Chatham v. Davis

• Decision Date: 17 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14-3318,14-3318
• Citation: 839 F.3d 679
• Parties: Jocelyn Chatham, Administrator of the Estate of Marvin T. McDonald, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Randy Davis, Warden, Pinckneyville Correctional Center, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

839 F.3d 679

Jocelyn Chatham, Administrator of the Estate of Marvin T. McDonald, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Randy Davis, Warden, Pinckneyville Correctional Center, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 14-3318

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued October 26, 2015

Decided October 17, 2016

Christopher R. Smith, Attorney, Smith, Johnson & Antholt, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Carl J. Elitz, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, Rodney M. Sharp, Attorney, Sandberg Phoenix & Von Gontard P.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before Wood, Chief Judge, and Bauer and Sykes, Circuit Judges.

Sykes

, Circuit Judge.

Marvin McDonald died after suffering an asthma

attack while he was an inmate at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, an Illinois prison. His estate, administered by Jocelyn Chatham, sued the prison's warden, Wexford Health Services (a private corporation contracted to run the prison's healthcare unit), a prison doctor and nurse, and several prison guards under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chatham claimed that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to McDonald's serious medical needs, violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment. A magistrate judge entered summary judgment for the warden and Wexford. The other claims went to trial, and a jury found for the remaining defendants. Chatham now appeals, challenging the order granting summary judgment for the warden and Wexford. She also challenges the denial of her motions for leave to amend her complaint, for discovery sanctions, and for a new trial.

We affirm. The magistrate judge was right to enter summary judgment for the warden and Wexford. Chatham did not produce evidence to support a reasonable inference that the warden consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm to McDonald. Nor did she have evidence showing that a Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional injury. Finally, the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to allow leave to amend, impose a discovery sanction, or grant a new trial.

I. Background

McDonald was an inmate at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, an Illinois prison, and was housed in the segregation unit. At about 5 p.m. on May 26, 2010, he began to suffer an asthma

attack in his cell. His symptoms persisted, and after a few hours, he told his cellmate about his situation. Unlike certain other units in the prison, the segregation cells did not have emergency call buttons, so his cellmate banged on the cell door to alert the guards. A guard eventually responded and escorted McDonald to the prison's healthcare unit. By that time it was approximately 12:15 a.m.

Pinckneyville's healthcare unit is run by Wexford, a private company under contract with the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). The healthcare unit was supposed to be managed by a permanent medical director, but the post had been vacant for more than a year. To cover the position, two Wexford doctors split the medical director's responsibilities: Dr. Jill Wahl, a traveling medical director, and Dr. Dennis Larson, a regional medical director.

When McDonald arrived at the healthcare unit, he was wheezing and using his accessory muscles

to breathe. Nurse Rhonda Reuter checked his vital signs, assessed the oxygen saturation in his blood

, and measured his peak expiratory flow rate, which was extremely low. Nurse Reuter started him on oxygen and administered an albuterol nebulizer and epinephrine. She then phoned Dr. Larson for a consult.

Dr. Larson was on call for about a dozen IDOC facilities that evening, although he was only the backup on-call doctor for most of these facilities. He slept through Nurse Reuter's call. At about 2 a.m. he finally returned her call and was briefed on McDonald's situation. He continued the oxygen, prescribed more albuterol

, and added prednisone, a steroid. Dr. Larson called back again about a half hour later to check on McDonald's status and was told that he was still using his accessory muscles to breathe. At that point Dr. Larson ordered McDonald transferred to Pinckneyville Community Hospital via ambulance, calling ahead to alert the emergency-room staff of his condition.

In the ambulance McDonald was given more albuterol

and another asthma medication. He arrived at the hospital at 3:45 a.m. and was seen by a Dr. Reyes 15 minutes later. Dr. Reyes treated him with more albuterol, still another medication to aid in breathing, and more epinephrine. These treatments continued throughout the early morning hours. At 5:20 a.m. McDonald was still having difficulty breathing, so Dr. Reyes inserted a breathing tube. The initial attempt to insert the tube failed, but by 5:44 a.m. intubation was achieved. It was too late. A Code Blue was called at 5:53 a.m. McDonald died at 6:09 a.m.

Chatham, the administrator of McDonald's estate, filed this § 1983

suit alleging that various prison officials and Wexford were deliberately indifferent to McDonald's serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In addition to Wexford, the named defendants included Randy Davis, the Pinckneyville warden; Dr. Larson and Nurse Reuter; and the guards who were responsible for monitoring McDonald on the date in question. The claims against the warden and Wexford focused on the lack of a permanent medical director in the healthcare unit and the lack of emergency call buttons in the segregation-unit cells. The complaint also alleged that Wexford failed to adequately train Nurse Reuter in 911 protocols specific to asthma-related emergencies like McDonald's. A magistrate judge entered summary judgment for Warden Davis and Wexford on these claims.

The claims against the remaining defendants—Dr. Larson, Nurse Reuter, and the prison guards—were allowed to proceed. Before trial but after the expiration of the court's deadline to amend the pleadings, Chatham sought leave to file a third amended complaint to add state-law claims against Nurse Reuter and Dr. Larson. The magistrate judge denied the motion. Chatham also moved for discovery sanctions against Wexford for dragging its feet in disclosing its treatment protocols relating to asthma

. That motion, too, was denied. The remaining claims were tried to a jury, which returned a defense verdict. After an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, Chatham appealed.

II. Analysis

Chatham seeks review of four separate orders: (1) the magistrate judge's order granting summary judgment for Warden Davis and Wexford; (2) the denial of leave to file a third amended complaint; (3) the denial of discovery sanctions; and (4) the denial of her motion for a new trial.

A. Summary Judgment

We review the magistrate judge's summary-judgment order de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Chatham and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Burton v. Downey , 805 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2015)

. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Chatham alleged that Warden Davis and Wexford violated McDonald's rights under the Eighth Amendment by deliberately failing to mitigate risks to the health and safety of inmates in the Pinckneyville prison in several respects. “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) ). A prison official may be liable for deliberate indifference only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). A medical deliberate-indifference claim requires proof that the prisoner suffered from “(1) an objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.” Duckworth v. Ahmad , 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008).

McDonald's asthma

attack, which ultimately proved fatal, plainly qualifies as an objectively serious medical condition. The question here is whether Chatham produced sufficient evidence on the state-of-mind element of the claim. The inquiry is a subjective one: “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 ; see also

Petties v. Carter , No. 14–2674, 836 F.3d 722, 728, 2016 WL 4631679, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016) (en banc) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed us that a plaintiff must provide evidence that an official actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.”). “The requirement of subjective awareness tethers the deliberate-indifference cause of action to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment....” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. , No. 15–1647, 839 F.3d 658, 662, 2016 WL 5934768 (7th Cir. Oct. 12, 2016).

Chatham argues that Warden Davis was deliberately indifferent in two respects: (1) He failed to install emergency call buttons in the segregation unit and (2) he failed to ensure that the position of permanent medical director was filled in a timely fashion. The evidence doesn't support either contention.

Nothing in the record suggests that Warden Davis had actual knowledge of specific facts that would support an inference that the absence of emergency call buttons created a substantial risk of harm. There's no evidence, for example, that he ignored recommendations to install such a system or that he was aware of previous emergencies in the segregation unit that the presence of call buttons would have averted. Cf. Petties , 836 F.3d at 729–30, 2016 WL 4631679, at *4

(discussing the types of evidence...