Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.

Decision Date16 October 1897
Docket Number337.
Citation83 F. 249
PartiesFARMERS LOAN & TRUST CO. v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. IN re HOLLY et al.
CourtUnited States Circuit Court, District of Washington, Northern Division

Frank H. Graves, for petitioners.

C. W Bunn and W. A. Underwood, for Northern Pac. Ry. Co.

M. D Grover, for Great Northern Ry. Co.

HANFORD District Judge.

This is a proceeding instituted by the merchants and shippers of the city of Spokane, under section 16 of the interstate commerce law, as amended by the act of March 2, 1889 (1 Supp.Rev.St (2 Ed.)p. 688), to enforce the decision and order of the interstate commerce commission in the case of Merchants Union v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 5 Interst.Commerce Com.R. 478-513.

Spokane is one of the most ambitious and promising of the interior cities of the Northwest. It has many natural and acquired advantages as a site for a great manufacturing and commercial city, but it is situated 400 miles from the seaboard, and is wholly dependent upon railroads as carriers of its commerce. The merchants and business men of Spokane, being discontented because the transcontinental railroads were exacting a higher rate for through freight from Eastern terminals to Spokane than they were receiving for through freight from the East delivered at Portland and terminal points on Puget Sound, organized the Merchants' Union, and, by that name, prosecuted a complaint before the interstate commerce commission against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and the Union Pacific Railway Company, which was then operating connecting lines of railway, under the general name of the Union Pacific System, extending from Omaha to Portland, in the state of Oregon, and with branches reaching to Spokane, which proceeding resulted in the decision and order above referred to, which order is as follows:

(1) The defendants herein, by reason of the competition at their Pacific terminals of carriers not subject to the act to regulate commerce, may make commodity rates on competitive traffic to those terminals which are less than their rates on like traffic to Spokane; but such commodity rates must not be lower than are necessary from time to time to meet such competition, nor allowed in any case on articles not actually subject thereto. (2) In the matter of car-load rates, mixed car-load lots ar car-load rates, minimum weight of shipments entitled to car-load rates, and in all other respects, the defendants, and each of them, will furnish, provide, and allow the same privileges, facilities, and advantages on shipments to Spokane as are or may be at nay time furnished, provided, or allowed on like shipments to Portland or other Pacific terminals. (3) On or before the 1st day of January, 1893, the defendants in this case, and each of them, will prepare, publish, and put in effect, tariff rates on all classified traffic from their Eastern terminals to Spokane, which shall be approximately eighteen per cent. less than the tariffs now in force at that point, and shall not materially exceed eighty-two per cent. of the class rates now applied both to Spokane and the Pacific terminals; and thereafter the defendants will not, nor will either of them, charge, collect, or receive for transportation from their Eastern terminals to Spokane a greater sum or amount than the rates fixed and prescribed by such reduced tariffs. The following named rates on each of the ten classes, respectively, shall be deemed a compliance with this requirement, viz.: Class 1, $2.90; 2, $2.46; 3, $2.05; 4, $1.64; 5, $1.44; A, $1.44; B, $1.28; C, $1.02; D, $0.90; E, $0.74. In case of any reduction in class rates to Pacific terminals, a further and corresponding reduction will be made on like shipments to Spokane, except as provided in the foregoing opinion. This order will apply not only to rates from St. Paul and other Eastern terminals of the defendants, but is intended to include directions for a corresponding reduction in the grouped rates from points east of St. Paul so far as they are applied to Spokane traffic. As the railroads which join with the defendants in making these rates have not been made parties to this proceeding, the case will be reopened, if necessary, for the purpose of bringing them in, to the end that all carriers affected may be bound by this order unless cause be shown for a different ruling.

In the year 1894, while the Northern Pacific Railroad was in the hands of receivers, the petitioners filed their petition herein, in which they complained that the receivers, in the operation of said railroad were discriminating against Spokane in the matter of freight rates, in utter disregard of said order. Thereupon the court required the receivers to answer said petition, and, after the issues had been made up, an order was entered appointing Mr. L. S. B. Sawyer, of San Francisco, master in chancery pro hac vice, and the case was referred to him to take the evidence, and make a full report covering the facts and law of the case. The Northern Pacific Railway Company has been substituted as respondent in place of the receivers, said company having acquired the property of Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and become the successor of the receivers in the operation thereof, by purchase at the sale under a decree, foreclosing mortgages thereon. It the foreclosure decree it was expressly provided that the purchaser at the sale should take the property and business, subject to the rights of the petitioners in this proceeding, and should be bound by the decree of this court, upon the final determination of the issues involved herein, in the same manner and to the same extent as the receivers would be bound if such decree had been entered while the railroad remained in their control. The Great Northern Railway Company is operating a line from St. Paul, through Spokane to Seattle; and, as the business of that company must necessarily be affected by the decision of this case, it has been permitted to introduce evidence and to be heard in the argument. Testimony and documentary evidence has been taken by said master, at the cities of Spokane, Seattle, and Tacoma, in the state of Washington, and in Portland, in the state of Oregon, and in San Francisco, Cal., and in St. Paul, Minn.; and said master has made a full and exhaustive report, setting forth the facts and his conclusions from the evidence taken, and his opinion upon the questions of law involved in the controversy. To this report, the petitioners have filed exceptions, and the case has been argued and submitted upon the questions raised by said exceptions.

For a clear and complete presentation of the several propositions advanced by the litigants, and of the merits of the case, I find it most convenient to copy the larger portion of the master's report, which is as follows:

'The petition in this case is the beginning of an independent suit or proceeding, in which the finding of fact in the commission's report is made prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated; and although, under said act, 'formal pleadings' may be dispensed with, the court must hear and determine the cause 'upon proper pleadings and proofs.' The court will not grant any relief not prayed or not within the issues. This is a sui generis proceeding, but the fundamental rules of pleading and practice which govern all proceedings in any court apply to it. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 37 F. 567-614; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 49 F. 177; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 50 F. 295; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 56 F. 925 (affirmed in 162 U.S. 184, 16 Sup.Ct. 700); Shinkle, Wilson & Kreis Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 62 F. 690, 693; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co., 64 F. 981, 983; and other cases, last, but not least, Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184, 16 Sup.Ct. 700; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 197, 16 Sup.Ct. 666,-- the last two cases being called respectively the 'Social Circle Case' and the 'Import Rate Case.'

Before examining the pleadings and proofs in this case, let us consider some preliminary points and objections made by respondents. They contend: '(1) That the statute giving the commission, or any company or persons interested, the right to bring a proceeding to enforce an order of the commission, and customarily, as the cases reported in the courts show, the commission having brought a proceeding in its own name to enforce its own orders, the fact that it has not done so in this case raises a presumption that the commission itself does not consider that its order is being violated. ' Counsel do not press this point, but we think it worth mentioning. * * * It will be observed by reference to the act that the resort to this court is in the case of the violation of or neglect or refusal to obey or perform a lawful order or requirement of the commission.

Respondents contend: '(2) That the so-called 'order of the commission,' above recited, especially in its first paragraph, is no order at all, within the meaning of the law capable of enforcement, but only a rule or principle of law, expressly leaving it open for further investigation before the commission to determine what merchandise and what tariffs might fall from time to time within the rule or outside of it. ' Without any authority on the subject, it would seem that an order that was to be obeyed or enforced should be definite, complete, and perfect, and easily understood. Says the supreme court: 'If the commission, instead of confining its action to redressing, on complaint made by some particular person, firm, corporation, or locality, some specific...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • South Cent. Bell Telephone Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Com'n, 83-3494
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 11 Octubre 1984
    ...orders that specifically command certain individuals to take particular actions may be enforced, see, e.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 83 F. 249 (D.Wash.1897), other courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have enforced rules and regulations under the statutory provision. ......
  • New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. PUB. UTIL. COM'N
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • 15 Junio 1983
    ...an "express command of the ICC" and therefore did not give rise to an action under section 16(12). And in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 83 F. 249 (D.Wash.1897), the Court held that "a mere general declaration of the duty of the defendant corporations, as defined in the......
  • United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
    • 4 Diciembre 1905
    ... ... Anti-Trust Law' are separate and independent acts, not ... germane in ... & P.R.R ... Co. (C.C.) 82 F. 192, 196; Farmers' Loan & Trust ... Company v. Northern Pacific Railway ... ...
  • United States v. Roberts & Oake
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 9 Noviembre 1932
    ...by injunction. 38 Stat. 738; Southern Pacific Co. v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. (C. C. A.) 101 F. 779, 785; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (C. C.) 83 F. 249, 268. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by agreement for the purposes of a test case as to matters concerning whi......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT