Proctor v. State Government of North Carolina
| Decision Date | 30 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1711,85-1711 |
| Parties | 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,454, 56 USLW 2206 Janet M. PROCTOR, Appellee, v. The STATE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA, Executive Branch; The Department of Human Resources of The State of North Carolina; David Flaherty, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources; The Office of State Personnel of the North Carolina Department of Administration; I.O. Wilkerson, Director of the Division of Facility Services, North Carolina Department of Human Resources; Edward Seagroves, Analyst, Division of Manpower Management; North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Clark Edwards, Director, Manpower Management Division, North Carolina Department of Human Resources; Roy High, Section Chief, Office of State Personnel of the North Carolina Department of Administration, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Edwin M. Speas, Jr. and Marcella Ann Reed, Sp. Deputy Attys. Gen. (Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. of North Carolina, Raleigh, N.C., on brief), for appellants.
Joyce L. Davis and Cynthia M. Currin (Crisp, Davis, Schwentker, Page & Currin, Robert A. Hassell, Raleigh, N.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and MERHIGE, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
The state of North Carolina ("the State") appeals from the district court's order holding Marvin Dorman, a State employee, in contempt of court for violation of a consent order previously entered into by the State and appellee, Janet Proctor. Initially, with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c), the matter was heard by a United States magistrate. The magistrate certified the facts to the district court under Sec. 636(e) and the district court found Dorman in contempt. The State contends that the district court's order should be reversed because (1) the district court applied an erroneous standard in reviewing the facts found by the magistrate, (2) the magistrate's findings of fact do not support the district court's order and are clearly erroneous, (3) the district court's order requires judgment for the State, and (4) the magistrate's findings of fact do not support an award of damages to appellee. We find that the district court did not apply the standard of review intended by Congress under Sec. 636(e) when it reviewed the magistrate's findings of fact. Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's order of contempt and remand the matter for further consideration.
Appellee, Janet Proctor, began working for the State of North Carolina in 1961. In 1964, Proctor became the head of the State's Student Loan Program, which was part of the State's Department of Human Resources.
In July of 1975, Proctor filed suit against the State under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. On December 12, 1980, the parties entered into a consent order which provided that Proctor would be entitled to continue in the same position in which she had been serving, with the same rights and obligations as any other similarly situated State employee and without fear of retaliation by the State.
In June of 1981, Proctor filed a motion to enforce the consent decree. Proctor contended that the consent order had been violated because her job responsibilities had been changed. The magistrate ruled in favor of Proctor. The State appealed to this Court pursuant to Sec. 636(c)(3). Holding that changes in Proctor's position would not offend the consent decree if "decided upon in the exercise of sound managerial discretion and motivated by legitimate business reasons," we vacated the magistrate's order and remanded the case. Proctor v. State Government of North Carolina, Executive Branch, 689 F.2d 491, 494 (4th Cir.1982). On remand, the magistrate ruled that the changes in Proctor's position were the result of the exercise of sound managerial discretion and were motivated by legitimate business reasons. Accordingly, the magistrate held that such changes did not constitute a violation of the consent order. Proctor appealed and during the pendency thereof filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the district court to consider alleged new evidence of changes in her job. In an unpublished opinion, we remanded the case for consideration of the Rule 60(b) motion. Thereafter the magistrate denied Proctor's motion, suggesting that the more appropriate manner of presenting additional evidence, as Proctor wished to do, was to request a show cause order.
On January 24, 1984, Proctor filed a motion to hold the State in contempt for violation of the consent order. In support of this motion, she alleged that (1) her job responsibilities were reduced as of April of 1983, (2) her position was legislatively exempted from certain protections provided to most State employees by the State Personnel Act, (3) she was arbitrarily terminated from her employment with the State, and (4) she was offered a new position with the State, conditioned upon her not pursuing further litigation against the State.
The magistrate heard the evidence and concluded that the consent order had not been violated by either the restructuring of Proctor's job or the conditioning of the new job offer on Proctor's abstaining from further litigation against the State. The magistrate did find, however, that the consent order had been violated by the exemption of Proctor's position from the State Personnel Act and by the termination of her employment.
Section 636(e)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that, in a proceeding before a magistrate, the disobedience of a lawful order constitutes a contempt of the district court for the district in which the magistrate is sitting. Accordingly, a violation of the consent order would have constituted a contempt under Sec. 636(e). Upon finding that the consent order had indeed been violated, the magistrate, pursuant to Sec. 636(e), certified the facts to the district court and ordered the State to appear before the district court to show cause why it should not be held in contempt.
The district court requested that the parties address the issue of the district court's responsibilities under Sec. 636(e) at that stage of the proceedings. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on the subject, the district judge ruled that he was precluded from receiving evidence and that his primary duty was to determine "whether the act complained of, on the facts as found by the magistrate [were] such as to 'warrant punishment' and, if so, 'punish such person'."
A show cause hearing was held at which time the parties presented oral arguments and submitted affidavits; no oral testimony, however, was presented.
On July 1, 1985, the district judge entered an order finding that, under the facts as found by the magistrate, the actions of Proctor's immediate supervisor, Marvin Dorman, constituted contempt of court. The district judge awarded Proctor back pay, front pay, retirement benefits and attorney's fees. The instant appeal followed.
The State contends that the district judge erred in concluding that he was bound by the magistrate's findings of fact. We agree and, accordingly, vacate the district court's order holding Dorman in contempt and remand the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The litigation between Proctor and the State was referred to a magistrate for all purposes in November, 1979. This referral was accomplished pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c) which provides for referral to a magistrate with the parties' consent. Section 636(c)(3) provides that the parties may appeal to the court of appeals from the magistrate's decision "in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court." Section 636(c)(4) provides that, in the alternative, the parties may consent to appeal to the district court "in the same manner as on an appeal from a judgment of the district court to a court of appeals." Ordinarily, then, in an appeal from a decision rendered by a magistrate in a Sec. 636(c) proceeding, the magistrate's findings of fact are reviewed only to the extent of determining whether such findings are clearly erroneous.
Section 636(e), however, provides a different review procedure for contempts. This section states that, when a party has committed an act which may constitute a contempt,
the magistrate shall forthwith certify the facts to a judge of the district court and may serve or cause to be served upon any person whose behavior is brought into question under this section an order requiring such person to appear before a judge of that court upon a day certain to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt by reason of the facts so certified. A judge of the district court shall thereupon, in a summary manner, hear the evidence as to the act or conduct complained of and, if it is such as to warrant punishment, punish such person in the same manner and to the same extent as for a contempt committed before a judge of the court, or commit such person upon the conditions applicable in the case of defiance of the process of the district court or misconduct in the presence of a judge of that court.
Proctor contends that, in contempt proceedings in which the parties have consented to referral to the magistrate, the district court has no authority to review the magistrate's factual findings and the court of appeals is limited to determining whether such findings were clearly erroneous. This would essentially result in the same type of review as that normally followed in proceedings under Sec. 636(c). We decline to adopt Proctor's interpretation of the district court's responsibilities under Sec. 636(e), however, for it is contrary to the plain language of that section,...
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