Pinnell v. Burroughs
| Decision Date | 24 February 1915 |
| Docket Number | 111. |
| Parties | PINNELL ET AL. v. BURROUGHS ET AL. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Warren County; Ferguson, Judge.
Action by W. A. J. Pinnell and others against W. C. Burroughs and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
A purchaser at a judicial sale may, so long as the decree stands, presume that it has been regularly rendered.
This action, to recover the possession of land, was brought by W A. J. Pinnell, Robert L. Pinnell, and Lena Andrews, as children and heirs at law of Jackson Pinnell, against the defendants, who are the children of Lucy W. Pinnell, the widow of Jackson Pinnell, by her subsequent marriage with John H. Burroughs, who was her second husband. The land in dispute is that which was allotted to the widow of Jackson Pinnell, and plaintiffs alleged that at her death the defendants wrongfully took possession thereof. Plaintiffs further allege that Jackson Pinnell, at the time of his death, was seised of the said land, and that it descended to them, as his heirs at law. Defendants admit that Jackson Pinnell was, at one time, seised of the said land, but deny that it descended to plaintiffs, as his heirs. On the contrary, they aver that the "reversionary interest" therein, or the fee subject to the widow's dower, was sold under a judgment of the superior court of Warren county, where the land is situated, in a suit or proceeding entitled Henry B. Hunter, executor of Willis Lloyd, deceased, against Willis A. J. Pinnell (one of the plaintiffs in this action) and others, who were the other plaintiffs.
The court held that, in the state of the pleadings, the burden was upon the defendants, and they offered, as evidence The court permitted the deed to be read as evidence. It had been proved November 25, 1870, and registered March 4, 1871, and was in the following words and figures:
"This indenture made and entered into this the 20th day of September, 1870, between Henry B. Hunter, executor of Willis Lloyd, party of the first part, and John H. Burroughs, party of the second part, all of Warren county, state of North Carolina, Witnesseth: That the said party of the first part was, by a decree of the superior court of the said county of Warren, made in a certain cause wherein the said party of the first part was plaintiff, and Willis A. J. Pinnell, an infant under twenty-one years old, and others, were defendants, ordered to sell, for the purpose of paying the debts of the said Willis Lloyd, which his personal property was insufficient to discharge, certain real estate of the said Willis Lloyd, to wit, the reversion after the life estate of Mrs. Lucy W. Burroughs, in a tract of land of 238 acres, situated in the said county of Warren, on the waters of Rich Neck, adjoining the lands of Jacob Parker, Henry Williams, and others, same being the tract which was assigned to the said Lucy W. Burroughs, then Lucy W. Pinnell; and whereas, the said party of the first part, in pursuance of the said decree, did on the 14th day of May, 1870, sell the said real estate at auction at the courthouse door in the town of Warrenton, when said party of the second part became the purchaser in the sum of one thousand dollars and paid the whole of the purchase money in cash; and whereas, upon report of the said sale to the said court, the same was in all respects confirmed, and said party of the first part was by final decree in said cause ordered to execute a deed for said real estate to the said party of the second part: Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises and of the said sum of one thousand dollars, the receipt of which is hereby again acknowledged, the party of the first part has given, granted, bargained, sold, and conveyed, and doth by these presents give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey, unto the said party of the second part and his heirs forever, the real estate heretofore described. To have and to hold the same with all appurtenances thereto belonging to him the said party of the second part and his heirs forever. In testimony whereof the said party of the first part has hereunto set his hand and affixed his seal on the date first above written.
H. B. Hunter, [Seal.]
Executor of Willis Lloyd."
It was admitted that the plaintiff Willis A. J. Pinnell was heir at law of Willis Lloyd, deceased. The court was of the opinion, and so ruled, that, even if the defendants should show the loss of the records recited in the deed, the deed could not be considered as evidence of title against the plaintiffs, who are the heirs at law of Jackson Pinnell; the sale being had, as recited in said deed, by the executor of Willis Lloyd, and the property sold as the property of Lloyd to pay Lloyd's debts, and not the debts of Pinnell, and Pinnell's heirs are not bound by the recitals of said deed. The defendants duly excepted to this ruling and, in deference thereto, offered no other evidence. The court thereupon directed the jury to find for the plaintiffs, which was done, and defendants appealed, after reserving exceptions and assigning errors.
John H. Kerr, of Warrenton, and A. C. & J. P. Zollicoffer, of Henderson, for appellants.
Thos. M. Pittman, of Henderson, for appellees.
WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).
We are of the opinion that there was error in the ruling of the court. It may be conceded that there is no connection proven between Jackson Pinnell and Willis Lloyd; and, in the view taken by us of the case, it was not necessary that it should have been shown. The object of the defendants was not to prove that the heirs of Jackson Pinnell had lost the title, which it is alleged had descended to them, by a sale of the land under the decree of the court in the suit by the executor of Willis Lloyd, but to show that the plaintiffs in this action were parties, as defendants and as heirs of Willis Lloyd, in the proceeding brought by the executor of Willis Lloyd to have the land sold for the payment of his debts. If they were parties to the latter suit, they are bound and concluded by the judgment rendered therein, and it can make no difference whether they acquired title to the land as the heirs of Jackson Pinnell, or as heirs of Willis Lloyd, as they are estopped by the judgment without regard to the source from which they may have derived title. If they had any other right or title to the land at the time they were called upon to answer the complaint, they should have disclosed it, and pleaded it, and, having failed to do so, they are concluded by the judgment as to the title, which was alleged to have been in Willis Lloyd, and will not be heard to aver against it in this action. Armfield v. Moore, 44 N.C. 157; Carter v. White, 134 N.C. 474, 46 S.E. 983, 101 Am. St. Rep. 853; Gregory v. Pinnix, 158 N.C. 147, 73 S.E. 814. The court, in Owen v. Needham, 160 N.C. 381, 76 S.E. 211, quoting from and approving Coltrane v. Laughlin, 157 N.C. 287, 72 S.E. 962, held it to be a well-recognized doctrine here and elsewhere that:
"When a court having jurisdiction of the cause and the parties renders judgment therein, it estops the parties and their privies as to all issuable matter contained in the pleadings, and, though not issuable in the technical sense, it concludes, among other things, as to all matters within the scope of the pleadings which are material and relevant and were in fact investigated and determined on the hearing"--citing Gillam v. Edmonson, 154 N.C. 127, 69 S.E. 924; Tyler v. Capeheart, 125 N.C. 64, 34 S.E. 108; Tuttle v. Harrill, 85 N.C. 456; Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 277, 25 S.Ct. 58, 49 L.Ed. 193; Aurora City v. West, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 82, 103, 19 L.Ed. 42; Chamberlain v. Gaillard, 26 Ala. 504; 23 Cyc. pp. 1502-1506.
It was stated again and applied to a proceeding for the sale of land for assets in Smith v. Huffman, 132 N.C. 600, 44 S.E. 113. One question involved directly in a proceeding to sell lands for assets is the intestate's ownership of the land; and if he is not the owner, and any other party to the record is the owner or has an interest therein, which would be prejudiced by a decree which does not recognize and protect it, he is estopped, so long as the decree stands unreversed, and the doctrine is said to be founded on the principles of justice and fair dealing, as we find declared in the foregoing cases. The party is estopped for the reason in part, that he has been delinquent, as he had his day in court and a fair opportunity to assert his right, which he deliberately failed to do, and he will not afterwards be heard to call the matter in question, for the law does not permit the same question to be again litigated, under such circumstances. If it did, there never would be an end to controversy. The parties to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial