., and POTTERFIELD and DOYLE, JJ.

DOYLE, J.

Following a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Bobbi Ann Fransen, in a personal injury action arising out of a car accident, the plaintiff, Kaydon Turner, sought a new trial based in part on claimed juror misconduct. She asserted that one juror impermissibly informed the other jurors about her experience with the type of vehicle driven by Fransen, thereby influencing the jury's finding of no fault. The district court rejected this argument, as do we.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Just before noon on April 16, 2007, Bobbi Fransen was driving her Jeep Cherokee home from class at a community college. She was traveling in the northbound lane on Highway 67. Kaydon Turner was behind her in a Dodge Neon. Turner said that as the Cherokee approached an intersection with a flashing yellow light, it signaled a right turn and moved into the right turn lane. Turner continued traveling straight ahead in her lane. All of a sudden, according to Turner, instead of turning right, the Cherokee turned left in front of her. Turner's much smaller vehicle went underneath Fransen's, flipping the higher profile Cherokee on its side.

Fransen's account of the accident was different. She said that as she approached the intersection, she slowed down and signaled a left turn towards her home. As she was turning, she was struck from behind by Turner's vehicle. Fransen denied signaling a right turn or moving into the right turn lane, stating she would have had no reason to do so because her home lay in the opposite direction.

The police officer that investigated the crash determined it occurred as Turner described based on the damage to the vehicles and their resting places on the road after the accident and his conversation with Turner at the scene. He did not speak with Fransen. Turner sued Fransen for the injuries she claimed to have sustained in the accident.

At the jury trial, Turner presented the testimony of an accident reconstructionist, whose opinion was aligned with the officer that investigated the accident. This expert explained the damage to the Neon, which was limited to the right front of the car, suggested it was “not a true rear-end collision.” He stated that had it been “a straight-on rear collision, you would expect the front end to be collapsed all the way across.” He also found it significant that the damage to the Cherokee was confined to its undercarriage with no damage to the rear bumper.

Despite the expert testimony in Turner's favor, the jury returned a verdict finding Fransen was not at fault in the accident. Turner filed a motion for new trial, alleging that after the trial she learned a juror had told the others that the juror's son “had a Jeep Cherokee with a lift and that it was dangerous and unstable.” Turner believed this information had adversely influenced the jury, who heard testimony from Fransen that her Cherokee had been similarly equipped with a suspension lift kit. Turner additionally claimed the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence and the district court erred in not giving a requested jury instruction. The court rejected all of these grounds for relief.

Turner appeals.

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed based on the grounds asserted in the motion. See Fry v. Blauvelt, 818 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Iowa 2012). The claims of juror misconduct and instructional error present discretionary grounds for relief and are accordingly reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Giltner v. Stark, 219 N.W.2d 700, 710 (Iowa 1974) (juror misconduct); Schmitt v. Koehring Cranes, Inc., 798 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa Ct.App.2011) (refusal to give a requested instruction). The sufficiency of the evidence, on the other hand, presents a legal question. Fry, 818 N.W.2d at 128. We therefore review this ground for the correction of errors at law. Id.

III. Discussion.A. Juror Misconduct.

We begin our analysis with the meat of Turner's appeal—her claim of juror misconduct. In an affidavit attached to Turner's new trial motion, the forewoman of the jury claimed as follows:

During the jury discussion, one of the jurors reported that she knew about Jeep Cherokees like Mrs. Fransen's because a member of her family, her son, had a Jeep Cherokee that had a lift on it, and that it was unstable and could roll over. Her son would not allow his girlfriend to ride in it because it was danger[ous] and could roll over.

Turner claims the information provided by the juror was “extraneous prejudicial information” entitling her to a new trial. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(2). We disagree, though our courts' cases on this point are not in complete accord.¹

The parameters of an inquiry into claims of juror misconduct are set forth in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.606(b):

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.

(Emphasis added.) From this rule, our courts have developed the following three-part test that must be established by the complaining party:

(1) evidence from the juror must consist only of objective facts concerning what actually occurred in or out of the jury room bearing on misconduct; (2) the acts or statements complained of must exceed tolerable bounds of jury deliberations; and (3) it must appear the misconduct was calculated to, and with reasonable probability did, influence the verdict.

Ray v. Paul, 563 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Iowa Ct.App.1997); see also State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Iowa 1989).

What constitutes “extraneous prejudicial information” within the meaning of rule 5.606(b) has never been discussed at length by our courts, though the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that jurors “undoubtedly discuss a variety of subjects in considering cases.” State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 771 (Iowa 1975). “It is a fact that jurors will bring with them to deliberations their life experiences. Indeed, how jurors perceive the evidence and judge the credibility thereof will be indubitably shaded by such experiences.” Lopez v. Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc., 417 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1073 (N.D.Iowa 2006). Jurors are “ ‘not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observation and experience of the affairs of life, but may give effect to such inferences as common knowledge or their personal observation and experience may reasonably draw from the facts directly proved.’ “ State v. Stevens, 719 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted).

“Discussion and deliberation in the jury room would be idle form if jurors were bound to refrain from illustrating or emphasizing their views by reference to any matter or thing which they have found to be true or false in their individual experience, and if verdicts were to be held vitiated thereby the jury system would better be abandoned altogether.”

Houston, 209 N.W.2d at 45 (citation omitted).

“The fact that unforeseen evidence falls within the expertise of a juror does not render it extraneous.” State v. Heitkemper, 538 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis.Ct.App.1995); see also Marquez v. City of Alburquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.2005) (“A juror's personal experience ... does not constitute ‘extraneous prejudicial information.’ ”). Indeed, as a federal court has acknowledged, “Evaluation of credibility necessarily relies on experience.” Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir.2004) (noting a study that found fifty percent of the jurors' time is spent discussing personal experiences). “One great advantage of jurors over judges is their diversity of experiences.” Id.

Ideally, at least someone on a jury of twelve will be able to contribute to the rest of the jury some useful understanding about whatever evidence comes up. It is probably impossible for a person who has highly relevant experience to evaluate the credibility of witnesses without that experience bearing on the evaluation. Were we to require the impossible and prohibit jurors from relying on relevant, past personal experience, about all we would accomplish would be to induce jurors to lie about it when questioned afterward, unless we limited jury participation to the most unworldly and ignorant individuals.

Id. at 880; see also United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir.1970) (“All must recognize, of course, that a complete sanitizing of the jury room is impossible.”).

That is not to say, however, “that all juror experience is proper grist for the deliberative mill.” Grotemeyer, 393 F.3d at 880. For example, a juror may not bring into the jury room evidence developed outside the witness stand, such as the results of a juror's experiment conducted while the jury was on a weekend recess, legal research performed during the trial, or knowledge gained outside of court that the defendant has previously been convicted of...