Doe v. McCulloch
| Decision Date | 20 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-2667,15-2667 |
| Citation | 835 F.3d 785 |
| Parties | Grand Juror Doe, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Robert P. McCulloch, in his official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Andrew McNulty, Anthony E. Rothert, Jessie Steffan, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation, Joshua Michael Pierson, David Eric Sowers, Ferne Paula Wolf, Sowers & Wolf, Saint Louis, MO, Gillian R. Wilcox, ACLU of Missouri Foundation, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
David J. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, H. Anthony Relys, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, MO, Peter Jay Krane, St. Louis County Counselor's Office, Saint Louis, MO, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
WOLLMAN
, Circuit Judge.
Grand Juror Doe appeals from the dismissal of her declaratory judgment action, following the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction.1 We conclude that the district court should not have dismissed the case outright, but rather should have stayed the case while the state-law issues were decided by the Missouri state courts. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Doe served on the Missouri grand jury that considered whether probable cause existed to indict Darren Wilson, the Ferguson, Missouri, police officer who shot and killed Michael Brown in August 2014. County prosecutors presented evidence to the grand jury over the course of several weeks. On November 24, 2014, the grand jury returned a “no true bill” of indictment and was discharged from service. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 540.260
().
That evening, Robert P. McCulloch, the prosecuting attorney for St. Louis County, held a press conference, during which he explained the grand jury's investigation and its decision not to indict Wilson on any charges. He also released some of the evidence that prosecutors had presented to the grand jury, including transcripts, reports, interviews, and forensic evidence.
Doe took an oath of secrecy twice, once in May 2014 when she began her term as a grand juror and a second time in September 2014 when her term was extended to allow the grand jury to complete its investigation into the Wilson matter. The oath asks, in relevant part:
Do you solemnly swear you will diligently inquire and true presentment make, according to your charge, of all offenses against the laws of the state committed or triable in this county of which you have or can obtain legal evidence; the counsel of your state, your fellows and your own, you shall truly keep secret?
. Missouri law disallows a grand juror from “testify[ing] or declar[ing] in what manner he or any other member of the grand jury voted on any question before them, or what opinions were expressed by any juror in relation to any such question.” Id.§ 540.310. Missouri law further provides that “[n]o grand juror shall disclose any evidence given before the grand jury, nor the name of any witness who appeared before them, except when lawfully required to testify as a witness in relation thereto.” Id.§ 540.320. A grand juror who unlawfully discloses evidence or names of witnesses “shall be deemed guilty of a class A misdemeanor,” id., which can result in a term of imprisonment and a fine.
Doe would like to speak about her experience as a grand juror and express her opinions about the grand jury's investigation. She would like to correct any implication that the grand jury unanimously found that there was no probable cause to indict Wilson on any charges. Moreover, in Doe's opinion, the prosecutors presented evidence and explained the law differently in the Wilson matter than they had in the other matters presented to the grand jury. Doe claims that she has not recounted her experience or expressed her views because she fears the imposition of criminal penalties or other punishment.
Doe filed suit against McCulloch in his official capacity in January 2015. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Missouri statutes restricting grand jurors from disclosing information were unconstitutional as applied to her. She claimed that the state's grand-jury secrecy laws violate her First Amendment right to free speech. McCulloch moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the district court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)
. The district court decided to abstain and granted the motion to dismiss, even though a lawsuit is typically stayed—not dismissed—under Pullman. See, e.g., Bob's Home Serv., Inc. v. Warren County, 755 F.2d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1985) (); Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1377 (8th Cir. 1980) ().
After her federal lawsuit was dismissed, Doe filed a state-court petition, seeking a declaration that section 540.320 does not apply to her and requesting a release from the oath she took. The petition also set forth her First Amendment claim, but stated that Doe did not seek relief on that claim and instead reserved the right to return to federal district court to have her constitutional claim heard in a federal forum. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 421–22, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964)
().
Meanwhile, in federal district court, Doe moved to alter or amend the judgment, asking that her case be stayed—rather than dismissed—so that she could pursue her First Amendment claim in federal court if her state-law claims proved unsuccessful. Despite the seeming application of the Pullman
doctrine in its previous order, the district court stated in its order denying Doe's motion to alter or amend judgment that it had dismissed the case under the abstention doctrine set forth in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), “a feature of which is outright dismissal of the complaint by the federal court.” Bob's Home Serv., Inc., 755 F.2d at 628. The district court thus instructed Doe to pursue all of her claims in state court.
Doe argues on appeal that the district court erred by dismissing her First Amendment claim under Burford
. “Burford abstention applies when a state has established a complex regulatory scheme supervised by state courts and serving important state interests, and when resolution of the case demands specialized knowledge and the application of complicated state laws.” Bilden v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1990) ; see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 361, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). Doe's lawsuit does not involve any complex regulatory scheme, nor does it demand the delicate balancing of state interests typically found in Burford abstention cases. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 362, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (). Moreover, although the Missouri statutes are not without ambiguity, they also are not particularly complicated. Doe's lawsuit simply does not implicate the principles underlying Burford abstention, for “it does not demand significant...
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