84 Hawai'i 191, State v. Schmidt, 17185

Citation932 P.2d 328
Decision Date17 January 1997
Docket NumberNo. 17185,17185
Parties84 Hawai'i 191 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Jerome SCHMIDT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Hawai'i

James S. Tabe, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Robert K. Kekuna, Jr., Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, County of Maui, on the brief, Wailuku, Maui, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BURNS, C.J., and WATANABE and ACOBA, JJ.

ACOBA, Judge.

We hold that (1) Defendant-Appellant David Jerome Schmidt (Defendant) was brought to trial on his theft charge within 180 days as required under article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD or the IAD), Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 834, (2) the 180-day period ran from receipt of Defendant's request for final disposition of outstanding charges by the State of Hawai'i (the State), and not from the date the request was filed with Minnesota officials having custody of Defendant, (3) the time attributable to determining Defendant's motion to continue trial and the period of the continuance are excludable from the 180-day period, and (4) the excludable periods tolled the 180-day period without the necessity of a formal determination by the trial court (court). We hold, further, that (5) Defendant's failure to object to the trial date for his bail jumping charge, which was set beyond the 180-day period, waived any objections brought after the period had run and that Defendant implicitly consented to his bail jumping trial date by requesting a consolidation of his theft trial with his bail jumping trial for the purpose of plea bargaining. Finally, we hold that (6) Defendant was not entitled to credit on his Hawai'i sentence for time served for a Minnesota offense, and (7) any improper trial comments by the State were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

I.

On March 16, 1993, a jury found Defendant guilty of second degree theft, in violation of HRS § 708-831(1)(b) (Supp.1990) (theft) and first degree bail jumping, in violation of HRS § 710-1024 (1985) (bail jumping). On May 14, 1993, judgment was filed accordingly, and the court sentenced Defendant to five years incarceration in each case with the terms to run concurrently.

On June 14, 1993, Defendant appealed.

On appeal, Defendant raises six arguments.

II.
A.

Four of Defendant's six arguments relate to the application of the IAD.

The IAD sets forth:

procedures by which compact members may secure the presence at trial of a prisoner incarcerated in the jurisdiction of another compact member and by which a prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of charges against him or her pending in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he or she is incarcerated.

State v. Batungbacal, 81 Hawai'i 123, 126, 913 P.2d 49, 52 (1996); State v. Willoughby, 83 Hawai'i 496, 501, 927 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Haw.App.1996). Article III(a) of the IAD requires that a prisoner demanding disposition of pending charges must be brought to trial in the charging state within 180 days of the prisoner's demand. This "speedy trial" provision states, in pertinent part:

(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a ... party state, and whenever during the ... term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after the prisoner shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of the prisoner's imprisonment and the prisoner's request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.

HRS § 834-1, art. III (1993) (emphases added). In essence, by submitting an article III request, a prisoner forfeits his or her right to contest extradition in "exchange for the surety that outstanding charges will be resolved at trial within the specified time frame of 180 days[.]" Batungbacal, 81 Hawai'i at 127, 913 P.2d at 53.

B.

The following facts are relevant to Defendant's IAD contentions.

On March 23, 1992, Defendant was indicted for theft. On April 27, 1992, Defendant was indicted for bail jumping. Arrest warrants were issued for Defendant.

On August 6, 1992, while incarcerated in the Minnesota Correctional Facility, Defendant filed a request for final disposition of the aforesaid outstanding indictments pursuant to article III of the IAD. On August 17, 1992, the Maui Prosecutor received the appropriate IAD forms. 1 On December 19, 1992, Defendant was returned to Hawai'i.

On December 23, 1992, the court set Defendant's trial on the theft charge for February 8, 1993. Measured from August 17, 1992, a total of 175 days would elapse to the trial date of February 8. His trial on the bail jumping charge was set for March 15, 1993, 210 days from August 17, 1992.

On January 28, 1993, Defendant filed a motion to continue trial on the theft charge to March 15, 1993. At the time of Defendant's motion to continue, 164 days of the 180-day period had elapsed. On February 2, 1993, the court granted the Defendant's motion to continue trial to March 15, 1993, and Defendant requested consolidation of the trials on the theft and the bail jumping charges. The State did not object.

On March 5, 1993, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the theft and bail jumping indictments. The court denied the motion to dismiss at a hearing held on March 10, 1993. An order was entered accordingly on March 16, 1993.

On March 15, 1993, Defendant proceeded to trial on the theft and bail jumping charges and was found guilty on March 16, 1993. 2

III.
A.

First, Defendant argues that the court erred in finding that the IAD's 180-day period commenced on August 17, 1993, the date when the State received notice of the Defendant's desire to dispose of his Hawai'i charges. Instead, Defendant contends that the time for counting the IAD "speedy trial" provision began on August 6, 1992, the date when he filed his request for a final disposition of his outstanding charges with the official having custody of him.

Contrary to Defendant's position, "[t]he 180-day time limit of article III(a) begins to run once the prisoner's request for final disposition is delivered to the prosecuting officer and court of the receiving state." Batungbacal, 81 Hawai'i at 127, 913 P.2d at 53 (citing Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 53-54, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1091-92, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993) ("[T]he 180-day time period in Article III(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.")).

When the parties filed their briefs, State v. Carroll, 4 Haw.App. 573, 670 P.2d 1290 (1983), controlled. Carroll stood for the proposition that the appropriate date to commence the time period for counting the IAD's "speedy trial" provision was when the prisoner filed a request for final disposition with the official having custody of him. Carroll, 4 Haw.App. at 576, 670 P.2d at 1292-93.

The IAD, however, is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact coming within the scope of the Compact Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). The Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, provides in pertinent part: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...." Thus,

[b]y vesting in Congress the power to grant or withhold consent, or to condition consent on the States' compliances with specified conditions, the Framers sought to ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority.

Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 439-40, 101 S.Ct. 703, 707, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). The IAD, therefore, is a federal law subject to federal court construction. Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719, 105 S.Ct. at 3403 (citing Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438-42, 101 S.Ct. at 706-09 ("[C]ongressional consent transforms an interstate compact ... into a law of the United States[.]")).

Consequently, the United States Supreme Court's construction of article III(a) in Fex is controlling, and the holding in Carroll is no longer viable. As previously indicated, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has adopted the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of article III(a). Batungbacal, 81 Hawai'i at 127, 913 P.2d at 53. Therefore, we disregard the State's concession in its answering brief that the 180-day period began to run on August 6, 1992.

We hold, then, that the lower court did not err when it held that the 180-day time period began to run on August 17, 1992.

B.
1.

Second, Defendant asserts that the lower court erred in excluding the period beginning January 28, 1993 and ending February 2, 1993 from the aforesaid 180-day time limit. This period reflects the time which elapsed between Defendant's filing of his motion for a trial continuance in the theft case and the date of the hearing at which the court granted his motion.

HRS § 834-1, art. VI(a) of the IAD states in pertinent part:

(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.

(Emphasis added.)

In Batungba...

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