McLaughlin v. SUPERINTENDING SCHOOL

• Citation: 2003 ME 114,832 A.2d 782
• Parties: Patricia MCLAUGHLIN o/b/o Joseph McLaughlin v. SUPERINTENDING SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF LINCOLNVILLE.
• Decision Date: 16 September 2003
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

832 A.2d 782

2003 ME 114

Patricia MCLAUGHLIN o/b/o Joseph McLaughlin v. SUPERINTENDING SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF LINCOLNVILLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: March 11, 2003.

Decided: September 16, 2003.

Catherine R. Connors, Esq. (orally), Daniel E. Wathen, Esq., Pierce Atwood, Portland, Charles E. Gilbert III, Esq., Julie D. Farr, Esq., Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, for plaintiffs.

Deirdre M. Smith, Esq. (orally), Melissa A. Hewey, Esq., Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon, Portland, for defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.

DANA, J.

[¶ 1] Patricia McLaughlin (Patricia), as next best friend of her grandson Joseph McLaughlin¹ (Joseph), appeals from the summary judgment in favor of Superintending School Committee of Lincolnville (School) entered in the Superior Court (Waldo County, Marden, J.). Patricia contends that the Superior Court erred in finding that (1) she failed to comply with the 180-day notice requirement of the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA), 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(1) (2003), and (2) that the September 2001 amendment to 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(2) (2003) did not extend the deadline for her notice of claim. Because we agree with Patricia that the amendment to section 8107 extended the deadline for her notice of claim, we vacate the Superior Court's judgment and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Joseph first enrolled at the Lincolnville Central School in November 1995, part way through his first grade year. During his third grade year, he began complaining of various health problems, including persistent headaches, confusion, memory loss, back pain, muscle weakness, and fatigue. Patricia noticed that on the days she picked Joseph up for lunch and took him to air-conditioned locations, he felt better. That spring it had been hot, and the classroom was stuffy and hot, with little airflow.

[¶ 3] Patricia noticed a link between the classroom conditions and Joseph's problems, but attributed his problems to the heat. She disputes that she had any suspicion at that time that Joseph's problems were caused by the later-identified air quality problems at the school, or even later in fifth grade when his problems became more severe. Initially, she did not bring her concerns to the school officials because she did not consider herself Joseph's "parent," but she did talk to Joseph's third grade teacher about the hot, stuffy conditions in the classroom and Joseph's problem catching his breath.

[¶ 4] Later, in fourth and fifth grades, Joseph developed problems with his motor skills, including an inability to hold and use a pencil. Patricia spoke to the school superintendent about Joseph's symptoms at the end of his fourth grade year, but stated that at that time she had no idea what might be causing them. Finally, in fifth grade, Joseph displayed strong signs of irritability.

[¶ 5] On April 3, 2000, a routine indoor air quality assessment revealed to the school department the presence of certain molds, thought to have adverse health effects, and carbon dioxide levels above recommended levels. The assessment results were disclosed to the media and the public at a public meeting that evening. Local media reported the results the next day and continued to discuss the results throughout April, May, and June 2000.

[¶ 6] Because of the air quality problems, on April 13, 2000, the School Department closed certain classrooms and relocated classes to other rooms in the building. Following the disclosure of the air quality information, Patricia faxed that information to one of Joseph's doctors, Dr. Lord, who told her that the air quality at the school was "not conducive to Joseph's health." Patricia discussed with Dr. Lord the possible connection between the air quality at the school and Joseph's muscle weakness. Patricia knew that high carbon dioxide levels could "sap" or "drain" Joseph's muscles and stated that at that time she realized, "inwardly," that the high carbon dioxide levels "could be affecting [Joseph] and [the high level] could be affecting [his] headaches." Based on this information, Patricia, her husband, Joseph's parents, Dr. Lord, Joseph's physical therapist, Donna Dutton, and Dr. Upham, made a joint decision to remove Joseph from the Lincolnville Center School. On April 14, 2000, Patricia withdrew Joseph because of the high carbon dioxide levels and his headaches.

[¶ 7] During the week of April 17 through April 21, 2000, while the school was closed for vacation, the school cleaned and made other efforts to mitigate the poor air quality. At the end of the week, the department held a second public meeting concerning the contamination. This meeting included presentations from the service that had conducted the air quality assessment, and from Dr. Susan Upham, a physician with whom Patricia had consulted concerning Joseph's problems.

[¶ 8] On April 28, 2000, the Department closed the entire school and relocated all the classes. A third public meeting on May 3, 2000, provided the public with presentations from a variety of officials, including representatives from the Maine Department of Education and the Maine Pesticide Board.

[¶ 9] Patricia also completed an Indoor Air Quality Questionnaire in April 2000, the night before it was due and to the best of her ability, but she could not be sure that it was completely accurate. In the questionnaire, she checked off boxes indicating the main symptoms Joseph had experienced since 1996 that occurred when he was in the building that she may have felt were related to the building. She also stated that she had previously consulted Susan McKinley, a physician, for Joseph's condition, who prescribed Claritin, an allergy medicine. Patricia disputes that she knew the cause of Joseph's health problems in April and testified that she did not link the air quality problems at the school to Joseph's symptoms until October 2000, when Dutton provided a report suggesting that the poor air quality caused his problems. Before Dutton's diagnosis, she could only speculate or guess that there was a connection between the two.

[¶ 10] Patricia sent a notice of claim, required by the MTCA, to the School on November 1, 2000. In March 2001, she filed Joseph's complaint. The School moved for a summary judgment, arguing that the notice of claim had not been filed within 180 days of when the claim accrued. The court entered a summary judgment for the School, finding that, at the latest, the claim accrued in April 2000, when the School publicly disclosed the air quality problems, more than 180 days before the notice of claim. According to the court, this disclosure put Patricia "on notice of some likelihood that the school conditions caused or contributed to" Joseph's condition. Moreover, the court determined that the Legislature's amendment to section 8107 did not extend the notice of claim deadline for Patricia to 180 days after Joseph reached age eighteen. The court reasoned that because the notice had not been timely filed, the cause of action "did not exist at the conclusion of 180 days from the date of injury, therefore, the two-year statute of limitations [had] no meaning."

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶ 11] We review "the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment has been granted, to decide whether the parties' statements of material facts and the referenced record material reveal a genuine issue of material fact." Rogers v. Jackson, 2002 ME 140, ¶ 5, 804 A.2d 379, 380 (citations omitted). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court gives the party opposing summary judgment the benefit of any inferences that might reasonably be drawn from the facts presented. Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 9, 784 A.2d 18, 22. If the record reveals no genuine issue of material fact, then summary judgment is proper.

[¶ 12] Moreover, the burden rests on the moving party to show that the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action. Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Aldrich, 2002 ME 16, ¶ 8, 788 A.2d 603, 606. The question of when a tort claim accrues is a legal question, see White v. McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker, P.A., 2002 ME 160, ¶ 7, 809 A.2d 622, 623; therefore, it is subject to de novo review, see Bissias v. Koulovatos, 2000 ME 189, ¶ 6, 761 A.2d 47, 49. A determination of a statute of limitations defense is usually made on a motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment; however, sometimes, a genuine issue of material fact concerning the date of the injury will preclude such rulings. Townsend v. Chute Chem. Co., 1997 ME 46, ¶ 9 n. 3, 691 A.2d 199, 202.

[¶ 13] Statutory interpretation is also a legal question subject to de novo review. State v. Bjorkaryd-Bradbury, 2002 ME 44, ¶ 9, 792 A.2d 1082, 1084. When interpreting a statute, our main objective is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Id. "To determine that intent, we look first to the statute's plain meaning." Id. If there is no ambiguity, we need proceed no further. Lewiston Raceway, Inc. v. Maine State Harness Racing Comm'n, 593 A.2d 663, 665 (Me.1991). If, however, ambiguity exists, then we look beyond that language to the legislative history. Bjorkaryd-Bradbury, 2002 ME 44, ¶ 9, 792 A.2d at 1084.

B. Notice of Claim

[¶ 14] According to 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(1) (2003),² unless an exception for good cause applies,³ a notice of claim must be filed within 180 days of when the cause of action accrues. Patricia filed Joseph's notice of claim on November 1, 2000. For Patricia to have complied with the 180-day requirement, the claim needed to accrue after May 5, 2000. However, in 2001, the Legislature amended 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(2),⁴ which provides notice requirements for claimants who are incapacitated, including minors, by adding a second sentence. Patricia contends that this amendment extends the notice period for...