People v. Clay, 1-03-2690.

Decision Date30 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 1-03-2690.,1-03-2690.
Citation836 N.E.2d 872
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dustin CLAY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Sam Adam, Sam Adam, Jr., and Richard J. Dvorak, Chicago, for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, Renee G. Goldfarb, and Sally L. Dilgart, Office of the State's Attorney, Chicago, for Appellee.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Dustin Clay was charged with murder in connection with the stabbing deaths of his girlfriend and two-year-old daughter. After a bench trial, the trial court rejected defendant's insanity defense and found him guilty of murder but mentally ill. Defendant was sentenced to natural life without parole. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the Illinois insanity statute (720 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 2000)) violates the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois constitutions; (2) the Illinois insanity statute violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Illinois constitutions; (3) the Illinois insanity statute violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois constitutions; (4) the trial court erred in finding that defendant was competent to stand trial; and (5) the trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to prove that his actions were a result of mental disease or defect. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant lived with his girlfriend Nicole Lafin and their daughter Jade in a condominium owned by defendant's mother Dinah Clay (Mrs. Clay). Nicole was last seen alive early in the evening of Thursday, May 18, 2000. On May 22, 2000, the police went to the apartment to check on Nicole. When the officers and Mrs. Clay announced themselves, it took defendant 15 to 20 minutes to respond. When asked why it had taken so long to answer the door, defendant stated that he had been sleeping. The bodies of Nicole and Jade were found in the living room.

Officer Robert Smith was assigned to investigate the crime scene and help evidence technicians. He testified as follows. Nicole's body was on the living room floor near the front door. It was covered with a sheet. Jade's body was a few feet away from Nicole's. It was covered with a shirt. A bloody knife was found near Jade's body. There were puddles of blood next to the bodies, and blood stains on the couch cushions and the wall. There were no signs of forced entry into the apartment.

Dr. Aldo Fusaro, an expert in forensic pathology, testified that Nicole sustained 21 stab and incised1 wounds, including nine wounds to her head, neck and face; three wounds to her chest; and nine wounds to her arms and hands. Jade sustained five stab and incised wounds to the neck, a stab wound beneath her chin, and an incised wound extending from her mouth to her ear. Both bodies had begun to decompose. Judging by the condition of the bodies, Nicole and Jade were probably killed sometime between Thursday, May 18, and Friday, May 19.

Defendant was taken into custody. After administering Miranda warnings, detectives Pulia and Kosik questioned defendant. Detective Pulia testified as follows. At first, defendant was silent and did not respond to the detectives. However, neither did defendant indicate that he did not want to talk to the detectives. At some point, defendant started answering the detectives' questions. The detectives mentioned that people had been calling the apartment looking for Nicole, and she had not been to work since Wednesday. Defendant corrected the detectives, telling them that Nicole was at work on Wednesday and Thursday. Defendant next acknowledged that he had talked to a woman from Nicole's work on Monday and told her that Nicole was not home. Defendant also admitted that he had told his mother when she called that Nicole was not home. When the detectives asked whether it was true that Nicole was in the apartment at the time of the phone calls, defendant put his face in his hands and answered "yes." When asked about his whereabouts since Thursday evening, defendant stated that he stayed home, did not go to the store, and nobody came over. At that point, defendant told the detectives that he did not want to talk any more, and the interrogation ceased.

During the in-custody search of defendant, an Arlington Heights Motel 6 receipt was discovered. The detectives drove to the Motel 6 and spoke to an employee, Elsa Muneton. The parties stipulated that the detectives showed Ms. Muneton a photograph of defendant, and Ms. Muneton identified defendant as the person who signed in as Dustin Clay.

In late October of 2002, the court held hearings regarding defendant's fitness to stand trial. Two forensic psychiatrists were called to testify — the State called Dr. Roni Seltzberg, and the defense called Dr. Alexander Obolsky.

Dr. Seltzberg testified as follows. Before interviewing defendant, she reviewed a number of documents, including the arrest report, field reports from the police department, the autopsy report, the indictment, and defendant's psychiatric records. Dr. Seltzberg also examined defendant's medical profile from the Cook County jail's department of health services which indicated that defendant was prescribed Zoloft, an antidepressant. In addition, she spoke with the defendant's counsel (an assistant Public Defender) and an assistant State's Attorney.

Dr. Seltzberg first interviewed defendant on May 17, 2001. During the interview, she inquired into defendant's educational and social background, substance abuse history, psychiatric history, ability to understand the charges against him, and his recollection of the events in the case. Regarding substance abuse, Dr. Seltzberg noted that defendant reported using marijuana in the past. When Dr. Seltzberg told defendant that he was charged with double murder, defendant remarked that he was facing the death penalty. Defendant was able to tell Dr. Seltzberg his next court date and who was the presiding judge. He was able to explain the roles of the assistant State's Attorney and his attorney. Defendant expressed trust in his attorney and stated that he had no difficulty in communicating with her, noting that he could best help his attorney by telling her the truth. Defendant also indicated that he understood: the nature of trial proceedings, including direct and cross examinations; that he had the right to testify, but was not required to do so; and the nature of plea bargaining. When asked about his understanding of an insanity defense, defendant told Dr. Seltzberg that an insanity defense meant that he was "`not being mentally able to understand the situation.'" Dr. Seltzberg stated that, overall,

"[defendant] was oriented to time, place, person, situation. He was not agitated. There was no slowing of his movement or thoughts. There was no thought disorder noted * * *, nothing delusional.

He was responding to questions as if we were having a regular conversation. * * * [N]o long delays for him to think about it.

His speech was of normal rate, normal volume. The only thing that I noted [was] that even though his mood was fine, * * * his outward presentation of his emotions[ ] was kind of flat. He maintained good eye contact. He was cooperative with the evaluation other than not wanting to discuss a couple of things."

On cross-examination, however, Dr. Seltzberg admitted that during a subsequent interview in February of 2002 defendant had told her that he was withholding information from his attorney regarding his alibi defense. Defendant indicated that he believed that if he revealed his alibi witness then some unspecified individuals involved in the drug trade might hurt or kill him or his family. In Dr. Seltzberg's opinion, this withholding of a potential witness "may or may not" have been based on a delusional belief. In addition, Dr. Seltzberg admitted having concerns that defendant had a delusional belief about having been adopted. Defendant based this belief on the fact that he had a "widow's peak" hairline and his parents did not. In Dr. Seltzberg's view, defendant's explanation was "a little bit odd." Dr. Seltzberg additionally recalled reading a report prepared by a social worker who interviewed defendant's parents, where Mrs. Clay indicated that defendant was obsessed with the idea that a record producer had mailed him a check for a million dollars and Mrs. Clay had stolen it.

Dr. Seltzberg further admitted on cross-examination that she was aware of defendant's multiple prior hospitalizations for psychiatric problems. She had reviewed medical records from the hospitals where defendant had undergone psychiatric evaluations on four different occasions in 1999.2 Dr. Seltzberg stated that according to the records, defendant was brought into the emergency room on the first occasion after being found in a catatonic state in his car at a public intersection. Defendant's condition was described as an acute psychotic reaction, possibly attributable to drug use. The second time he was brought into the emergency room, defendant was confused and possibly catatonic. The medical records in regard to that hospitalization "referred to [a] diagnostic impression of an acute psychotic reaction possibly secondary to marijuana." However, defendant's catatonic state may have also been explained by low potassium levels. When defendant was admitted on the third occasion, he was "totally non-communicative for several days and acting in a guarded manner." Thereafter, defendant displayed psychotic symptoms, which included religious delusions and "paranoid and anxious affect."3 Defendant was "preoccupied with internal stimuli" — meaning, in lay terms, that he may have been hearing voices or experiencing visual hallucinations. For instance, without any prompting from the hospital personnel, defendant stated that he was not...

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7 cases
  • People v. Garcia
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 8, 2015
    ...the State must prove the defendant fit by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Clay, 361 Ill.App.3d 310, 331, 297 Ill.Dec. 141, 836 N.E.2d 872 (2005). ¶ 52 Fitness and mental illness differ: fitness is a legal term determined by a judge or jury; mental illness is diagnosed by a licens......
  • People v. Stahl
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • May 22, 2014
    ...due process and does not impose an unduly restrictive burden on the State); People v. Clay, 361 Ill.App.3d 310, 331, 297 Ill.Dec. 141, 836 N.E.2d 872 (2005). ¶ 27 The issue of whether a defendant's amnesia as to the events surrounding the crime per se renders him unfit to stand trial is one......
  • People v. Sedlacek
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 28, 2013
    ...between a claim of unfitness to stand trial and a plea of insanity” ( People v. Clay, 361 Ill.App.3d 310, 324, 297 Ill.Dec. 141, 836 N.E.2d 872 (2005)). “Fitness addresses a defendant's ability to function and participate in court proceedings,” while “insanity involves whether a defendant, ......
  • People v. Stahl
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 19, 2013
    ...proceedings against him or if he is unable to assist counsel in his defense. People v. Clay, 361 Ill.App.3d 310, 330, 297 Ill.Dec. 141, 836 N.E.2d 872, 889 (2005) (quoting 725 ILCS 5/104–10 (West 2000)). Once a bona fide doubt is raised as to the defendant's fitness to stand trial, the Stat......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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