Melton v. State

• Decision Date: 12 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 61,61
• Parties: Joseph MELTON v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

842 A.2d 743

379 Md. 471

Joseph MELTON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 61, Sept. Term, 2003.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

February 12, 2004.

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, of Baltimore), on brief, for petitioner.

Gary E. Bair, Solicitor General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, of Baltimore, on brief), for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (retired, specially assigned), JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

On October 4, 2001, petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and convicted, in a bench trial, of the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence, the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony, and the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor with a penalty of over two years of incarceration. On December 14, 2001, petitioner was sentenced to five years of incarceration without parole for the conviction based on the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence and to a concurrent sentence of five years of incarceration without parole for the conviction based on the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. The trial judge suspended the sentence "generally" for the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor with a penalty of over two years of incarceration.

Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On June 3, 2003, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision. The Court of Special Appeals held that:

"separate criminal offenses have been committed. For each offense, the Legislature has provided a separate punishment. Moreover, the Legislature has not indicated in any way that it intended to prohibit the imposition of separate sentences for the crimes at issue. For these reasons, the rule of lenity does not require a merger of the separate offenses proscribed by Article 27, §§ 445(d)(1)(i) and (ii)." [Footnote omitted.]

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court and on September 10, 2003, this Court granted the petition. Melton v. State, 377 Md. 111, 832 A.2d 204 (2003). In his brief, petitioner presents one question for our review:

"Under Md. Ann Code, Art. 27, § 449(e), may a court impose separate sentences on an individual who has been convicted under a count alleging a violation of § 445(d)(1)(i) (unlawful possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a prior conviction of a crime of violence), a count alleging a violation of § 445(d)(1)(ii) (unlawful possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a prior conviction of a felony), and a count alleging a violation of § 445(d)(1)(iii) (unlawful possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a prior conviction of a misdemeanor with a statutory penalty of more than two years), where all of the charges are based on one act of unlawful possession of a regulated firearm?"

We answer petitioner's question in the negative and hold that the Legislature did not intend for a court to render separate multiple verdicts of convictions on an individual for illegal possession of a regulated firearm pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 445(d)(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) and § 449(e) and (f) where that individual fits within several categories of prior qualifying convictions, but only possessed a single regulated firearm on a single occasion. Further, an interpretation to the contrary would be barred by the rule of lenity.

I. Facts

Petitioner's convictions arose out of a January 2001 incident involving a dispute between neighbors in an apartment building in the Essex area of Baltimore County, Maryland. Around 6:30 p.m. on the evening of January 23, 2001, two sets of neighbors arrived in the parking lot of their apartment complex at approximately the same time. Pursuant to the testimony of the first couple, Shikera Bibb and her fiancee, Duane David, the two had a confrontation with petitioner and his wife after Ms. Bibb and Mr. David approached the Meltons. Mr. David asked to speak to petitioner and petitioner's wife sprayed both Ms. Bibb and Mr. David in the face with mace.¹ Mr. David then threatened reprisal against petitioner's wife. Ms. Bibb and Mr. David testified that petitioner pulled out a gun and pointed it at them in response to Mr. David's actions.² While pointing the gun back and forth at Ms. Bibb and Mr. David, petitioner told them that they were not going to touch his wife.

Ms. Bibb and Mr. David then walked away from the Meltons and entered their apartment building. Soon thereafter, they again encountered the Meltons and another heated argument ensued. Ms. Bibb and Mr. David testified that petitioner again displayed a handgun before the confrontation ended.

At trial, the State presented certified copies of petitioner's prior convictions, including his convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of controlled dangerous substances (not marijuana), second degree assault and resisting arrest. While testifying in his own defense, petitioner admitted to a prior conviction for felony theft. The State also presented evidence that the handgun brandished by petitioner during the January 23rd incident with his neighbors was a regulated firearm.

As a result of this incident,³ petitioner was charged with three separate violations of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 445(d)(1)(i), (ii) and (iii),⁴ because he possessed a firearm and: 1-had been previously convicted of a crime of violence (second degree assault); 2-had been previously convicted of a violation classified as a felony (felony convictions for possession of controlled dangerous substances and a felony theft conviction); and 3-had been previously convicted of a violation classified as a misdemeanor that carries a penalty of more than 2 years (second degree assault). Although his possession of the firearm on January 23rd was treated as a single act of possession, petitioner was nonetheless charged with three separate criminal offenses solely because of his prior history of convictions. Petitioner was convicted on all three charges. As mentioned previously, the trial judge sentenced petitioner to five years of incarceration on the (d)(i) count and a concurrent five years of incarceration for the (d)(ii) count, while his sentence for the (d)(iii) conviction was suspended generally.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The three counts relating to the illegal possession of a firearm by a prohibited person pursuant to which petitioner was convicted are crimes that are purely statutory in nature. In interpreting statutes, this Court has said that "the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (2001) (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 139 (2000) (internal citation omitted)). A court should first examine the plain language of the statute when attempting to ascertain the legislative intent. Holbrook, 364 Md. at 364, 772 A.2d at 1246; In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 57, 763 A.2d at 139. If the statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then this Court "will give effect to the statute as it is written," Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 323, 835 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2003) (quoting Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003) (quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994))), and we will not add or delete words from the statute, Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 427 (2002).

Only if the statutory language is ambiguous will this Court look "beyond the statute's plain language in discerning the legislative intent." Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde's of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483, 833 A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003). We have said that ambiguity exists within a statute when there are "two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute." Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). Once a statutory provision is found to be ambiguous, then we may look to other relevant factors that may reveal the statute's intent or general purpose, such as "a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments... and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal." Clyde's, 377 Md. at 483, 833 A.2d at 1021 (quoting Moore, 372 Md. at 677,814 A.2d at 566 (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 58, 763 A.2d at 140 (internal citation omitted))). Any "[c]onstruction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided." Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (alteration added) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992))); see also Moore, 372 Md. at 677-78,

814 A.2d at 566.

In the case sub judice, the language of § 445(d)(1) appears clear and unambiguous on its face. It is a mere enumeration of the classifications of persons prohibited from possessing regulated firearms in Maryland. Petitioner does not now dispute the fact that he was in violation of § 445(d)(1) because of his previous convictions coupled with his being found guilty of possession of a single firearm during the January 23, 2001 incident. Petitioner does, however, challenge his multiple convictions under § 445(d)(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the statute. The question is thus whether the language of § 449(e) and (f), the subsections instituting penalties for petitioner's three convictions under § 445(d)(1)(i), (ii) and (iii), stating that "Each violation shall be considered a separate...