Bennett v. Stirling

• Decision Date: 21 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 16-3,16-3
• Citation: 842 F.3d 319
• Parties: Johnny Bennett, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections ; Joseph McFadden, Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondents–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

842 F.3d 319

Johnny Bennett, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.Bryan P. Stirling, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections ; Joseph McFadden, Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondents–Appellants.

No. 16-3

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 25, 2016

Decided: November 21, 2016

ARGUED: Alphonso Simon, Jr., Office of the Attorney General of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. John Henry Blume, III, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, New York, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alan Wilson, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.

Lindsey S. Vann, Justice 360, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Harris joined.

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Johnny Bennett challenges the imposition of a capital sentence in the South Carolina courts. While recognizing full well the deferential standard of review under AEDPA, we nonetheless agree with the district court that the sentencing was suffused with racially coded references to a degree that made a fair proceeding impossible. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court granting habeas relief.

I.

Bennett, a black man, was convicted in 1995 for murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and larceny in a South Carolina trial court. In a separate penalty proceeding, the state, with Solicitor Donald Myers at the helm, emphasized the size difference between Bennett (6'6? and 300 pounds) and the victim Benton Smith, a black man with a slight build (5'7? and 135 pounds). A mixed-race jury sentenced Bennett to death for the murder. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld Bennett's convictions but reversed his death sentence, ordering the trial court to conduct a new sentencing. State v. Bennett, 328 S.C. 251, 493 S.E.2d 845 (1997) (Bennett I).

The second sentencing proceeding was held in 2000. As in the first trial, Myers led the prosecution and the jury sentenced Bennett to death. But this time, the jury was composed of white jurors only. And before this all-white jury, Myers chose to use racially charged language from the first sentence of his opening argument to his final soliloquy, casting aside the race-neutral presentation he had employed with the mixed-race jury.

The most egregious appeals to racial prejudice came in his closing argument, in which he referred to Bennett using a slew of derogatory terms. Myers admonished the jury, "Meeting [Bennett] again will be like meeting King Kong on a bad day." J.A. 1443. He also labeled Bennett a "caveman," a "mountain man," a "monster," a "big old tiger," and "[t]he beast of burden." J.A. 1420–44. In addition, Myers intentionally elicited irrelevant, inflammatory testimony from one of the state's witnesses, who recounted a dream in which he was chased by murderous, black Indians. While cross-examining a defense witness, Myers alluded to Bennett's sexual partner as "the blonde-headed lady," J.A. 1343–44, alerting the jury to the interracial nature of the relationship.

Bennett moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied his request. The court found that the "King Kong" comment "was not an appeal to racial prejudice" and was an "invited response" to the defense's portrayal of Bennett as a peaceful and helpful prison citizen. J.A. 1628–29. As a result, the court concluded, the reference did not result in a denial of due process. The court analyzed the "caveman" comment separately and arrived at the same conclusions.

The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, holding that the comments "did not improperly inject racial issues into the trial." State v. Bennett, 369 S.C. 219, 632 S.E.2d 281, 289 (2006) (Bennett II). The court observed that the "King Kong" label "could have racial connotations" but found that Myers's use of the term "was not an appeal to the passions or prejudices of the jury." Id. at 288. Instead, the reference conveyed Bennett's "size and strength as they related to his past crimes" and was an invited response. Id. at 288–89. The court found the "caveman" comment "merely descriptive" of testimony that Bennett had twice pulled someone else by the hair. Id. at 289. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Bennett v. South Carolina, 549 U.S. 1061, 127 S.Ct. 681, 166 L.Ed.2d 530 (2006) (mem.).

In 2008, Bennett sought post-conviction relief (PCR) in state court, arguing that the seating of a racially biased juror violated his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. While preparing for the PCR proceeding, Bennett's counsel interviewed a former juror and asked why the juror thought Bennett committed the murder. The juror responded, "Because he was just a dumb nigger." J.A. 1846. After hearing testimony from the juror, the PCR court denied relief on the grounds that the juror was not racially biased at the time of the actual sentencing. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Bennett filed the instant petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 2014. He raised seven grounds for relief, including prosecutorial misconduct and juror bias. After a hearing, the district court granted relief independently on both grounds, vacated Bennett's death sentence, and "return[ed] the matter to the Lexington County Court of General Sessions for resentencing within 180 days of [the] order." Bennett v. Stirling, 170 F.Supp.3d 851, 855 (D.S.C. 2016). According to the district court, the state courts unreasonably determined that the "King Kong" comment, "black Indians" testimony, and "blonde-headed lady" remark were not intentional appeals to racial prejudice. Id. at 861–67. The district court also found unreasonable the PCR court's determination that the juror was not racially biased at the time of the sentencing. Id. at 867–72. The respondents now appeal.

II.

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Winston v. Pearson, 683 F.3d 489, 503–04 (4th Cir. 2012).

A.

Under Section 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant a state prisoner's habeas petition unless the state court's adjudication of the prisoner's claim was legally or factually unreasonable. See28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ; Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ). More precisely, Section 2254(d)(1) allows relief if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." § 2254(d)(1). Circuit precedent "cannot form the basis for habeas relief." Parker v. Matthews, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155, 183 L.Ed.2d 32 (2012). In addition, "[t]he more general the [federal] rule, the more leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). Section 2254(d)(2), in turn, permits relief where the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." § 2254(d)(2). A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct, and the petitioner must rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1).

Federal courts thus owe state tribunals significant deference. In the words of the Supreme Court, "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 ).

Section 2254 thus imposes a high yet not insurmountable hurdle to relief. The statute "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction." Id. at 102–03, 131 S.Ct. 770 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). Federal habeas review may not be used "to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010). But AEDPA deference is not unlimited. It "does not by definition preclude relief" and "does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review." Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).

B.

Bennett alleges that the prosecutor appealed to racial prejudice in his capital sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, the "clearly established Federal law" that governs our analysis is the Supreme Court's decision in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Darden held that a prosecutor's improper comments offend the Constitution if they "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Id. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) ); seeParker, 132 S.Ct. at 2153. Under this standard, it "is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned." Darden, 477 U.S. at 180–81, 106 S.Ct. 2464. Courts must conduct a fact-specific inquiry and examine the challenged comments in the context of the whole record. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11–12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).

Prosecutors, moreover, retain substantial latitude to present their case as they see fit. That latitude is not to be casually abridged. The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[t]he...