United States v. Hunter

• Decision Date: 26 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–12640,15–12640
• Citation: 835 F.3d 1320
• Parties: United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jacobi Tavares Hunter, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

835 F.3d 1320

United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Jacobi Tavares Hunter, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 15–12640

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Date Filed: August 26, 2016

Jonathan Colan, Daniel Matzkin, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, John C. McMillan, U.S. Attorney's Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Miami, FL, Fletcher Peacock, Federal Public Defender's Office, Fort Pierce, FL, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before WILSON and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and MOORE,^* District Judge.

WILSON

, Circuit Judge:

Jacobi Hunter appeals his 60–month sentence, imposed after he pleaded guilty to drug-related charges pursuant to a written plea agreement. On appeal, Hunter contends that the government breached the plea agreement by failing to recommend a reduction for acceptance of responsibility at sentencing. We agree. Hunter was induced to plead guilty to all charges against him based, in part, on the promise that the government would recommend the reduction on his behalf. The government not only failed to recommend the reduction at sentencing, but also objected to and argued against Hunter receiving the reduction based on facts it knew prior to offering the plea deal. This conduct constitutes a breach of the agreement entered into by the parties. Accordingly, we vacate Hunter's sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

A federal grand jury indicted Hunter on four charges of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

, (b)(1)(C)–(D). These charges arose from a traffic stop, wherein officers had stopped Hunter for illegal window tint on his vehicle, and, after detecting marijuana, ordered Hunter out of his car and frisked him. Hunter filed motions to dismiss and to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, which the district court heard and denied.

During the hearing on those motions (the “suppression hearing”), which took place on February 4, 2015, with both parties present, the district court explicitly found that Hunter's testimony regarding some of the facts leading up to the traffic stop was not credible. Specifically, the officers had testified that Hunter was driving south on Congress Avenue and had oversteered into a right turn onto west Blue Heron Boulevard when they pulled him over for his illegal window tint, but Hunter testified that he was driving west on Blue Heron Boulevard, not Congress Avenue, and had not oversteered. Acknowledging these factual discrepancies, the district court found that “Hunter's testimony [wa]s not credible in this regard.”

After the suppression hearing, the government extended a plea deal. The written plea agreement provided that Hunter would plead guilty to all four charges brought against him, with the following relevant stipulation (the “acceptance-of-responsibility reduction”):

The United States agrees that it will recommend at sentencing that the Court reduce by two levels the sentencing guideline level applicable to the defendant's offense, pursuant to [§] 3E1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, based upon the defendant's recognition and affirmative and timely acceptance of personal responsibility. If at the time of sentencing the defendant's offense level is determined to be 16 or greater, the government will make a motion requesting an additional one level decrease ... stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of her [sic] own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the Court to allocate their resources efficiently.

Hunter accepted this deal and, on March 4, 2015, pleaded guilty at a change-of-plea hearing in the district court.

The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) that included a two-level increase for obstruction of justice and did not include a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Hunter submitted several objections to the PSI, including objections to the enhancement for obstruction of justice and the failure to include an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The government did not request the reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Instead, the government filed a motion seeking an upward departure or variance from the recommended guidelines range. In response, Hunter filed a motion seeking a downward variance due to, inter alia , the physical and mental harm he allegedly suffered during his arrest.

At sentencing, Hunter objected to the exclusion of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction from the PSI, arguing that the government's failure to recommend the reduction was a violation of the plea agreement. The government again did not recommend the reduction. Instead, it officially objected to Hunter receiving the reduction and argued for an enhancement. The government maintained that it was not obligated by the plea agreement to seek a reduction for acceptance of responsibility if the court concluded that Hunter had obstructed justice by committing perjury during his suppression hearing, even though the hearing took place before the plea deal was offered. Arguing that this failure to recommend the reduction constituted a breach, Hunter sought specific performance by the government and to have the case reassigned to another judge.

The district court found that the government had not breached the plea agreement, but it expressed concern that “the Government seems to give with one hand and take back with the other, because a defendant ... would believe if he signed this agreement that he was going to get the acceptance of responsibility.” Thus, the district court held it would give Hunter the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to “solve this,” recognizing that “the decision to plead guilty is an enormously important decision.” The government subsequently conceded that, given the district court's ruling, Hunter was “probably” entitled to a three-level reduction. The government then argued its motion for an upward departure or variance. In light of its rulings during the hearing, the court recalculated the applicable guidelines range as 18 to 24 months' imprisonment. Over Hunter's objections, the district court imposed a 60–month sentence. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, Hunter's conditional plea agreement reserved the right to appeal only the denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence and waived other challenges. However, an appeal waiver does not bar a defendant's claim that the government breached the plea agreement. United States v. Puentes–Hurtado , 794 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015)

; United States v. Gonsalves , 121 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, we may consider Hunter's appeal.

Hunter preserved his objection to the purported breach of the plea agreement in the district court, and the parties agree on the facts material to this appeal. Accordingly, we must determine only whether the government's undisputed conduct breached the plea agreement. We review this legal issue de novo. United States v. Copeland , 381 F.3d 1101, 1104 (11th Cir. 2004)

. We first address whether the government breached its agreement with Hunter. Concluding that it did, we then turn to the appropriate remedy.

A. Breach

“[A] plea agreement must be construed in light of the fact that it constitutes a waiver of substantial constitutional rights requiring that the defendant be adequately warned of the consequences of the plea.” United States v. Jefferies , 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A material promise by the government, which induces a defendant to plead guilty, binds the government to that promise.” United States v. Thomas , 487 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) ). Hence, the government breaches a plea agreement when it fails to perform the promises on which the plea was based.

“Whether the government violated the agreement is judged according to the defendant's reasonable understanding at the time he entered his plea.” United States v. Boatner , 966 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992)

. We apply an objective standard to “decide whether the government's actions are inconsistent” with the defendant's understanding of the plea agreement, Copeland , 381 F.3d at 1105, rather than reading the agreement in a “hyper-technical” or “rigidly literal” manner, United States v. Rewis , 969 F.2d 985, 988 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In exchange for Hunter's promise to plead guilty to all four charges in his indictment, the government promised to recommend a reduction for acceptance of responsibility at sentencing. Yet, at sentencing, the government did not recommend the reduction. In fact, the government objected to and argued against Hunter receiving the reduction. Viewed objectively, “the government's actions are inconsistent with what the defendant reasonably understood when he entered his guilty plea.”¹ See Copeland , 381 F.3d at 1105

(internal quotation mark omitted); cf.

United States v. Keresztury , 293 F.3d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 2002) (“It is certainly inconsistent with a defendant's reasonable understanding of a promise not to contest a reduction for acceptance of responsibility for the government to add its voice in support of the PSI recommendation that the defendant receive no such reduction.”).

It is clear that Hunter reasonably understood the government would recommend the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction on his behalf at sentencing. The promise to recommend the reduction was a key material concession made by the government in the plea agreement.² The government did not drop...