Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

Decision Date11 April 1988
Docket Number86-8026,Nos. 85-8845,s. 85-8845
Parties46 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 930, 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,915 James HILL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee. James HILL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Isabel Gates Webster, Gary W. Walker, Atlanta, Ga., for James Hill et al.

Paul A. Howell, Jr., Kutak Rock & Campbell, Atlanta, Ga., for Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

One of these two consolidated appeals is from a judgment in favor of the employer, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) in an action brought initially by fifty plaintiffs whose applications for employment with MARTA were rejected. The basis of the complaint was racial discrimination in MARTA's hiring practices. The second appeal is from the district court's refusal to grant MARTA attorney's fees. 1 We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

With respect to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, two dispositive orders were entered by the district court. On April 30, 1984, Judge Owen Forrester granted defendant's motion for summary judgment as to a portion of the claims of certain plaintiffs. 591 F.Supp. 125. The plaintiffs claim that the court erred in finding that the claims of some plaintiffs were not timely filed under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983 (1982) and/or Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e (1982). No appeal is taken from the court's denial of the claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985 (1982). The second dispositive order was entered by Judge Robert L. Vining, Jr. on September 4, 1985, and dismissed the balance of the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to defendant's motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The plaintiffs contend that the court erred in finding that they did not make out a prima facie case.

We shall discuss first the background and facts leading to the orders of the district court, then the individual claims of those plaintiffs whose cases were dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b), and finally the claims of those plaintiffs whose suits were found completely barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Only thirty-nine of the original plaintiffs have appealed.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS

MARTA is a public corporation operating the transit system in Atlanta and those portions of Fulton and DeKalb Counties not within the City of Atlanta. It purchased the Atlanta Transit System in 1972 and then expanded with the assistance of federal funds. MARTA sought from its inception to ensure equal employment opportunities without regard to race or sex. See Whatley v. MARTA, 632 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir.1980). During the period relevant to this lawsuit, MARTA had approximately 2,700 employees, of whom 52% were white and 48% were black. The population figures for this period reflect that the two counties served were 65% white and 35% black. Because this case principally involves applicants for bus drivers, it is noted that 51% of the drivers were black and 49% white.

In 1977 and 1978 certain members of MARTA's Board of Directors became concerned about the racial makeup of MARTA's employees. Three or more Board members were of the view that MARTA had a disproportionate number of black bus operators and that there was a perception in the community that whites could not obtain these jobs. Consequently, in November of 1978, MARTA began considering the applications of minimally qualified whites for positions as bus operators ahead of the applications of blacks who were minimally qualified. Since the majority of the plaintiffs were applicants for the position of bus operator and there was no evidence that there was any discrepancy in the treatment of white and black applicants for other positions, the balance of the discussion at this stage will pertain only to those who applied for the position of bus operator.

Applications for jobs in the Operations Division 2 were available at the office of that division on Summit Drive. In the reception room on a bulletin board and on cards were instructions with respect to completing the application. Applicants submitted their completed applications to the receptionist. They were told that their applications would be considered and that they would be contacted if they were minimally qualified and a position was open. Applicants were also told, if they inquired, that their applications would be kept on an active list for one year, after which they would not be considered. William Dean was in charge of the employment office for Operations and his assistant was Brady Dorsey.

Dean's and Dorsey's testimony revealed that Dorsey screened the applications and that there was a rejection rate at that stage of approximately 85%. A log was kept of all applications, and they were classified AI, application incomplete; NI, not interested; and QA, minimally qualified applicant. Applications would be deemed incomplete if, for example, they bore no signature, revealed an unexplained gap in past employment, failed to list the name of a former supervisor who could be contacted, or did not include the applicant's age. Applications would be labeled "not interested" if they revealed, for example, that the applicant was under the age requirement of 25, had a frequent turnover in employment, had a criminal record, or lacked sufficient education. The "QA" list was comprised of the remainder of the applicants and these were the only applicants who would advance further into the hiring process.

Dean testified that attrition and the addition of new routes resulted in the need for about 12 operators a month or 150 a year. He estimated that there were about 6,000 applicants for the bus operator position in the 1978-79 years. 3 QA applications were retained for one year from the date of application. Since the number of those minimally qualified far exceeded the number hired, many on the QA list were never contacted by MARTA. The processing of those who were contacted involved first the administration of a validated test, 4 then an interview, and finally an Equifax investigation of the applicant's background, including any criminal and traffic violations. If an applicant passed through all these stages successfully and could obtain the appropriate licenses, he was deemed fully qualified for the position.

Dean admitted that from November 1978 until November 1979, the applications of those on the QA list for bus operator were considered out of sequence, with white applicants being considered ahead of blacks. 5 An audit of the Operations Division hiring conducted internally by MARTA and covering the period involved here revealed that black men and women were being hired 153 and 126 days, respectively, after they made the QA list, while white men and women were being hired just 48 and 33 days after they qualified. As a result, on November 16, 1979, the Operations employment office was directed to consider those on the QA list only in the order of their applications. 6 It is important to note that none of these plaintiffs claims he or she was subject to discrimination as a result of this out of sequence processing.

At the same time, new procedures were instituted for the handling of those applicants who did not make the QA list during the period in which the acceleration took place. This is the category into which most of these plaintiffs fall. The names of persons who had applied between October 1, 1979 and November 16, 1979 but had been rejected were compiled on what was called the "B" list (the "A" list being those applicants from October 5 to November 16 who were already on the QA list). The people on the B list were written letters advising that their applications were being reprocessed. The content of these letters will be discussed later in connection with each plaintiff individually. A "C" list was also compiled and included the names of all applicants between November 16, 1979 and December 31, 1979. No applications were accepted after December 31, primarily to give the employment office time to review the applications from the B and C lists.

The only direct evidence of discrimination in MARTA's hiring practices was the uncontradicted testimony that during the thirteen-month period minimally qualified whites from the QA list were considered in advance of minimally qualified blacks. All of the other testimony was to the effect that there was no discrimination at the level at which all but four or five of these plaintiffs were rejected, i.e., before making the QA list. There was also evidence that between 1972 and 1978, black applicants had been considered sequentially in advance of white applicants, until by 1978, 51% of the bus operators were black.

Even so, a number of the plaintiffs, all of whom were black, presented evidence that they applied during or immediately before the relevant period, that their applications were complete, and that they met all the minimum age, educational, and background (steady employment and no criminal record) qualifications, and still they did not make the QA list. Additionally, MARTA's audit of the applicant flow from October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1979 included some statistics that add support to plaintiffs' case.

No. of % No. % No. % No. of %

Applicants Tested Hired Employees

Maj. 1863 21% 601 67% 272 64% 1168 54%

Min. 7021 79% 290 33% 153 36% 992 46%

Tot. 8884 100% 891 100% 425 100% 2160 100%

The figures above are taken directly from MARTA's internal audit, which was admitted in the district court as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 77. They reveal that the probability of employment for a majority applicant was 14.6%, while the probability of employment for a minority...

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