Crawford v. State

• Decision Date: 01 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. F-89-39,F-89-39
• Citation: 840 P.2d 627,1992 OK CR 62
• Parties: Joseph CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 627

840 P.2d 627

Joseph CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-89-39.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Oct. 1, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1992.

An Appeal from the District Court of Creek County; Charles S. Woodson, District Judge.

Joseph Crawford, Appellant, was tried by jury and convicted of Murder in the First Degree (21 O.S.1981, § 701.7), First Degree Burglary, After Former Conviction of a Felony (21 O.S.1981, § 1431); Robbery by Force and Fear, After Former Conviction of a Felony (21 O.S.1981, § 791); and Larceny of an Automobile, After Former Conviction of a Felony (21 O.S.1981, § 1720) in Case No. CRF-88-41, in the District Court of Creek County. The jury found the existence of one aggravating circumstance and recommended punishment of death for the murder conviction, and prison terms of ninety-nine (99) years for burglary; forty-five (45) years for robbery and twenty (20) for larceny of an automobile. The trial court sentenced accordingly. From this judgment and sentence Appellant has perfected this appeal. Judgments and sentences for Robbery by Force, After Former Conviction of a Felony, and Larceny of an Automobile, After Former Conviction of a Felony are AFFIRMED, the judgment and sentence for First Degree Burglary is REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to DISMISS, the judgment of guilt of First Degree Murder is AFFIRMED and the sentence of death for First Degree Murder is REMANDED for RESENTENCING.

William H. Luker, Asst. Appellate Public Defender, Norman, for appellant.

Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen., A. Diane Hammons, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

LUMPKIN, Vice Presiding Judge:

Appellant Joseph Crawford was tried by jury and convicted of Murder in the First Degree (21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 701.7); First Degree Burglary, After Former Conviction of a Felony (21 O.S.1981, § 1431); Robbery by Force, After Former Conviction of a Felony (21 O.S.1981, § 791); and Larceny of an Automobile, After Former Conviction of a Felony (21 O.S.1981, § 1720), Case No. CRF-88-41, in the District Court of Creek County. The jury found the existence of one aggravating circumstance and recommended punishment of death for the murder conviction and imprisonment for ninety-nine (99) years for the burglary conviction; forty-five (45) years for the robbery conviction and twenty (20) years for the larceny of an automobile conviction. The trial court sentenced accordingly. From this judgment and sentence Appellant has perfected this appeal.

Eighty (80) year old Nattie Jo Price was discovered missing from her Bristow, Oklahoma home on Saturday morning, February 20, 1988. The chief of the Bristow Police Department received a phone call Tuesday morning, February 23, 1988, concerning the Appellant's possible involvement in the disappearance of Ms. Price. Appellant was located later that day in Sapulpa. When questioned by agents of the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI), Appellant confessed to breaking into Ms. Price's home on Friday night, February 19, 1988, and to stealing her television set and her car. He told the agents that he kidnapped Ms. Price, placing her in the trunk of the car. He said that he took Ms. Price to a shed behind a house in Sapulpa and left her there. He insisted that she was alive when he left her.

Following Appellant's directions, the agents found Ms. Price, dressed only in her nightgown, inside the shed. Testimony from the medical examiner revealed that she had been dead for at least twelve (12) hours prior to being found and within four to six hours of her last meal, and that she had numerous wounds covering her body. The cause of death was determined to have been manual strangulation and blunt injuries to the head.

I. ISSUES RELATING TO THE GUILT-INNOCENCE STAGE OF TRIAL

In Appellant's third assignment of error, he contends that the evidence of first degree murder was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Appellant was charged with malice aforethought murder and, in the alternative, felony-murder. We have previously held "where an information charges first degree malice aforethought murder, a conviction may be had for felony-murder if supported by the evidence" regardless of the fact the charges were not pled in the alternative. Munson v. State, 758 P.2d 324, 332 (Okl.Cr.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 820, 102 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989). Because the proof presented at trial in support of the felony-murder charge consisted of both direct and circumstantial evidence, we will review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set forth in Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202 (Okl.Cr.1985); whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moore v. State, 788 P.2d 387, 400 (Okl.Cr.1990).

A conviction for felony-murder requires that the accused must have committed murder while in the commission of one of the enumerated felonies found in 21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 701.7(B). In this case, the information alleged that the murder was committed during the course of a first degree burglary. Appellant confessed to breaking into the decedent's home during the nighttime with the intent to steal her car.

This is supported by evidence found at the decedent's home; the hook to the outside screen door was missing, the wooden door into the house was splintered and the lock found across the room. A dresser in the decedent's bedroom had been ransacked with items strewn on the floor. A lamp in the living room had been knocked over and the television was missing.

Appellant also admitted that, once inside the house, he demanded that Ms. Price give him the keys to her car. He then removed Ms. Price from the house and transported her to the shed where she was found. Testimony from the medical examiner established that Ms. Price had been severely beaten and manually strangled prior to being placed in the shed.

We find this evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the decedent had been killed during the commission of the burglary. Therefore, as the jury's verdict does not specify whether Appellant was found guilty of malice-aforethought murder or burglary-murder or robbery-murder, the verdict must be interpreted as one of felony-murder in order that Appellant receive the benefit of the rule that a defendant cannot be convicted of felony-murder and the underlying felony. Munson, 758 P.2d at 332.

In his sixth assignment of error Appellant contends that his compelled attendance at trial in jail coveralls bearing the words "Bristow Jail" on the back denied him a fair trial. Defense counsel did not bring the Appellant's clothing to the attention of the trial court until after voir dire had commenced. Counsel again objected after voir dire was completed and requested a dismissal of the case. Appellant's motion was overruled on the grounds that a dismissal was warranted only if Appellant was before the jury in handcuffs.

It is error to compel an accused to appear before a jury in prison clothing where a timely request has been made for civilian clothing. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). Compelling an accused to attend his trial in a prison uniform seriously erodes the presumption of innocence that all accused persons are entitled to. Collins v. State, 70 Okl.Cr. 340, 106 P.2d 273, 279 (1940).

In Watt v. Page, 452 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir.1972), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1070, 92 S.Ct. 1520, 31 L.Ed.2d 803 (1972), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, despite the absence of a timely objection, a conviction need not be reversed if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the fact of overwhelming evidence. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); See also Rhinehart v. State, 609 P.2d 781, 783 (Okl.Cr.1980).

Although Appellant's objection was not timely, in light of his repeated objections, we do not feel that this lack of timeliness is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 513, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1696, 48 L.Ed.2d 126, 135. However, based on the rule in Watt we cannot say that this conviction requires reversal. As previously discussed, the overwhelming evidence supports the finding of guilt and therefore we find the jail attire had little, if any, effect upon the verdict.

Contrary to Appellant's contentions, we do not find that Appellant's clothing made the sentencing stage of trial too unreliable to meet the heightened standard of reliability imposed by the eighth amendment of the federal constitution and Article II, § 9, of the State constitution. Appellant testified during the second stage of trial. He identified his family, admitted to prior felony convictions for burglary and escape and emphasized the fact that he had never hurt anyone. In light of this evidence, Appellant's presence in jail coveralls was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based upon the particular facts of this case, including Appellant's confession to all offenses save the murder, his leading of the police to the location of the body and the remaining evidence as discussed above, we find that Appellant's clothing did not contribute to the jury's verdict and Appellant is therefore not entitled to a reversal of his conviction nor modification of his sentence. This assignment of error is denied.

In his seventh assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred when it refused to allow the defense to introduce the audio tape of Appellant's conversation with girlfriend, Carol Welch. Again, we find merit to Appellant's argument but do not conclude that reversal is warranted.

The tape in question resulted when Ms. Welch was wired by OSBI agents and sent into the apartment where...