O'Connor v. Scarpino

• Citation: 638 N.E.2d 950,83 N.Y.2d 919,615 N.Y.S.2d 305
• Parties: , 638 N.E.2d 950 In the Matter of Michael O'CONNOR, Appellant, v. Anthony A. SCARPINO, Jr., as Judge of the Westchester County Court, Respondent. In the Matter of Belinda G. EDDY, Appellant, v. Patrick L. KIRK, as Judge of the Herkimer County Court, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 09 June 1994
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 305

615 N.Y.S.2d 305

83 N.Y.2d 919, 638 N.E.2d 950

In the Matter of Michael O'CONNOR, Appellant, v. Anthony A. SCARPINO, Jr., as Judge of the Westchester County

Court, Respondent.

In the Matter of Belinda G. EDDY, Appellant, v. Patrick L. KIRK, as Judge of the Herkimer County Court, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 9, 1994.

Jeffrey Chamberlain, Albany, for appellants.

G. Oliver Koppell, Atty. Gen., Albany (Wayne L. Benjamin, Jerry Boone and Peter H. Schiff, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The judgments of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Penal Law § 400.00 is the exclusive statutory mechanism for the licensing of firearms in New York State. Under subdivision (2)(f) of that section, a licensing officer is empowered to issue the so-called "carry license", which authorizes a licensee to have a pistol or revolver and carry it concealed, "when proper cause exists for the issuance thereof".

Petitioner Eddy sought a carry license from the Herkimer County licensing officer, stating in her application that she intended to use a pistol for "hunting and target shooting". The officer issued the license with the notation that it was "issued for hunting, fishing & target practice". Petitioner O'Connor sought a carry license from the Westchester County licensing officer, indicating that he wanted to use a weapon in "hunting, target shooting and protection of property and person". The officer issued the license with a notation that it was "restricted to target shooting, hunting only".

In each matter, petitioner argues that the restriction should be removed from the license because the statute does not expressly empower licensing officers to impose conditions. We agree with the courts below that the licensing officers' power to determine the existence of "proper cause" for the issuance of a license necessarily and inherently includes the power to restrict the use to the purposes that justified the issuance. Without such a power to condition, the licensing officer's authority to allow possession of a handgun only for proper cause would be rendered meaningless and the obvious regulatory purpose of the statute would be frustrated.

Moreover, petitioners' argument is inconsistent with the regulatory scheme of Penal Law § 400.00. The other licenses allowed by the statute are narrowly circumscribed to the circumstances justifying their issuance (see, e.g., subd. [2][a] [license to possess in...