Sykes v. Cook Cnty. Circuit Court Probate Div.

• Decision Date: 14 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–1781,15–1781
• Citation: 837 F.3d 736
• Parties: Gloria Jean Sykes, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Cook County Circuit Court Probate Division, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

837 F.3d 736

Gloria Jean Sykes, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Cook County Circuit Court Probate Division, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 15–1781

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 5, 2016

Decided September 14, 2016

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied October 27, 2016^*

Richard M. Varchetto, Attorney, Law Offices Of Richard M. Varchetto, Elmhurst, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Mary Ellen Welsh, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Peter J. Schmiedel, Ronald D. Menna, Jr., Attorneys, Fischel & Kahn, Amy L. Anderson, Joshua C. Bell, Attorneys, Brenner, Monroe, Scott & Anderson, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before Wood, Chief Judge, and Bauer and Williams, Circuit Judges.

Williams

, Circuit Judge.

Gloria Jean Sykes went to her mother's probate proceeding to present a motion and brought her service dog, Shaggy. Instead of letting her present her motion, the judge asked her a series of questions about Shaggy, struck her motion, and entered an order barring Shaggy from the courtroom. Gloria argues that she should be able to bring a lawsuit in federal court for denial of reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. But because the source of her injury is a state court judgment, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear her case.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Gloria's First Federal Lawsuit

This case originates in an earlier guardianship dispute between two sisters over their mother, Mary G. Sykes. Gloria Jean Sykes is Mary's younger daughter. Carolyn Toerpe, her older daughter, was granted guardianship of Mary in 2009. After losing the state guardianship battle, Gloria filed a lawsuit in 2011 in federal court, alleging that Toerpe, the Cook County Guardian, two participating guardians ad litem, the Cook County Circuit Court, then-Governor Quinn, and the state of Illinois were violating the ADA by refusing reasonable accommodations to her mother. Gloria alleged among other things that the state defendants were depriving her mother of the right to be present at court proceedings and to receive reasonable accommodations in the form of support and consultation with family members. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that if Gloria obtained the relief she sought, it would be forced to overturn the state court decision granting guardianship to Toerpe, in violation of the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine. It also relied on long-established precedent that federal courts may not intervene in state probate proceedings. We affirmed the dismissal of that lawsuit. M.G.S. ex rel. Sykes v. Toerpe , No. 12–3373, Dkt. 19 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013) (unpublished order).

B. State Probate Proceeding

After losing her federal appeal, Gloria returned to state court, pursuing her federal claims in a “Motion for Reasonable Accommodations,” seeking relief both for herself and her mother in the probate proceeding. On the day the motion was scheduled for hearing, Gloria went to the Daley Center with her service dog, Shaggy, whom she uses for assistance with her post-traumatic stress disorder

. She entered the building without a problem and then went up to the courtroom of Judge Aicha MacCarthy, who was presiding over Mary's probate case. Gloria alleges that Judge MacCarthy called the case, and then “immediately, angrily, and indifferently” interrogated Gloria about her need for Shaggy. She also states that the interrogation lasted for several minutes, and at its end, MacCarthy “expelled Gloria and her dog from the courtroom—banned forever.” While it's unclear what caused Gloria to think the ban was in perpetuity, the probate record reflects that Judge MacCarthy entered an order striking Gloria's motion without prejudice and prohibiting Gloria from returning with Shaggy without leave of the court.

C. The Current Lawsuit

Gloria returned to federal court with a new complaint that recycled many of her old claims, but added one that is the focus of today's decision: she alleged that by banning Shaggy from her courtroom, various state defendants violated Gloria's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court again dismissed all claims that Gloria asserted on behalf of her mother for largely the same reasons as the first lawsuit. It then turned specifically to Gloria's claim regarding Shaggy and concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine if Gloria's ADA rights were violated because she was denied use of a service animal during court proceedings. First, it held that because Gloria's claim against the state defendants was inextricably intertwined with the state court order banning Shaggy and striking Gloria's reasonable accommodation motion, as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine. Rooke

r v. Fidelity Tr. Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) ; D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Second, it held that it was barred from hearing the claim because it arose out of a state probate proceeding. And finally, it held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because Gloria had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about Shaggy in state court. See

Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Gloria only challenges the district court's dismissal of her ADA claim pertaining to the use of Shaggy in Judge MacCarthy's courtroom. We review a district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, accept as true all facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.

G & S Holdings, LLC v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2012)

. We may affirm a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on any ground that the record supports. Sladek v. Bell Mgmt. Pension Plan , 880 F.2d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 1989).

A. ADA Accommodations for Service Animals

Before reaching the question of jurisdiction, it helps to understand the substantive footing of Gloria's claim. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits public entities (which includes instrumentalities of state and local governments, like courthouses) from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.,

42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA's accommodation mandate reflects enforcement efforts by Congress to ensure citizens' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004). In Lane, the Supreme Court considered the Title II claims of paraplegic litigants and members of the public who were forced to crawl up stairs to access a courtroom, and held that Congress was authorized to, and did, abrogate Tennessee's right to sovereign immunity in defending against the claims by passing Title II of the ADA. Id . at 531, 124 S.Ct. 1978.

With a few exceptions, Title II requires public entities to permit service animals to accompany people with disabilities in all areas where members of the public are allowed to go. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(g)

. Service animals are defined as dogs that are individually trained to do work or perform tasks for people with disabilities. Id . at § 35.104. “Emotional support animals” are not considered service animals which fall under Title II's mandate. Id . In situations where it is not obvious if a dog is a service animal, employees of a public entity are permitted to ask if the dog is a service animal required because of a disability, and what work or task the dog has been trained to perform. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f). They are not permitted to request documentation for the dog, require the dog to demonstrate a task, or inquire about the nature of the person's disability. Id .

The basis of Gloria's ADA claim on appeal is that Judge MacCarthy and by extension, the Probate Division of Cook County Circuit Court, asked impermissible questions to bar Shaggy from the courtroom, and denied Gloria reasonable accommodations by banning Shaggy. Gloria's complaint claims that Shaggy is a service dog, and we will proceed on that assumption for the purposes of our analysis. Because Shaggy was banned from the courtroom, Gloria claims she was effectively excluded from participating in and benefiting from services of the courthouse. This case differs from a Lane- style claim of denial of access to a courthouse, because her exclusion from the courthouse stemmed from a judicial order, not from a courthouse policy or practice.

B. District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction

With her claim now framed, we must determine if the district court had jurisdiction over Gloria's claim. At the time of the district court's decision, Mary's probate proceeding was ongoing. As a result, the district court applied Younger

abstention, the principle that federal courts should abstain from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings that are judicial in nature, involve important state interests, provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims, and do not contain special circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate. See

Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez , 505 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2007). Between the district court's ruling and this appeal, Mary died, so her probate proceeding is terminated. As a result of Mary's death, Younger

is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for us to disturb.

The district court also invoked the probate exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction, which precludes federal courts from interfering with persons and property that are in the custody of a state probate court. Marshall v. Marshall , 547 U.S. 293, 311-12, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006)

. The rationale for the rule is that in situations where a state court controls the subject of a custody battle or the property in a decedent's estate, another court should not “be permitted to...