Riddle v. Mondragon

• Decision Date: 29 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-2225,93-2225
• Citation: 83 F.3d 1197
• Parties: James RIDDLE, Lee Siemon, Bobby Trujillo, Jerry Walker, Gerald Sostrich, Ernie E. Delgado, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Juan Trevino, Kevin Yates, Adan Acosta, James W. Cotton, Clint Cook, Cory D. Luman, Vernard Miles, Francisco Juarez, Jody Morales, Michael Duran, Andrew Sisneros, Andre Boyer, Gilbert Garcia, Leland Furbush, Joe Franco, Plaintiffs, v. Eloy MONDRAGON, Secretary New Mexico Department of Corrections; Bruce King, Governor of the State of New Mexico; Tom Udall, Attorney General, New Mexico; Donald A. Dorsey, Warden, Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1197

83 F.3d 1197

James RIDDLE, Lee Siemon, Bobby Trujillo, Jerry Walker Gerald Sostrich, Ernie E. Delgado, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Juan Trevino, Kevin Yates, Adan Acosta, James W. Cotton Clint Cook, Cory D. Luman, Vernard Miles, Francisco Juarez Jody Morales, Michael Duran, Andrew Sisneros, Andre Boyer, Gilbert Garcia, Leland Furbush, Joe Franco, Plaintiffs, v. Eloy MONDRAGON, Secretary New Mexico Department of Corrections; Bruce King, Governor of the State of New Mexico; Tom Udall, Attorney General, New Mexico; Donald A. Dorsey, Warden, Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-2225.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 29, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. Nos. CIV-92-1363-HB, CIV-92-1405-HB, CIV-92-1411-HB, CIV-92-1429-HB, CIV-92-1432-HB, CIV-93-414-HB).

Paul J. Kennedy, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. ^*

Nick D'Angelo, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Garnett R. Burks, Jr., Las Cruces, New Mexico (Melinda L. Wolinsky, Deputy General Counsel, for New Mexico Corrections Department, Santa Fe, New Mexico, with them on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EBEL and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge. ^**

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants, who are convicted sex offenders and inmates in the Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility at Las Cruces, New Mexico, appeal the district court's dismissal of their civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and based on alleged Eighth Amendment, due process, and equal protection violations. We affirm.

I

Twenty-one plaintiffs filed virtually identical complaints alleging civil rights violations by state prison officials, judges, legislators, and other state officials. The district court consolidated all the actions and, thereafter, plaintiffs proceeded jointly. In addition to their complaints, plaintiffs filed a document styled as a brief in support of their civil rights claims. Plaintiffs also sought leave to file additional exhibits in support of their claims. The district court permitted these papers to be filed, but in its dispositive order found that the papers would not "facilitate the disposition of this action" and concluded that they would be excluded from consideration as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 2, 1993, disposed of all the plaintiffs' claims, but only six of the twenty-one plaintiffs have appealed the dismissal. After pro se briefs had been received, we appointed counsel to represent the plaintiffs/appellants, ordered supplemental briefing, and heard oral argument.

In their respective complaints plaintiffs essentially alleged two sorts of Eighth Amendment claims. First, they averred that each of them as convicted sex offenders have been denied adequate treatment for their mental disorders related to their "addictive sexuality." E.g., I R., Tab 1, at 3. Second, plaintiffs alleged that defendant prison officials have failed to protect them from assault by fellow inmates. Plaintiffs' due process claims were based on various state statutes which, they contended, created a protected liberty interest in mental health treatment and rehabilitation. Finally, plaintiffs charged that both the legislative scheme pursuant to which they were sentenced and the policies of the department of corrections violated their equal protection rights. Plaintiffs sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief.

The district court concluded that plaintiffs' claims for damages against state legislators and judges were legally frivolous, and therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). To the extent plaintiffs sought relief against defendants in their official capacities, the district judge determined the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The judge also held that plaintiffs' claims against the state judges for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot; these claims, the judge found, alleged that excessive sentences had been imposed, but under New Mexico law the sentencing judges had jurisdiction to modify the sentences only within a ninety day period after sentencing, which time had obviously elapsed. Finally, the court dismissed the remainder of plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's dismissal of their claims for damages against the state judges and legislators, or their damage claims against the remaining defendants in their official capacities. Therefore, on appeal, we are concerned primarily with the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 877 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir.1989). A district court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.1991) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). "A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109. If the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court should construe his pleadings liberally and hold the pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. at 1110. However,

[t]he broad reading of the plaintiff's complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based. Not every fact must be described in specific detail, ... and the plaintiff whose factual allegations are close to stating a claim but are missing some important element that may not have occurred to him, should be allowed to amend his complaint, .... Nevertheless, conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based ....

Id. at 1110 (citations omitted).

II

We begin our examination with plaintiffs' claims that they are being denied necessary medical care in violation of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is unclear whether plaintiffs invoked the Fourteenth Amendment because the Eighth Amendment applies to the states only through the Fourteenth Amendment or because they were attempting to allege violation of substantive due process rights. However, we have previously noted that where constitutional protection is afforded under specific constitutional provisions, alleged violations of the protection should be analyzed under those provisions and not under the more generalized provisions of substantive due process. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493 (10th Cir.1990) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870-71, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). Accordingly, we will review plaintiffs' claims under the Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

The states have a constitutional duty to provide necessary medical care to their inmates, including psychological or psychiatric care. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). When prison officials are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs, they violate the inmate's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). "A medical need is serious if it is 'one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.' " Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H.1977)); see also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1992) ("The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a 'serious' need for medical treatment."). The Fourth Circuit has held that a prisoner

is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial.

Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1977).

In their complaints, plaintiffs alleged that they each have a serious mental disorder--that they are "driven by sexually compulsive drives that are deviant." I R., Tab. 1, at 3. They further alleged that they have requested and have been denied treatment for their disorder. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants Dorsey and Mondragon do not recognize that sex offenders suffer from mental illness and refuse to comply with plaintiffs' repeated requests for treatment. Each plaintiff alleged that the available mental health treatment at the prison is inadequate to address his specific disorder and that the lack of treatment has caused him to suffer mental anguish. Specifically, each plaintiff alleged that his "addictive sexuality erodes his self-esteem to [the] point of apathy, reinforces fear and feelings of differentness, leading to apathy, and keeps him in the ...