Shafii v. British Airways, PLC

• Decision Date: 08 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1288,D,1288
• Citation: 83 F.3d 566
• Parties: 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2263, 131 Lab.Cas. P 11,578 Seyed N. SHAFII, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 95-7816.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 566

83 F.3d 566

152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2263, 131 Lab.Cas. P 11,578

Seyed N. SHAFII, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1288, Docket 95-7816.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Submitted April 3, 1996.

Decided May 8, 1996.

Seyed N. Shafii, Rio Rancho, NM, pro se.

Harry N. Turk, New York City, for defendant-appellee.

Before: WINTER, JACOBS and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge:

This dispute requires us to consider whether the state claims brought by an employee against his former employer can be resolved without reference to the language of a collective bargaining agreement. If they can, they belong in state court despite the general preemptive effect of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151-188. We hold that the claims raised in this action are not preempted by the RLA, and that they should be remanded to the state court.

Background

The facts are essentially undisputed. In December 1988, while employed by British Airways as a reservations sales agent in New York, Seyed N. Shafii brought a criminal harassment claim against his supervisor, Jean Hendry. British Airways and Shafii submitted the dispute to mediation, which resulted in an agreement providing that: a) Shafii would drop his claims against Hendry and British Airways in exchange for the airline's promise "not to pursue any claims arising out of the case," and b) the underlying dispute with Hendry would be resolved under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) governing Shafii's employment.

A few weeks after this agreement was reached, British Airways transferred Shafii to a different work area. A little later, at the end of January 1989, Shafii was suspended and then fired. As required by the CBA, Shafii filed a grievance challenging his termination. The grievance was submitted to an arbitrator, who upheld the dismissal.

In 1990, Shafii filed a complaint in federal court, challenging the arbitrator's decision. He claimed that one of his witnesses was not allowed to testify, that the arbitrator was biased, and that the arbitrator's findings of fact were not based on the evidence presented. In 1992, the district court denied Shafii's motion to amend his complaint to include claims for breach of the mediation agreement and for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Shafii v. British Airways, 799 F.Supp. 292 (E.D.N.Y.1992). Later, the district court granted summary judgment for British Airways.

Shafii appealed that decision to this Court. Because we found that the district court had wrongly treated certain of Shafii's evidence as inadmissible hearsay, we vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case. Shafii v. PLC British Airways, 22 F.3d 59 (2d Cir.1994). On remand, the district court once again granted summary judgment for British Airways, holding, as a matter of law, that Shafii had failed to prove any violations of his due process rights. Shafii v. British Airways, 872 F.Supp. 1178 (E.D.N.Y.1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 404 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1554, 134 L.Ed.2d 656 (1996).

While Shafii's case was pending in federal court, he filed a pro se complaint against British Airways in New York State Supreme Court, Queens County. In that complaint, he made three claims. First, he said that British Airways transferred and ultimately dismissed him in retaliation for his filing the criminal harassment charge against Hendry. Second, he asserted that British Airways' decision to fire him was a violation of the mediation agreement in which the airline had agreed not to "pursue any claims" related to the harassment charge. And finally, Shafii alleged that British Airways had slandered and defamed him, thereby preventing him from obtaining employment with another airline. He sought $3 million in damages.

After Shafii had begun this action in the state court, British Airways filed a notice of removal in the Eastern District of New York. Shafii immediately asked that the case be remanded to the state court. He also sought sanctions against British Airways pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. British Airways, in turn, moved to dismiss Shafii's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to enjoin Shafii from filing further suits against British Airways or its employees without leave of the court.

The district court denied Shafii's motion to remand the case. It determined that his contract claims were preempted by the RLA. It further held that the defamation claim was properly in federal court since 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) "authorizes removal of an entire case, and confers upon the courts discretion to decide otherwise non-removable issues and claims." Shafii v. British Airways, 895 F.Supp. 451, 457 (E.D.N.Y.1995). The court then granted British Airways's motion to dismiss, holding that the claims were "minor disputes" over which the Railroad Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction under the RLA. Id. It denied Shafii's request for sanctions because Shafii had failed to show that British Airways was litigating in bad faith and because the airline had asserted meritorious defenses. Id. at 459-60. Finally, in view of Shafii's "history of litigiousness and the repetitive nature of the actions he has commenced," the court entered an injunction forbidding Shafii from filing further claims against the airline or its employees without leave of the court. Id. at 458. Shafii appealed.

We conclude that Shafii's state law claims are not preempted by the RLA because they rest on rights independently available under state law that do not require interpretation of the CBA. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the case to the district court with instructions to return the matter to the state court. ¹ Because the only issue Shafii has raised in federal court, his motion for remand, is meritorious, we vacate the district court's injunction against him. But we affirm the court's holding that sanctions against British Airways are not warranted.

Discussion

Removal to Federal Court

A defendant in an action filed in state court may remove that claim to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), if the plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint" includes a federal cause of action. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). But in the context of the RLA, this rule is broadened. If the state claims put forward are in fact preempted by the RLA, the action may properly be removed to the federal courts, even when the plaintiff's complaint does not itself include a federal cause of action. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2247-49, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). The standard for determining when a state claim is preempted by the RLA is simply and clearly stated: "where the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2248.

The district court denied Shafii's motion to remand the case to the New York courts because it concluded that his state contract claims turned on an interpretation of the CBA. We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion to remand. See Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir.1995). Examining the claims raised in Shafii's complaint, we conclude that none of them in fact requires interpretation of the CBA, and that they are instead grounded on "rights and obligations that exist independent of the collective-bargaining agreement." Norris, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2247.

Shafii's first allegation is that he was transferred, and ultimately discharged, in retaliation for filing a harassment claim against his supervisor. In Norris, the Supreme Court faced a similar retaliatory discharge argument and found that the state law suit was not preempted by the RLA. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2248. Like the Court in Norris, we find that the elements of an action for retaliatory discharge--which primarily depend on a determination of the employer's motive for firing an employee--do not require an interpretation of the CBA.

Shafii's second contract-related claim is that British Airways fired him in violation of the mediation agreement that the parties had signed. That agreement provided that British Airways would not "pursue any claims" in connection with Shafii's harassment suit against his supervisor. We need not here address the question of whether British Airways's decision to dismiss Shafii is or is not forbidden by the mediation agreement. The only question before us is whether interpretation of the mediation agreement--which is analogous to an individual employment contract between Shafii and the airline--requires an interpretation of the CBA.

Arguing that it does, British Airways points out that the...