Lake v. Skelton

• Decision Date: 03 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-13124,15-13124
• Citation: 840 F.3d 1334
• Parties: Michael Leslie Lake, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Skelton, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

840 F.3d 1334

Michael Leslie Lake, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Michael Skelton, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 15-13124

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Date Filed: November 3, 2016

Gerald Richard Weber, Jr., Law Offices of Gerry Weber, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Cynthia L. Counts, Duane Morris, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Naveen Ramachandrappa, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

George Marvin Weaver, Eric Paul Wilborn, Hollberg & Weaver, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Lauren S. Bruce, Hugh William Rowling, Jr., Cobb County Attorney's Office, Marietta, GA, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, BLACK, and PARKER,^* Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR

, Circuit Judge:

This interlocutory appeal requires us to decide whether sovereign immunity bars a complaint for damages against a deputy sheriff who failed to accommodate a dietary request from an inmate in a county jail in Georgia. Michael Leslie Lake requested a vegetarian diet for religious reasons during his pretrial detention. After his jailers denied the request, Lake sued Major Michael Skelton in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff of Cobb County. Lake sought declaratory relief, damages, fees, and costs for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983

, 2000cc et seq . The district court denied Major Skelton's motion for summary judgment against Lake's claims for damages, and Skelton filed an interlocutory appeal. We conclude that the sovereign immunity of Georgia extends to a deputy sheriff who denies a dietary request of an inmate in a county jail. We reverse the denial of summary judgment against Lake's claims for damages and remand with an instruction to enter judgment for Skelton on those claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Lake, a Christian, alleges that he made a religious vow in 1997 to abstain from eating meat, animal fats, or gelatin. He also refuses to eat any part of a meal that contains those items or to trade those items for acceptable food. Lake took the vow because he thought it would gain him the friendship of a woman named Leslie.

On November 28, 2011, Lake was arrested for contacting Leslie, allegedly in violation of a stalking protective order. He was held without bond at the Cobb County Adult Detention Center, which is operated by the sheriff of Cobb County. Major Skelton served as operational support commander at the Detention Center.

Lake requested a special diet to accommodate his religious vow, but the jailers denied that request. In May 2012, Lake sued Major Skelton. The jailers accommodated Lake's request on November 29, 2012. Lake was released on July 15, 2013, after the Cobb County Superior Court dismissed all charges against him.

Lake sued Major Skelton in his official and individual capacities. He alleged that Skelton violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Lake sought declaratory relief, damages, fees, and costs.

Major Skelton moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Skelton in his individual capacity, but it denied summary judgment for him in his official capacity on the ground that the sovereign immunity of Georgia did not extend to him. Skelton filed an interlocutory appeal, and we have jurisdiction limited to the issue of his immunity, see Black v. Wigington , 811 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016)

.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a summary judgment, including the issue whether the sovereign immunity of a state extends to an official. Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County , 400 F.3d 1313, 1324 n.26 (11th Cir. 2005)

. We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Black , 811 F.3d at 1265, and summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III. DISCUSSION

A state is immune from a suit for damages in federal court by one of its own citizens, Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U.S. 1, 14–17, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)

, and this sovereign immunity extends to an official when he acts as an “arm of the State,” Manders v. Lee , 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) ). Before our en banc decision in Manders, we applied different tests to determine whether the sovereign immunity of a state extended to an officer. One test had four factors, see

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm'n , 226 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000), and another had three factors, see

Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp. , 208 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2000). A third test specifically addressed deputy sheriffs and jailers. See

Lancaster v. Monroe County , 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). In Manders, we established a single test to determine when an official or entity acts as an arm of the state. We first determine “the particular function in which the defendant was engaged when taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise.” Manders , 338 F.3d at 1308. We then determine whether the defendant is an “arm of the State” in his performance of the function by considering four factors: “(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Id. at 1309. In applying these four factors, we evaluate both the “governmental structure of [the] office vis-à - vis the State” and the “functions in issue.” Id.

Manders

applied the four-factor test to decide whether the sheriff of Clinch County, Georgia, was acting as an arm of the state in “establishing force policy at the jail and in training and disciplining his deputies in that regard.” Id. at 1319. The first factor “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of immunity” because “[t]he sheriff's authority to use force or the tools of violence ... and the sheriff's obligation to administer the jail are directly derived from the State” and because “use of force and creating force policy are quintessential policing functions.” Id. The second factor also “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of immunity,” id. at 1322, because, “[i]n addition to mandating and controlling sheriffs' specific duties ..., only the State possesses control over sheriffs' force policy and that control is direct and significant in many areas, including training and discipline,” id. at 1320. The third factor “tilt[ed] ... toward immunity,” id. at 1324, because the state partially funded the sheriff's office and the financial contributions of the county were required by state law, id. at 1323–24. The fourth factor “d [id] not defeat immunity,” id. at 1329, because although neither the state nor the county was required to pay an adverse judgment, the sheriff apparently would have to pay out of his budget and “both county and state funds are implicated,” id. at 1327. The Court also stated that “the State's sovereignty and thus its integrity remain directly affected when federal court lawsuits interfere with a state program or function.” Id. at 1329. We concluded that the sheriff of Clinch County, Georgia, was immune from a suit for damages that challenged his policy on the use of force. Id. at 1328.

A. Governmental Structure

We must apply the four-part test from Manders

to the function performed by Major Skelton as a deputy sheriff. Whether a deputy sheriff in Georgia is an arm of the state is complicated. On the one hand, the offices of sheriff and deputy are created by state law, see Ga. Const. Art. IX, § I, ¶ III (sheriff); Ga. Code Ann. § 15–16–23 (deputy), sheriffs sometimes function as an arm of the state, see, e.g. , Manders , 338 F.3d at 1305–06, and the office is independent from Cobb County and its governing body, see Ga. Const. Art. IX, § II, ¶ I (c)(1). On the other hand, the Constitution of Georgia refers to sheriffs as “County officers,” see id. Art. IX, § I, ¶ III, sheriffs are elected by the voters of their counties, see

Manders , 338 F.3d at 1312, and sheriffs largely exercise their authority within their counties, see id.

Georgia exerts significant control over the Cobb County Sheriff. The office of the sheriff, although independent, is not a “body corporate” like Georgia counties are. See Ga. Const. Art. IX, § I, ¶ I

; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 36–1–3 and 1–3–3(7). Instead, the State legislature establishes the powers and duties of sheriffs. See Ga. Const. Art. IX, § I, ¶ III. These duties fall into two broad categories: (1) the common-law duty of “enforc[ing] the law and preserv[ing] the peace on behalf of the sovereign State”; and (2) “specific statutory duties, directly assigned by the State, in law enforcement, in state courts, and in corrections.” Manders , 338 F.3d at 1319. “Most of those duties are an integral part of the State's criminal justice system and are state functions.” Id.

Georgia uses county jails to incarcerate its state offenders, and it requires sheriffs to take custody of all inmates in the jail in their counties and to administer the jails. Manders , 338 F.3d at 1315–18

. Sheriffs are responsible for transferring detainees to and from state court, id. at 1315–16, and sheriffs have discretion to transfer inmates between counties, id. at 1317

. “In contrast, counties have no authority over what corrections duties sheriffs perform, or which state offenders serve time in county jails, or who is in charge of the inmates in the county jails.” Id. at 1318.

The Georgia Constitution prohibits counties from taking actions “affecting” the office of the sheriff, including “the salaries ... [and] the personnel thereof.” Ga. Const. Art. IX, § II, ¶ I

(c)(1). Counties do not delegate their governmental or police powers to their sheriffs. See

Manders , 338 F.3d at 1319. “Although...