People ex rel. Thompson v. St. Francis Xavier Female Acad.

• Citation: 233 Ill. 26,84 N.E. 55
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. THOMPSON, County Treasurer, v. ST. FRANCIS XAVIER FEMALE ACADEMY.
• Decision Date: 20 February 1908
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

233 Ill. 26

84 N.E. 55

PEOPLE ex rel. THOMPSON, County Treasurer,

v.ST. FRANCIS XAVIER FEMALE ACADEMY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1908.

Appeal from Cook County Court; John B. Vaughan, Judge.

Proceedings in the name of the people ex rel. John R. Thompson, county treasurer, against the St. Francis Xavier Female Academy, to enforce a tax. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals. Reversed.

George W. Wilbur, for appellant.

Harry A. Lewis, County Attorney, and William F. Struckmann, for appellee.

FARMER, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook county against certain lots of appellant in the city of Chicago for taxes for the year 1906. Appellant is a corporation, organized under a special act of the General Assembly in 1847, and given perpetual succession. It was given power to acquire, hold, and convey real and personal property, and was required to hold the property of the institution solely for the purposes of education and not as stock for the individual benefit of the incorporators or any contributor, and apply all funds collected, or the proceeds of the property, in erecting suitable buildings,supporting necessary officers, instructors and servants, and procuring books and apparatus necessary to the success of said institution. It was also given power to confer such academical or honorary degrees as are usually conferred by similar institutions. The institution had about 600 students, ranging in age from 7 to 22 years. It owned a block of land upon which its buildings were located, and was desirous of obtaining the lots against which the taxes in controversy are levied. Said lots comprised a block, and lay opposite the property of appellant, being separated from the same by Evans avenue. In the fall of 1904 appellant entered into negotiations, through the Equitable Trust Company, for the purchase of the block desired. The lots were owned by a number of persons, and W. F. Grower was employed by John R. Walsh, president of said trust company, to act as a broker in purchasing the property. Grower purchased pieces of the property from time to time up to December, 1905, taking the title in his own name. December 15, 1905, one of the pieces of property sought to be taxed was deeded by Grower to appellant, the deed being filed for record December 29, 1905. Deeds to the other pieces of property were made by Grower to the Equitable Trust Company, bearing date December 14, 1904, and recorded December 30, 1905. The Equitable Trust Company advanced the money to make the purchases, and charged appellant interest on the same. The interest amounted to $4,890.95. Appellant also paid said company $500 for its services in connection with the purchase, and April 4, 1906, paid Grower $1,764.79 for making said purchases, Mary Ryan, president of appellant, made the arrangements with Mr. Walsh for the purchase of the property, and state the understanding between the parties was that Mr. Walsh would look after the purchase for the academy, and would advance or loan the money for the purchase, and would take care of it for them until they were able to take care of it themselves. The trust company advanced the money to make the purchases, and appellant repaid the same, making a payment of $12,950, January 12, 1905, one of $760.26 on February 14, 1905, and the balance, $77,890.95, August 17, 1906. On January 8, 1906, appellant made application for a loan on the property to the Mutual Life Insurance Company to obtain the money to make the last above mentioned payment to the trust company. The attorney who examined the title preliminary to making the loan found title to all the lots, except the one to which the deed had been made direct to appellant, in the Equitable Trust Company, and afterwards, on August 3, 1906, a deed was made to appellant for the lots to which it held title, and also a declaration of trust, which was attached thereto, showing that the title to said lots had been acquired in trust for appellant. These were recorded on August 17, 1906, after the making of the last payment to said trust company. In the fall of 1905 appellant seems to have taken possession of the property, and began to improve it by removing brushwood, planting trees, and laying out walks and drives, and in June, 1906, paid the taxes thereon for the year 1905. February 8, 1906, the city of Chicago, in consideration of the dedication by appellant of a strip of land on the west side of the property originally owned by appellant, vacated Evans avenue from Forth-Ninth to Fiftieth street, the ordinance stating appellant was the owner of the property in question. In the fall of 1906 a fence was put around all of the premises owned by appellant, and the property in controversy was used as a park or recreation ground for the pupils of the school. All of the property purchased as above, consisting of lots 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, was assessed and taxes extended against it for the year 1906. When application for judgment was made, appellant filed objections, claiming the same to be exempt because it was the property of an institution of learning. Judgment was rendered against the said property for taxes, and the case is brought here by appeal.

Two questions are presented by this appeal: Is appellant an institution of learning, as provided by section 2 of the revenue act? and was it the owner of the property on the 1st day of April, 1906? As a portion of lot 9 of the property in question was by deed conveyed direct to appellant on December 15, 1905, thereby making it the owner, at least, of that portion on April 1, 1906, it will be necessary to first determine whether appellant is an institution of learning within the meaning of the statute. The statute exempts from taxation ‘all lands donated by the United States for school purposes, not sold or leased; all public school houses; all property of institutions of learning, including the real estate on which the institutions are located, not leased by such institutions or otherwise used with a view to profit.’ The property in question was within the same inclosure as the school buildings of appellant, and was used as a playground for the pupils of the institution, and for no other purpose, and under the holding of this court in Monticello Female...