Daniel v. Ferguson
| Decision Date | 17 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-2998,86-2998 |
| Citation | 839 F.2d 1124 |
| Parties | Lewis R. DANIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wayne FERGUSON, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Frank P. Hernandez, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert T. Mowrey, David M. Pyke, Dallas, Tex., for Ferguson, et al.
Bob Lemens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jerry Benedict, Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for Thompson, Weaver, Hagan.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before GOLDBERG, POLITZ and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 seeks to recover for deprivation of property rights without due process of law and for arrest without probable cause. After hearing the plaintiff's evidence the district court dismissed the case under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although we find that the district court had jurisdiction we affirm the disposition of plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate (1) that he was deprived of any property rights and (2) that the violation, if any, of his rights in connection with his arrest resulted from state action. Plaintiff also sought recovery under state law. The district court, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, did not reach the merits of these state law claims. We remand plaintiff's pendent state claims to the district court for exercise of its discretion as to the appropriate disposition.
On March 23, 1982, Plaintiff, Lewis R. Daniel, borrowed $687,000 from Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation ("the Lender"). 1 Plaintiff gave the Lender a security interest in his farm land in Delta County, Texas ("the Farm"). On July 5, 1983, many months after Plaintiff had defaulted in his loan payments, the Lender foreclosed on the Farm. Even after the foreclosure, however, Plaintiff remained on the Farm. Plaintiff was a rent free tenant at will. In two letters, dated December 3, 1983 and February 14, 1984, the Lender gave Plaintiff formal notice of termination of his tenant at will status. Plaintiff testified that he nevertheless stayed on the Farm until late February or early March and returned to the Farm in early April, on at least one of the following days: April 9, 11, 12 or 13. Plaintiff also testified that he put chains and a lock on the Farm's gate around April 9.
On April 9, 1984, Plaintiff filed this action and a state court action challenging the Lender's foreclosure procedures and the Lender's title to the Farm.
On April 24, 1984, four relevant events occurred.
First, in the 162nd District Court of Delta County, Texas, defendant Judge Jim N. Thompson granted the Lender's request for a temporary restraining order to prevent Plaintiff from entering the Farm.
Second, an employee of the Lender, defendant Jim Judge, swore out a criminal trespass complaint against Plaintiff. The complaint alleged that "on or about the 10th day of April, 1984" Plaintiff "did then and there, intentionally and knowingly, remain on property, without the effective consent of L & N Land Corporation, the owner thereof, and the said defendant had received notice to depart but failed to do so." At the trial in this case, however, defendant Jim Judge testified that he did not actually see Plaintiff on the property on April 10, 1984. Defendant Jim Judge also testified
Third, on the basis of defendant Jim Judge's complaint, Delta County Justice of the Peace W.T. Alley, a defendant, issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff.
Fourth, D.P.S. Officers Hagen and Weaver, both named as defendants, attempted to serve this arrest warrant on Plaintiff at the Farm. Daniel testified that he observed the Lender's employees, defendants Jim Judge and Kent Krause, on the Farm at the same time as these two D.P.S. officers. Daniel testified that he was observing from a distance, and that he did not know why the officers were on the Farm and could not hear what they said. At the trial defendant Jim Judge testified that the Lender's employees and the D.P.S. officers were present on the Farm at the same time by coincidence.
The next day, April 25, 1984, Delta County Sheriff Michael Holbert and Delta County Deputy Sheriff Joe Zihlman, both named as defendants, served the arrest warrant.
On May 4, 1984, after a hearing attended by Plaintiff in the 162nd District Court of Delta County, Texas, defendant Judge Jim N. Thompson finalized the temporary restraining order by entering a temporary injunction ordering Daniel to stay off the Farm.
In this case Plaintiff named the six individual government employees identified above and ten private, nongovernmental defendants. In addition to the private defendants identified above, Plaintiff sued: Charlie Cullipher, the Lender's lessee; Jim Alsup and Randy Henderson, Cullipher's employees; Wayne Ferguson and Bruce French, the Lender's employees; and Charles Stegall, the purchaser of some of the personal property Daniel left on the Farm. The district court dismissed two additional defendants, the Lender's attorneys Julie McCoy and Robert Mowrey, before trial.
Before trial, the federal district court granted Judge Thompson's and Justice of the Peace Alley's motions for summary judgment based on absolute judicial immunity. The court found that these two defendants performed the acts that Plaintiff complained of in their capacity as judicial officers. 2 The Plaintiff also sued four other state actors, Delta County Sheriff Michael Holbert, Delta County Deputy Sheriff Joe Zihlman, and D.P.S. Officers Jerry Hagen and James Weaver. Before trial, the district court granted these four state actor defendants summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. 3 On appeal Plaintiff does not complain about the district court's disposition of the immunity motions. As a result we consider only the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against the private defendants.
The district court impaneled a jury and tried the case against the private defendants on the basis of the pretrial order 4 which included the Sec. 1983 claims and state law claims involving the legality of the Lender's foreclosure, defenses to the Lender's note, and trespass. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The district court concluded that it had no subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to prove a claim under Sec. 1983.
The district court cited McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Committee, 374 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896, 88 S.Ct. 216, 19 L.Ed.2d 214 (1967), to support its dismissal of Daniel's case under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In McBeath this court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to develop his evidence because the issue of jurisdiction and the merits were closely tied together and inseparable. Id. at 363.
The McBeath holding, although still good law, does not logically require that after having given the plaintiff an opportunity to develop his evidence the trial court should still dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. This court has held that
[w]hether a federal court has jurisdiction to decide a case and whether a plaintiff has a cause of action under a federal statute are distinct inquiries that must be addressed separately.... [T]he failure to present an adequate section 1983 claim does not strip the court of jurisdiction unless the claim is clearly immaterial, frivolous, and wholly insubstantial....
This court, consistent with the great weight of legal authority, has held that when a defendant's challenge to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, the proper procedure for the district court is to find that jurisdiction exists and to deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case. 5
The district court therefore erred in dismissing Daniel's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In addition to the jurisdictional objection, defendants also properly made a motion for directed verdict at the close of the Plaintiff's case. In Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (1969) (en banc) this court set forth the following standard for ruling on a motion for directed verdict:
[T]he court should consider all of the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case--but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury.
Id. at 374. "In passing on a motion for a directed verdict ... the court does not exercise discretion, but decides a pure question of law...." United States v. Bucon Construction Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir.1970). To determine whether the trial court should have granted a directed verdict we apply the same standard as the trial court would have originally. Rosenberg v. Trautwein, 624 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir.1980). We affirm the district court's reasoning and, finding Plainti...
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