Williams's Appeals

Decision Date07 May 1877
Citation83 Pa. 377
PartiesWilliams's Appeals.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ. WILLIAMS, J., absent

Appeals from the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1877, No. 51, 52.

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William C. Hannis, for appellant.—To use the language of Chief Justice AGNEW in Earp's Appeal, 25 P. F. Smith 119, "There are four things to be noticed in this will that clearly distinguish it from Yarnall's Appeal, 20 P. F. Smith 335, and Ogden's Appeal, Id. 501. The corpus of the estate is fully and distinctly invested in the trustees, and put under their control. The devise to Hannah Williams is only of the income. Her estate in the income is only for life. The principal of the estate is devised and bequeathed to those who are named in remainder. Here is plainly an active, operative trust."

In Dodson v. Ball, 10 P. F. Smith 492, Judge AGNEW again says, "The rule laid down is, that where an estate for life only is given, followed by a general power of appointment, and on failure to appoint, to children or to special heirs, the power to appoint will not enlarge the estate of the cestui que trust to a fee, and on a failure to appoint, the children or special donees in remainder take by purchase from the donor, and not by way of limitation as heirs of the cestui que trust:" Huber's Appeal, 30 P. F. Smith 348; Ash's Appeal, Id. 497; Phillips's Appeal, Id. 472.

It follows that Hannah W. Sterling has but an equitable estate for life; that the legal estate is in her trustees for her life, and after her death is in the persons designated as remaindermen by the will of her father. The life-tenant having but an equitable estate, and those in remainder a legal estate, the rule in Shelley's case has no applicability: Bacon's Appeal, 7 P. F. Smith 504.

In both of the wills in this case the provision in regard to coverture is precisely the same as that in Ashhurst's Appeal, 27 P. F. Smith 464, and the distinction which SHARSWOOD, J., draws between that and the other decided cases on this point will apply with the same force here.

N. H. Sharpless, for the appellee, submitted no paper-book and made no argument.

Chief Justice AGNEW delivered the opinion of the court, May 7th 1877.

It is to be regretted that these two trusts have been blended in the proceeding below. To this we must attribute the remarkable confusion, by the learned auditor and the court, of two trusts so different from each other in marked characteristics. It seems the report awaited the decision in Earp's Appeal, 25 P. F. Smith 119, but the learned auditor thought it afforded no guide; quoting that sentence in the opinion in which it is said the interpretation of the language of wills must vary with the intention of the testator, as "precluding the attempt to discern any such guide." The criticism has the merit of novelty, as it has always been supposed that the intention of a testator is the polar star to guide to the meaning of his language, and there is no procrustean rule on which words can be stretched to make them always fit certain legal results, whether so intended or not. Such a rule might suit city scriveners where wills follow given formulas, but never could be tolerated in those parts of the state where ignorant men draw wills, a class which far outnumbers the former. No greater outrage upon the rights of dying men could be committed than to defeat their just intentions by rules which make words and not the sense the guide of interpretation.

It is to be regretted that the learned court and auditor found no guide in Earp's Appeal, as its principle is in a greater degree applicable to the trust under Thomas Williams's will. That principle had been announced in Barnett's Appeal, 10 Wright 392, and has been repeatedly re-announced: Dodson v. Ball, 10 P. F. Smith 496-7; Wells v. McCall, 14 Id. 212; Yarnall's Appeal, 20 Id. 339; Ogden's Appeal, Id. 507; Ashhurst's Appeal, 27 Id. 464. The principle is that when an active trust is created to give effect to a well-defined lawful purpose of a testator in relation to his family the trust must be sustained whether the cestui que trust be sui juris or not.

In Earp's Appeal the corpus of the entire estate was vested in the trustees with active duties. To the three children, Hannah, Anna and George, the income only for life was given, without reference to coverture, as the specific purpose of the testator to be guarded against. A power of appointment by will was conferred, but this, it has been decided repeatedly, does not enlarge the precedent life-estate: Dodson v. Ball, supra, and authorities there cited; Yarnell's Appeal, supra; Ashhurst's Appeal, supra. Upon a failure to appoint, the entire estate was then to be held in trust for those who would take under the intestate law as the heirs of the three cestuis que trust. Thus the trust was active; the entire corpus was to be kept in trust to execute the ultimate purpose of the testator; the three children were entitled to an equitable estate in the income only for life, and not for coverture. The remainder in the right of the three children was a legal estate, the active duties of the trustees ceasing at the death of the life-tenants and the trust being then executed: Bacon's Appeal, 7 P. F. Smith 512; Rife v. Geyer, 9 Id. 393.

The testator had a lawful purpose to be performed, to wit: to protect his estate from all danger of loss during the lives of his three children, not from husbands merely, for George was in the same category with Hannah and Anna, and then to carry the estate unbroken over to the children of the cestui que trust, for in the course of nature he had reason to believe they would be the heirs. The rule in Shelley's case, therefore, had no place in the case, for the life-estate was equitable and the remainder legal. Earp's Appeal was followed by Ashhurst's Appeal, 27 P. F. Smith 464, in which Justice SHARSWOOD very clearly develops the character of the former, and winds up his statement thus: "It was not a case in which the entire equitable fee or absolute estate was in the beneficiary, when the continuance of the trust is no longer necessary, and ought, therefore, to end at the volition of the cestui que trust."

Now, if we examine the will of Thomas Williams, we shall find that it is a clearer case for the application of a principle which preserves an active trust to fulfil the purpose of the testator than either Earp's or Ashhurst's trusts. He gave the entire corpus of the estate to trustees, with active duties to lease the realty and put out the personalty upon real security, and to collect the rents and income and pay the same to Hannah Williams for life, and so that it should not be liable to the control or debts of her husband. Had the trust stopped here, it might have been argued with force that it was intended to protect against coverture only. But, after providing for a power of appointment by will, which we have seen does not...

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