Does 1-5 v. Chandler
| Decision Date | 17 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-17245,95-17245 |
| Parties | , 5 A.D. Cases 849, 15 A.D.D. 640, 8 NDLR P 78, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3466 John DOES 1-5, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Susan M. CHANDLER, Ph.D., Director of the Department of Human Services, a duly organized and recognized agency of the State of Hawaii; Patricia Murakami, Acting Administrator, Family & Adult Services Division, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Stanley E. Levin, Honolulu, Hawaii and Michael K. Livingston, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiffs-appellants.
G. Cher Foerster, Office of the Attorney General, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii; Helen Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV 95-498-HG.
Before BROWNING and NOONAN, Circuit Judges, and MERHIGE, Senior District Judge. *
This case arises out of a class action lawsuit brought by Appellants, John Does 1-5 and Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. Appellees are Susan M. Chandler, Director of the Hawaii Department of Human Services, and Patricia Murakami, Acting Administrator, Family and Adult Services Division.
HRS § 346-71 is the principal statutory mandate for Hawaii's General Assistance ("GA") Program. HRS § 346-71 was amended in 1995 by Act 166 of the Hawaii legislature. Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii on June 21, 1995, alleging that Act 166 violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130, as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
Appellants appeal the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of Act 166.
Prior to 1995, HRS § 346-71, Hawaii's applicable GA statute, provided GA benefits to those persons with dependent children, able-bodied persons at least 55 years of age, and disabled persons who were unable to provide sufficient support for themselves and who were not otherwise provided for under Hawaii law or eligible for federal assistance. In 1995, the Hawaii legislature passed Act 166 amending HRS § 346-71. Act 166 has the effect of eliminating GA as an entitlement and eliminating benefits for certain persons who had previously received them.
Act 166 eliminated benefits to those able-bodied persons who had been entitled to GA because they were at least 55 years old. Act 166 also limited the receipt of benefits to those who had been entitled to GA by reason of their disability to no more than one year. 1 Thus, after Act 166 the Hawaii GA program provides durationally unlimited benefits to persons with dependent children who are unable to provide sufficient support for themselves and who are not otherwise provided for under Hawaii law or eligible for federal assistance and benefits of up to a duration of one year to disabled persons unable to provide sufficient support for themselves and who are not otherwise provided for under Hawaii law or eligible for federal assistance.
The amendments to HRS § 346-71 contained in Act 166 became effective on July 1, 1995. Thus, if Act 166 is not found to violate federal law, persons who receive GA by reason of their disabilities will begin to be terminated from the program when their eligibility elapses a year from that date.
Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii on June 21, 1995, alleging that Act 166 violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130, as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. The Appellees have stipulated and the district court ordered that the Appellants-plaintiff class consists of "[a]ll persons who are, have been, or will be identified as "disabled" under Chapter 346 and its implementing regulations and who will be adversely affected by the implementation of Act 166." Shortly after filing suit, Appellants brought a motion for a preliminary injunction in the district court, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of HRS § 346-71, as amended. The district court denied this motion on November 13, 1995, determining that Appellants had failed to raise a "serious question" as to the validity of HRS 346-71, as amended.
A district court's order regarding preliminary injunctive relief is subject to limited review. The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction will be reversed only where the district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. Miller v. California Pacific Medical Center, 19 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.1994)(en banc).
A trial court's decision to deny injunctive relief should be upheld unless the court incorrectly applied the law, relied on clearly erroneous factual findings, or otherwise abused its discretion. Contract Services Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d 294, 297 (9th Cir.1995). Although district courts have wide discretion in issuing preliminary injunctions, "where the district court is alleged to have relied on erroneous legal premises, review is plenary." Miller, 19 F.3d at 455. Thus, issues of law underlying the decision are reviewed de novo. Id.
Title II of the ADA provides that "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Title II of the ADA is expressly modeled after Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b). Title II of the ADA incorporates the "nondiscrimination principles" of Section 504 and extends them to state and local government without regard to the receipt of federal financial assistance. Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 300-301 (3rd Cir.1994), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied; Vaughn v. Sullivan, 906 F.Supp. 466, 473, n. 11 (S.D.Ind.1995). There is very little case law interpreting Title II of the ADA. However, cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act are instructive in interpreting Title II of the ADA. See Easley, 36 F.3d at 300-302.
Title II's definition of "public entity" includes "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). DHS, as an agency of the State of Hawaii, is a "public entity." A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
Congress has explicitly authorized the Attorney General to promulgate regulations under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a). Thus, these regulations must be given "legislative and hence controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to the statute." See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2776, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984). The regulations state, in pertinent part:
(a) No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.
(b)(1) A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit or service, may not, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of a disability--
(i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service;
(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service that is not equal to that afforded others;
(iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided others;
(iv) Provide different or separate aids, benefits, or services to individuals with disabilities or to any class of individuals with disabilities than is provided to others unless such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to others;
...
(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service.
....
(3) A public entity may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration:
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(ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity's program with respect to individuals with disabilities;
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(8) A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program or activity being offered.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130.
The district court determined that in Act 166 "the...
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