Viers v. Baker

Citation841 S.E.2d 857
Decision Date14 May 2020
Docket NumberRecord No. 190222
Parties Sheila VIERS v. Chadwick Seth BAKER
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia

Gerald Gray, Clintwood (Erin B. Ashwell ; Charles J. Dickenson ; Frank K. Friedman, Roanoke; Woods Rogers, on briefs), for appellant.

(Henry Keuling-Stout, on brief), Big Stone Gap, for appellee.

PRESENT: All the Justices

OPINION BY JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS

In this appeal, we consider whether a Commonwealth’s attorney enjoyed absolute immunity from a claim for defamation by a former employee and whether the former employee sufficiently pled a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW

"As the present case was decided on demurrer, we recite the facts contained in the pleadings and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Coutlakis v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 293 Va. 212, 215, 796 S.E.2d 556 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Chadwick Seth Baker was elected to succeed Joshua Hunter Newberry as the Commonwealth’s attorney for Dickenson County in November 2015. Sheila Viers had been an administrative assistant in the Commonwealth’s attorney’s office for more than 29 years. Viers alleged that soon after the election, she happened to see Baker at the Clintwood post office, congratulated him, and asked if she should be worried about her job because she had heard rumors of forthcoming personnel changes. Baker assured her that they were only rumors and that she would keep her job. Prior to taking office, Baker also met with the administrative staff and assured them that he would retain them all.

On January 4, 2016, Viers alleged that Baker called her into his office, told her that it was dirty, and fired her. Cleaning the Commonwealth’s attorney’s office was not among her assigned duties. Later that evening, Baker met with Newberry and complained that he was unable to access his office computer. Newberry explained that he had "removed his password" but gave Baker information enabling him to create a new one.

Viers and her husband were both active members of the Democratic Party. Baker had been the Democratic nominee in the election. News of the firing caused consternation as it spread among local Democrats and other members of the community. Viers alleged that at a January 12 meeting of the Dickenson County Democratic Committee ("DCDC"), Baker told those present that he fired Viers because his office computer had been wiped clean and he could not use it. He knew that the statement was false because he knew that the computer had actually been merely temporarily inaccessible, and the true reason was that Newberry had "removed" the password. He made the false statement intending that those present would believe that Viers had been responsible and that it was the reason that he fired her. Baker’s false statement was not related to any possible pending or forthcoming criminal investigation. Baker made similar statements to others, including the county administrator, whom he told that he had fired Viers because she had tampered with his office computer.1

After applying for unemployment benefits, Viers prevailed in an administrative proceeding to determine whether she had been fired for misconduct. She subsequently obtained employment in another Commonwealth’s attorney’s office at a lower salary.

In May 2018, Viers filed a second amended complaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Relating to the first count, she alleged that Baker had lied to her when he assured her that she would keep her job, when he told her that she was being fired because his office was dirty, and when he told others that she had tampered with his office computer. These intentional acts caused her to suffer emotional distress, diarrhea, and vomiting; to be afraid to leave the house and to seek counseling; and to lose income and retirement benefits.

Relating to the defamation count, Viers alleged that Baker knowingly and intentionally falsely accused her of committing the crime of computer trespass, constituting defamation per se. He made the accusation intending to injure her reputation. As a result of his false statements, she suffered humiliation and loss of reputation.

Baker thereafter filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss. Regarding the first count, he asserted that he could not be liable for any assurances of employment made before January 1, 2016, when he took office. Thereafter, he could have fired Viers, an at-will employee, for any reason or none at all. Firing an at-will employee does not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it is not improper conduct. In any event, the injuries alleged in the second amended complaint were insufficient for such a claim. He also asserted that statements contained in exhibits to Viers’ original complaint contradicted her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because they showed that he had no malicious motive in firing her.

Regarding the defamation count, he denied making the statement at the DCDC meeting and asserted that even if he had, the second amended complaint failed to allege that he said that Viers was the person who had wiped his office computer clean so that he could not use it. He also asserted that the county administrator did not remember Baker making the alleged statement to him. Citing Lux v. Commonwealth , 24 Va. App. 561, 484 S.E.2d 145 (1997), he also argued that even if he had made the statements as alleged, he could not be liable because under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 he enjoyed qualified immunity for actions performed in his administrative and investigative functions as a prosecutor, and absolute immunity for actions within the scope of initiating and pursuing any criminal prosecution.

After a hearing, the circuit court entered a final order sustaining Baker’s demurrer. Regarding the first count, it incorporated its earlier order sustaining Baker’s demurrer to Viers’ original complaint. In that order, it ruled both that termination of at-will employment did not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that the complaint was insufficient because it lacked "clear and convincing evidence."

Regarding the defamation claim, the court ruled that Baker enjoyed absolute immunity because his alleged statements concerned his office computer, "an essential tool connected to his basic trial advocacy duties" "contain[ing] his calendar, a docket and other information critical to the running of his office." It therefore dismissed the case.

We awarded Viers this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

When reviewing a ruling sustaining a demurrer, we accept as true all allegations of historical fact pleaded in the complaint and interpret them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We review the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo. Parker v. Carilion Clinic , 296 Va. 319, 330, 819 S.E.2d 809 (2018).

A. DEFAMATION AND ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

In her first assignment of error, Viers asserts that the circuit court erred by ruling that Baker enjoyed absolute immunity from her defamation claim, both because (1) his defamatory statements to the DCDC were not made within the performance of his official duties and (2) she alleged that he acted maliciously. She argues that under Andrews v. Ring , 266 Va. 311, 320, 585 S.E.2d 780 (2003), immunity arises only if the tortious act is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." She contends that the circuit court did not evaluate whether Baker’s statement to the DCDC met that standard because it mistakenly applied federal immunity law, on which Baker had incorrectly relied below. Under Andrews , absolute immunity is an issue of state, not federal, law. Under Virginia law, absolute immunity arises from judicial immunity, which enables judges to exercise their discretion in judicial proceedings without fear of retaliatory private litigation. According to Viers, the context of Baker’s statements is so attenuated from that purpose that absolute immunity cannot apply. She argues that the mere fact that he was the Commonwealth’s attorney at the time he made the statements does not clothe him with absolute immunity when performing acts unrelated to his official duties.

We agree both that the circuit court erroneously applied federal immunity law and that, under the standard applicable in Virginia law, Baker does not enjoy absolute immunity from Viers’ claim for defamation.

In Lux , the only Virginia case Baker cited in his demurrer to support his immunity argument, the Court of Appeals reviewed a claim by a criminal defendant that a Commonwealth’s attorney should have been disqualified in a proceeding to revoke his suspended sentence. The defendant, who had sued the Commonwealth’s attorney in a then-pending federal court action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted that the federal lawsuit created a conflict of interest and moved that he be disqualified. 24 Va. App. at 566-67, 484 S.E.2d 145.

The Court of Appeals, affirming the circuit court’s denial of the motion, ruled that the federal lawsuit created no conflict of interest because the Commonwealth’s attorney was absolutely immune from suit under § 1983. Id. at 570, 484 S.E.2d 145 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) ). Reviewing the relevant federal caselaw, the Court of Appeals noted that § 1983 afforded

either qualified immunity or absolute immunity. SeeBuckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 268-69, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209, (1993). Under qualified immunity,
government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). With absolute immunity, government
...

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