Corrigan v. Dist. of Columbia

Decision Date08 November 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15-7098,15-7098
Citation841 F.3d 1022
Parties Matthew Corrigan, Appellant v. District of Columbia, et al., Appellees
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

841 F.3d 1022

Matthew Corrigan, Appellant
v.
District of Columbia, et al., Appellees

No. 15-7098

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 18, 2016
Decided November 8, 2016


Elizabeth M. Rademacher, Student Counsel, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Tillman J. Breckenridge, William R. Cowden, Patricia E. Roberts, and Jacob M. Derr, Student Counsel.

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: Rogers, Brown and Pillard, Circuit Judges.

Dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Brown.

Rogers, Circuit Judge:

Following two warrantless searches of his home by members of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), Matthew Corrigan sued the District of Columbia and individual MPD officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. He now appeals the grant of summary judgment to the defendants,

841 F.3d 1025

challenging the district court's rulings that there was no constitutional violation and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Even assuming, without deciding, that the initial “sweep” of Corrigan's home by the MPD Emergency Response Team (“ERT”) was justified under the exigent circumstances and emergency aid exceptions to the warrant requirement, the second top-to-bottom search by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (“EOD”) after the MPD had been on the scene for several hours was not. The MPD had already secured the area and determined that no one else was inside Corrigan's home and that there were no dangerous or illegal items in plain sight. Corrigan had previously surrendered peacefully to MPD custody. The information the MPD had about Corrigan—a U.S. Army veteran and reservist with no known criminal record—failed to provide an objectively reasonable basis for believing there was an exigent need to break in Corrigan's home a second time to search for “hazardous materials,” whose presence was based on speculative hunches about vaguely described “military items” in a green duffel bag. And assuming, without deciding, that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement applies to a home, the scope of the second search far exceeded what that exception would allow. In the end, what the MPD would have the court hold is that Corrigan's Army training with improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”), and the post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) he suffers as a result of his military service—characteristics shared by countless veterans who have risked their lives for this country—could justify an extensive and destructive warrantless search of every drawer and container in his home. Neither the law nor the factual record can reasonably be read to support that sweeping conclusion.

Because it was (and is) clearly established that law enforcement officers must have an objectively reasonable basis for believing an exigency justifies a warrantless search of a home, and because no reasonable officer could have concluded such a basis existed for the second more intrusive search, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity across the board. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in part and remand the case for further proceedings. Upon remand, the district court can address a remaining claim of qualified immunity based on reasonable reliance on a supervisor's order and Corrigan's claim of municipal liability, which the district court did not reach.

I.

Matthew Corrigan is an Army Reservist and an Iraq war veteran who, in February 2010, was also an employee of the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. On the night of February 2, 2010, suffering from sleep deprivation, he inadvertently phoned the National Suicide Hotline when dialing a number he thought to be a Veterans Crisis Line. When he told the Hotline volunteer that he was a veteran diagnosed with PTSD, she asked whether he had been drinking or using drugs and whether he owned guns. Corrigan assured her that he was only using his prescribed medication and was not under the influence of any illicit drugs or alcohol; he admitted that he owned guns. The volunteer told him to “put [the guns] down,” and Corrigan responded, “That's crazy, I don't have them out.” Corrigan Dep. 56:2–5. Despite Corrigan's assurances that his guns were safely stored, the volunteer repeatedly asked him to tell her “the guns are down.” Id. 56:2–14. When asked if he intended to hurt himself or if he intended to “harm others,” he responded “no” to both questions. Id. 69:6–18. Frustrated,

841 F.3d 1026

Corrigan eventually hung up and turned off his phone, took his prescribed medication, and went to sleep. Id. 56:10–14; 70:6–7. The Hotline volunteer proceeded to notify the MPD.

At approximately 11:13 p.m., according to the February 9, 2010, Barricade Report from Lieutenant Glover to the MPD Chief of Police, officers from the MPD Fifth District were dispatched to Corrigan's home for “Attempted Suicide.” Barricade Rpt. 1. Certain undisclosed “information” led them “to believe the subject was possibly armed with a shotgun.” Id . Corrigan lived at 2408 North Capitol Street, in Northwest D.C., in the basement apartment of a row house that had its own front and back doors. Upon arrival, the officers thought they detected a “strong odor” of natural gas and contacted the gas company, which turned off the gas to the row house. Id. ; D.C. Super. Ct. Tr. 113-14. The officers contacted Lieutenant Glover at home and he, in turn, gave orders to declare a “barricade situation,” which meant that the ERT also went to Corrigan's home. The MPD Command Information Center advised that Corrigan, a white male, age 32, had no known criminal record and there were no outstanding protective orders against him. An ERT investigator learned that Corrigan was a U.S. Army combat veteran who had served recently during the Iraq war and owned a rifle and several handguns. Additionally, he had recently terminated a romantic relationship and was under psychiatric care for PTSD and depression. He also had a dog.

At 2:00 a.m., the ERT assumed tactical control of the situation. At 2:10 a.m., the MPD began to secure the perimeter around Corrigan's home, including evacuating his neighbors. Barricade Rpt. 2; see D.C. Super. Ct. Tr. 113–14. At 2:30 a.m., Lieutenant Glover arrived on the scene and called on the EOD to respond. According to Lieutenant Glover's testimony, Corrigan's upstairs neighbor, who was his landlady, had told MPD officers that Corrigan occasionally had overnight guests, including an ex-girlfriend. See Glover Dep. 16:20–22; 33:1–5. An officer had reached the ex-girlfriend by cell phone, and she said Corrigan was a veteran taking prescribed medication for PTSD, had expertise in IEDs, and trained others in detecting and mitigating IED incidents. Id. 35:11–37:6. She also recalled seeing a green duffel bag containing “military items” in Corrigan's home that she had been told “not to touch” because “they were his guns and military stuff.” Id. 36:17–21.

Around 3:00 a.m., MPD negotiators attempted to speak with Corrigan by dialing his cell phone number, calling his name over a public address system, and knocking or kicking his front door. The MPD had no indication, however, that Corrigan's failure to answer the door was suspicious. The officers had been told by his landlady and ex-girlfriend that Corrigan was likely sleeping, having taken his prescribed medication; his voicemail message stated “Hi, you've reached Matt, if I'm unavailable, I'm probably asleep.” Indeed, his landlady, upon being advised that the reason for the police presence was Corrigan's attempted suicide, had insisted that was “outrageous” and repeatedly told the MPD officers that there was “a big misunderstanding” because she had known Corrigan for two years and had “never felt more comfortable with a neighbor in [her] life.” D.C. Super. Ct. Tr. 106, 110. She had explained to the officers that Corrigan had guns because he was in the military and that his home had electric, not gas, appliances.

Corrigan testified that around 4:00 a.m. he became aware of someone kicking at his front door, and then his back door, and was “terrified,” feeling he was being “hunted.” Corrigan Dep. 70:11–21. He

841 F.3d 1027

moved from his bedroom to the bathroom where he felt safest and tried to go back to sleep. Id . 70:21–71:3. When he turned on his cell phone at 4:16 a.m., see Barricade Rpt. 4, he received a flood of voicemails. He returned the call of the detective who was one of the MPD negotiators. Corrigan initially said he was at another address, because he was scared, but within minutes admitted he was at home. Having noticed the flood light and all the police officers at the front and back of his home, he told the negotiator he was coming outside but needed to put on clothes because of the fallen snow. He described the clothes he would be wearing and that his cell phone would be in his left hand when he came out so the police would not shoot him because they thought he had a gun. Corrigan Dep...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • United States v. Johnson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • February 4, 2019
    ...application to cases involving cars, and the D.C. Circuit left that question open just a few years ago. See Corrigan v. District of Columbia , 841 F.3d 1022, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Erickson , 991 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Pichany , 687 F.2d 2......
  • Sherrod v. McHugh
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • September 25, 2018
    ...and if so, (2) whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident." Corrigan v. District of Columbia , 841 F.3d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2016).6 Again, the Court's qualified immunity analysis requires a two-pronged inquiry to determine "(1) whether the facts i......
  • Clemons v. Couch
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • July 7, 2021
    ...from Cady a community-caretaker exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g. , Corrigan v. District of Columbia , 841 F.3d 1022, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (listing cases). Several circuits, including our own, discussed the exception in the context of warrantless searc......
  • Avila v. Dailey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • March 30, 2017
    ...right, and if so, (2) whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident." Corrigan v. District of Columbia , 841 F.3d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In determining what constitutes "clearly established" law at the time of the incident, the court looks to "ca......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Prisoners' Rights
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...suspect who has not disobeyed instructions” violated clearly established 4th Amendment right); Corrigan v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d 1022, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (off‌icers not entitled to qualif‌ied immunity for warrantless entry because search violated clearly established law). Public......
  • CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--FOURTH AMENDMENT COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ANALYSIS AGAINST THE COMMUNITY--CANIGLIA V. STROM, 953 F.3D 112 (1ST CIR. 2020).
    • United States
    • Suffolk Journal of Trial & Appellate Advocacy Vol. 26 No. 2, June 2021
    • June 1, 2021
    ...123, 133 (2013) (characterizing Fourth Amendment reasonableness test as "malleable standard"). (35) See Corrigan v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d 1022, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("Because the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cady focused on attributes unique to vehicles, some circuits have confine......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT