Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 08-91-00364-CV

Citation831 S.W.2d 81
Decision Date20 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 08-91-00364-CV,08-91-00364-CV
PartiesWORSHAM STEEL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Gonzalo ARIAS, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Jack Brewster, Brewster and Mayhall, Ronald Calhoun, Calhoun & Villa, El Paso, for appellant.

Michael J. Gopin, El Paso, for appellee.

Before OSBORN, C.J., and BARAJAS and LARSEN, JJ.

OPINION

BARAJAS, Justice.

This appeal arises from a case involving the wrongful discharge of an employee in violation of Article 8307c of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Appellant, Worsham Steel Company, appeals from an adverse jury verdict in which Appellee, Gonzalo Arias, was awarded $1,243,300 in both actual and exemplary damages. We reverse and remand.

I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

In December of 1989, Arias, a longtime employee of Worsham Steel Company, sustained a back injury while in the scope of his employment. It is unclear whether or not Arias reported the injury to his supervisor on the day of his injury. It is clear, however, that Roberto Gomez, a fellow employee who witnessed the accident, reported Arias' injury to a Worsham supervisor the day after the accident.

Although experiencing severe pain, Arias elected not to immediately seek medical care after the accident. Instead, Arias continued to report to work for two days following his accident, wanting to "wait and see" if he would soon "feel better." Unfortunately, Arias did not begin to "feel better" as soon as he had hoped. In fact, the record reveals that Arias was unable to return to work on the third day after his accident due to persisting back pain. Arias, however, failed to notify Worsham of his inability to work as a result of his back injury.

Arias eventually returned to work after a two-day absence. Upon his return, Arias was informed by Worsham that he no longer was employed with the company. Worsham explained to Arias that they had assumed "he quit" when he failed to report to work for two consecutive days. Worsham based this assumption on an alleged statement made by Arias prior to the injury. According to Worsham, Arias had supposedly expressed an intent to quit if he was not given a part-time position with the company. Since Worsham notified Appellee that part-time positions were not available, Worsham believed that Appellee had quit when Appellee did not show up to work.

On the day of his discharge, Arias asked Worsham to send him to a doctor because of his back injury. Worsham, however, refused to send Arias to the doctor because, according to Worsham, Arias was no longer an employee. Arias nonetheless visited a doctor that very same day. After his initial medical examination, Appellee was informed that he was suffering from a severe back injury.

The record reflects that Arias filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits and notified Worsham of the claim. After negotiating the claim, Worsham and Arias settled the workers' compensation claim. Consequently, this appeal only involves the wrongful discharge claim which was filed by Arias against Worsham.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, Worsham has advanced twelve points of error which collectively present four distinct issues. The first issue involves the question of whether Worsham's conduct is actionable under Article 8307c of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. The second issue concerns the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury's award of actual damages, i.e., whether being "sad," even being "very sad," standing alone, is sufficient to support an award for mental anguish. The third issue attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that Worsham acted "willfully or maliciously" in discharging Arias. Finally, the fourth issue questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's award of exemplary damages. To adequately dispose of this appeal, it is only necessary to reach the first two issues.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Worsham's evidentiary challenges are governed by two distinct standards of review. The applicable standard is determined by whether Worsham's challenge is predicated on legal or factual sufficiency grounds.

When presented with a "no evidence" or legal sufficiency challenge, this Court will consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which, when viewed in their most favorable light, support the jury verdict or court finding. All evidence and inferences to the contrary are to be disregarded. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987); Alm v. Aluminum Company of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex.1986). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the questioned finding, the no evidence point fails. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d at 16.

On the other hand, when a factual sufficiency challenge is advanced, this Court must examine all of the evidence. Lofton v. Texas Brine Corporation, 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex.1986). After considering and weighing all of the evidence, this Court may set aside a finding only if the finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). Since this Court is not a fact finder, it may not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would clearly support a different result. Clancy v. Zale Corporation, 705 S.W.2d 820, 826 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Wrongful Discharge--Article 8307c

In Points of Error Nos. One, Two, Eight, Nine and Twelve, Worsham asserts that Arias has failed to establish a cause of action for wrongful discharge as a matter of law. Additionally, Worsham argues that even if its conduct is actionable under Article 8307c, the evidence presented is both legally and factually insufficient to support any affirmative recovery.

Resolution of the above points of error requires an analysis of both Article 8307c and the evidence contained in the record. Specifically, Article 8307c, § 1 provides:

No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim, instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, [sic] or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.

Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8307c (Vernon Pamph.1992). Relying on the language employed in this statute, Worsham alleges that there is no cause of action for wrongful discharge because Arias failed to make a claim for workers' compensation benefits until two days after he was discharged from his employment with Worsham. In essence, Worsham advances the argument that no cause of action for wrongful discharge exists unless a claim for workers' compensation has been filed at the time of discharge. We disagree.

The purpose of Article 8307c is to protect injured employees who are entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act and to prevent them from being discharged once they have taken steps to collect such benefits. Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1990, writ denied). The natural derivative of this purpose is a liberal construction of the prerequisites for an Article 8307c claim. Specifically, Texas courts have held that wrongful discharge is a viable cause of action in situations in which an employee was fired before filing a claim for compensation benefits. Id. at 389; Hunt v. Van Der Horst Corp., 711 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, no writ); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111, 115-16 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In fact, all that is required to prosecute such a claim is evidence that shows an employee took steps toward instituting a proceeding under Article 8307c. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d at 389.

In both Hunt and Cigainero, the Dallas court and the Texarkana court held that the injured employees "instituted a proceeding" pursuant to Article 8307c once they informed their employer of their on-the-job injury. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d at 389; Hunt, 711 S.W.2d at 80. In the instant case, Arias informed his supervisor of his injury before his employment ended with Worsham. Such action constituted an affirmative step toward instituting a proceeding under Article 8307c. Consequently, Worsham's discharge of Arias is actionable conduct. To hold otherwise would be "to reward employers who are particularly adept at anticipating and quick in firing potential workers' compensation claimants over those who are slower to retaliate." Hunt, 711 S.W.2d at 80.

Having found that Worsham's actions in the instant case are actionable pursuant to Article 8307c, the question remaining is whether there exists sufficient evidence to support a recovery for Arias' wrongful discharge. In the simplest of terms, the evidence is sufficient if Arias' workers' compensation claim contributed to Worsham's decision to terminate him. See Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1989, writ denied); Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d at 390. Thus, any sufficiency inquiry entails a determination of the adequacy of Arias' proof of a causal link between the termination of his employment and the filing of his workers' compensation claim. Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658.

After having carefully reviewed the evidence that supports recovery, we find there is more than a scintilla of evidence establishing that Appellee was wrongfully discharged from his employment with Worsham. Indeed, the record reveals Arias was discharged shortly after Worsham was given notice of the injury. Moreover, there is testimony in the record that establishes Worsham's negative attitude toward workers' compensation claims in general and Arias' back injury in particular. There is also direct testimony from Worsham which established that if the injury had never occurred there would have been no reason whatsoever to terminate Arias. Based...

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