United States v. Compton

Decision Date19 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15-942,August Term 2015,15-942
Citation830 F.3d 55
PartiesUnited States of America, Appellee, v. Peter Compton, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Molly K. Corbett, Research & Writing Attorney (Paul J. Evangelista, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the brief), for Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY, for DefendantAppellant.

Steven D. Clymer, Assistant United States Attorney (Katherine Kopita, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY, for Appellee.

Before: Walker, Raggi, and Hall, Circuit Judges.

John M. Walker, Jr.

, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Peter Compton appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, J. ) denying his motion to suppress 145 pounds of marijuana discovered in his vehicle by United States Border Patrol (“Border Patrol”) agents. Compton argues that the agents seized him and searched his vehicle in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. We agree with the district court that the agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry

stop of Compton, see

Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and that the agents did not unreasonably extend the stop. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment denying the motion to suppress the physical evidence.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2013, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Border Patrol agents set up an immigration checkpoint near the Canadian border on State Route 11 in Chateaugay, New York. Approximately .5 miles west of the checkpoint, at the crest of a hill and on the north side of the road, there was a vegetable stand. The stand was “not manned” and only [i]ntermittently active.” App. 61, 79. Shortly before passing the vegetable stand, eastbound drivers coming over the hill would be able to see for the first time the vegetable stand and a sign alerting them to the checkpoint.

At approximately 8:00 a.m., Compton and his brother were traveling eastbound on Route 11 in their mother's green Ford sport utility vehicle (“SUV”). Compton sat in the front passenger seat while his brother drove.

Border Patrol Agent David Gottschall had parked his marked Border Patrol vehicle on the north side of Route 11, facing the road, between the checkpoint and the vegetable stand. From this position—approximately .35 miles west of the checkpoint and approximately .15 miles east of the stand—Gottschall could monitor eastbound traffic through his passenger side window. He observed Compton's SUV come over the crest of the hill, abruptly slow down, and veer into the U-shaped driveway of the vegetable stand.

Gottschall then received a telephone call from fellow Border Patrol Agent Daniel Taylor, who was stationed at the checkpoint. Taylor told Gottschall that a motorist entering the checkpoint had just reported that the SUV had passed her vehicle and then immediately slowed down upon reaching the crest of the hill.

After receiving the call from Taylor, Gottschall drove to the vegetable stand and parked behind the SUV. The SUV was unoccupied. He then saw Compton and his brother walking away from the vegetable stand approximately fifteen to twenty feet apart from one another. Each of the two men held a pint of peppers.

Gottschall ordered Compton and his brother to return to their vehicle, where he began to question them. Gottschall asked the men for identification and tried to find out why they had turned off the road so abruptly. Gottschall then walked back towards his Border Patrol vehicle, intending to run checks on the brothers' identities and the SUV's license plate. As he passed the rear seat of the SUV, he noticed a blanket in the back that appeared to be concealing something. Gottschall later testified at the suppression hearing that, in his experience, “blankets are commonly used to conceal humans,” to “conceal cigarettes” or, more generally, “to prevent the plain view observation of law enforcement.” App. 62.

Suspecting that the blanket in the SUV “either concealed humans or narcotics or something to that effect,” id. Gottschall contacted Taylor and asked him to bring a canine to the SUV. Taylor brought his canine, Tiko, to the SUV in less than a minute.

Gottschall and Taylor informed the brothers that the Border Patrol would be performing a canine sniff, removed the brothers from the SUV, and led Tiko around the SUV. The canine sniff took no more than five minutes, and during this time Compton and his brother sat handcuffed inside separate Border Patrol vehicles.

Tiko alerted at the SUV's rear door. After Taylor opened the door, Tiko entered the SUV and alerted to four duffle bags. The Border Patrol agents then informed Compton and his brother that they were under arrest. The Border Patrol later found that the four duffel bags contained approximately 145 pounds of marijuana.

On October 23, 2013, a grand jury indicted Compton and his brother on two counts. Count One charged the brothers with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)

and 846. Count Two charged the brothers with possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

On May 1, 2014, Compton moved to suppress statements as well as physical evidence obtained during the stop and seizure. He argued that the Border Patrol had lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and had extended the detention unreasonably. He also argued that, when the agents handcuffed him and placed him in a Border Patrol vehicle during the canine sniff, the detention became an arrest without probable cause.

On September 9, 2014, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a decision and order denying the motion as to the physical evidence. The district court rejected Compton's arguments as to the lack of reasonable suspicion and unreasonable length of detention. The district court agreed that the detention became an arrest without probable cause but determined that, because the Border Patrol would have discovered the marijuana without the arrest, the drugs did not need to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

On October 30, 2014, Compton and the government entered into a conditional plea agreement in which Compton agreed to plead guilty to Count Two of the indictment and both parties agreed that he reserved his right to appeal the district court's decision not to suppress the physical evidence.

On March 6, 2015, the district court dismissed Count One of the indictment on the government's motion and sentenced Compton to thirty months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. On March 30, 2015, Compton filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Compton argues on appeal that Gottschall lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him at the vegetable stand and that Gottschall unreasonably extended the detention to perform the canine sniff, errors that tainted his subsequent arrest and the vehicle search, requiring the suppression of evidence obtained from the search. We disagree.

I. Reasonable Suspicion

We review de novo a district court's reasonable suspicion determination. Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 691, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)

. “The factual findings underlying that determination must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Padilla , 548 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir.2008) ; United States v. Bershchansky , 788 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir.2015).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV

. “As this language indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government search or seizure is reasonableness.” United States v. Bailey , 743 F.3d 322, 331 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonableness is “generally determined by balancing the particular need to search or seize against the privacy interests invaded by such action.” Id.

Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a brief investigatory detention (commonly known as a “Terry

stop”) as long as the officer has reasonable suspicion “that the person to be detained is committing or has committed a criminal offense.” Id. at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted); see

Terry , 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

Reasonable suspicion requires more than an “inarticulate hunch [ ].” Terry , 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868

. The suspicion must derive from “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, provide detaining officers with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing.” Bailey , 743 F.3d at 332 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In assessing the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion, we must take into account “the totality of the circumstances” and must “evaluate those circumstances through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” United States v. Bayless , 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir.2000)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see

United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ([T]he evidence ... collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”).

Here, the district court properly rejected Compton's argument that Gottschall lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him at the vegetable stand. Gottschall's suspicion was reasonable due to the combination of (1) the brothers' avoidance of the checkpoint, (2) the checkpoint's proximity to the border, and (3) the brothers' peculiar attempt to conceal...

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