Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 214

• Decision Date: 18 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3138,86-3138
• Citation: 829 F.2d 1424
• Parties: 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2462, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,110 CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 214, a voluntary association and Ellis Johnson, individually and as General Chairman, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1424

829 F.2d 1424

126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2462, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,110

CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 214, a voluntary association and Ellis Johnson, individually and as General Chairman, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 86-3138.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 21, 1987.

Decided Sept. 18, 1987.

Michael S. Wolly, Mulholland & Hickey, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellants.

Stuart F. Gassner, Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Local 214 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and its General Chairman, Ellis Johnson ("the Union") appeal from an order of the district court that enjoined them from striking against the Chicago and North Western Transportation Company ("CNW") and denied their cross-motion for injunctive relief. The order was initially issued as a preliminary injunction, but was subsequently made permanent by the district court. The appeal turns on whether the dispute between the Union and CNW is "minor" or "major" for purposes of sections 2, 3 Second and 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Secs. 152, 153 Second and 156. We conclude that the district court correctly determined that the dispute is a minor one. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers is the exclusive bargaining agent for all electricians employed by CNW in its railroad operations. The parties operate under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement that, although frequently amended, has been in force since its initial adoption in 1921. This contract comprehensively defines the duties, rules, rates of pay and working conditions of all CNW electricians. The contract contemplates two methods under which electricians may be paid: hourly and monthly. "Hourly" employees are paid a specified rate per hour from the time they leave their home station to the time they return to that station; they are also paid overtime for work in excess of eight hours per day. "Monthly" employees are paid a set sum based on a specified average number of work hours each month. They must be "on duty" 24 hours per day, six days a week and are frequently required to travel overnight; they receive no overtime pay except for work done on Sundays. ¹

Many of the electricians employed by CNW and represented by the Union are linemen engaged in the maintenance and repair of the signal system that serves CNW's rail operations. Most are classified as "linemen-electricians," and are paid on a monthly basis. Nevertheless, the contract does include a provision for linemen to be paid on an hourly basis and assigned to a specific station and accompanying area. ²

In 1976, CNW and the Union began a series of discussions concerning changes in the pay and job classifications of electricians. These discussions were conducted pursuant to section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 156, which concerns proposals for modification of the terms of a contract itself. In 1984, CNW proposed conversion of all linemen-electrician positions to hourly-rate positions. After mediation was instituted, the Union agreed in principle to the conversion of positions. However, no agreement was reached because the two sides could not agree on the length of time necessary for phasing in the change to the hourly rate. Throughout these negotiations, CNW asserted that it could make the conversion to the hourly rate unilaterally without violating the contract, a position that the Union characterizes as a "threat" made in the context of negotiations. In December 1985, the contract was amended and renewed by the parties with no change in the pay rates or job classifications applicable to electricians.

In May 1986, a monthly-rated lineman-electrician posted at DeKalb, Illinois resigned his position. Rather than reposting the same position (or eliminating it entirely), CNW posted a new position for an hourly-rated station-lineman. The former lineman-electrician position was abolished. When the Union protested, CNW reiterated its position that it could shift positions within the contract. Ultimately, the Union threatened to strike, and CNW filed this action to obtain an anti-strike injunction. The Union filed a cross-motion for injunctive relief, in which it asked the district court to order CNW to reinstate the monthly-rated position.

The district court granted CNW's motion for a preliminary injunction against the threatened strike. The court held that the dispute between CNW and the Union involved the application of the collective bargaining agreement, not its creation or modification; thus it was a minor dispute subject to arbitration. The Union's cross-motion was denied. After an additional hearing, the injunction was made permanent.

II

The sole issue on appeal is whether the dispute between the Union and CNW over CNW's ability to replace unilaterally a monthly-rated lineman's position with an hourly-rated one is a "major" or "minor" dispute, as those terms are employed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Secs. 151-163.

A. The Major-Minor Distinction

Whether a dispute is major or minor depends on the relationship of the dispute to the collective bargaining agreement. A minor dispute is a dispute over interpretation of an existing contract; a major dispute is an attempt to create a contract or change the terms of a contract. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 768 F.2d 914, 920 (7th Cir.1985). The classic formulation of this major/minor distinction is set forth in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289-90, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1944):

The first ["major"] relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past.

The second class ["minor"], however, contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event the claim is founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal injuries. In either case, the claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future.

The consequences of characterizing a dispute as major or minor are of great significance because the dispute resolution procedures set forth in the RLA for each are very different. Justice Harlan set forth the major dispute procedures and the accompanying "status quo requirement" in Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 1115, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969):

The act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. Sec. 6. The parties must confer, Sec. 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. Sec. 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. Secs. 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens "substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President," who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. Sec. 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. Secs. 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.

If all these efforts fail, the union may strike. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 42 n. 24, 77 S.Ct. 635, 641 n. 24, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957); Missouri P.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 782 F.2d 107, 110-11 (8th Cir.1986). Minor disputes, by contrast, must be referred to binding arbitration under the auspices of the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB"), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 Second, and may not be the subject of strikes. The federal courts may act to protect the jurisdiction of the NRAB by enjoining strikes over minor disputes. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. at 41-42, 77 S.Ct. at 640-41; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 734 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir.1984).

The foregoing description of the differences between major and minor dispute resolution procedures under the RLA emphasizes the limited authority of the federal courts under the Act. The authority of the district court is limited to protecting the jurisdiction of the NRAB, the exclusive arbiter of minor disputes. Therefore, the federal court does not inquire into the merits of the underlying dispute except to the extent necessary to determine whether that dispute may be properly characterized as one involving the meaning of the contract provision. If, after referring to the existing collective bargaining agreement, the district court concludes that there is substance to the railroad's claim that it is acting within the terms of...