Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Antonio
Citation | 843 F.2d 1311 |
Decision Date | 06 April 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-1057,87-1057 |
Parties | , RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 6908 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee v. John ANTONIO; Angelo Carnemolla; Anthony Delvecchio; Faud C. Jezzeny; Dale Leininger; Ricky Micceo, also known as Ricky Peoili; John A. Napoli, Jr.; Jilly Rizzo; Heinrich F. Rupp; Gary F. Thomas; William J. Vanden Eynden; Gilbert Beall; Jilly Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware corporation; Frederic Mascola; Beverly Ann Mosko; Gary A. Mosko; Joseph Mosko; Martin J. Mosko; Stephen Lee Mosko; Barbara Jean Rupp, Defendants, and Aaron Mosko, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Christine O'Connor (Bruce D. Pringle, with her on the briefs) of Baker & Hostetler, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellant.
G. Robert Blakey (Barbara Blumenthal and Gary T. Cornwell, also of McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey, Denver, Colo., and Christopher A. Byrne, Sr. Atty., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LOGAN, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
In this appeal, we consider the validity of a preliminary injunction issued by the district court before trial to prevent dissipation of a defendant's assets which may be needed to satisfy a judgment if the suit is successful. This civil action stems from an alleged scheme to defraud the Aurora Bank (Bank), which led to the Bank's failure and its takeover by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC sued defendant-appellant Aaron Mosko and others for civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961-68, and the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA), Colo.Rev.Stat. Secs. 18-17-101 to -109, and under various common law theories of liability, including violations of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, fraudulent disposition of assets, and civil conspiracy. Mosko and twenty-one others were named as defendants, but none of the defendants were accused of all of the violations.
The FDIC has asked for several forms of relief, including actual damages and, as permitted both under Sec. 1964(c) of RICO and Sec. 18-17-106(7) of COCCA, treble damages and attorney's fees. To ensure Mosko's ability to satisfy any potential judgment, and because he appeared to be dissipating his assets, the FDIC requested that the district court issue a pretrial injunction to prevent such dissipation. The court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order, followed by a hearing and, on December 16, 1986, the preliminary injunction. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Antonio, 649 F.Supp. 1352 (D.Colo.1986). The preliminary injunction in relevant part requires all defendants, including Mosko: (1) to give an account of their assets to a special master; and (2) to refrain from "transferring, selling, assigning, dissipating, concealing, encumbering, impairing or otherwise disposing of" their assets, unless for normal business and living expenses of less than $5,000, without prior notice to FDIC and authorization by the master. See id. at 1357. The injunction applies broadly to all assets of the defendants, including those not traceable to alleged criminal activities.
Mosko appeals the preliminary injunction on two grounds: (1) the district court lacked authority to freeze assets unrelated to the alleged violations, and (2) the district court's finding of FDIC's probable success on the merits is clearly erroneous. We reject both arguments and affirm the grant of the injunction.
The first issue on appeal is whether the district court has the authority to freeze assets which are not traceable to illegal conduct. In issuing the preliminary injunction, the district court relied on both Colorado law, specifically COCCA Sec. 18-17-106(6), and its inherent equitable powers. Antonio, 649 F.Supp. at 1356-57. Because we uphold the district court's authority under the Colorado statute, we do not consider the injunction's validity under traditional equitable doctrines or under RICO.
Noting a pattern of questionable property conveyances by Mosko, the FDIC sought the preliminary injunction to prevent him from dissipating assets which might be needed to satisfy monetary judgments arising from this case. Mosko's potential joint and several liability under Colorado law is substantial: the FDIC seeks $3,000,000, before trebling, for violation of COCCA Sec. 18-17-104(3); another $3,000,000, before trebling, for violation of COCCA Sec. 18-17-104(4); and unspecified amounts for investigatory and litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, pursuant to COCCA Sec. 18-17-106(7).
In many respects the provisions of COCCA parallel those of the federal RICO statute. But the language relating to pretrial injunctive relief is broader in COCCA than in RICO. 1 COCCA provides:
Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 18-17-106(5) and (6) (emphasis added). Other COCCA provisions state that "[t]o effectuate the intent and purpose of this article, the provisions of this article shall be liberally construed." Id. Sec. 18-17-108. An explicit legislative purpose underlying COCCA was to expand traditional "sanctions and remedies ... [which] are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact." Id. Sec. 18-17-102.
The district court read Sec. 18-17-106(6) as permitting the injunction to issue upon plaintiffs' showing that Mosko appeared to be transferring most of his assets to relatives and others. We do not find the district court's construction of Colorado law to be erroneous. We believe the Colorado courts would give broad scope to the statute upon which the district court relied. That COCCA Sec. 18-17-106(7) permits treble damages bolsters this conclusion. Defendants will have to pay these treble damages with property which necessarily may not be traceable to the illegal activity. To uphold the integrity of this remedy, courts may need to ensure the postjudgment availability of assets not related to the illegal conduct.
Mosko makes no constitutional challenge to the injunction. Rather he contends that this injunction offends traditional equitable principles as applied in the federal courts, citing to statements in De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 222-23, 65 S.Ct. 1130, 1135, 89 L.Ed. 1566 (1945), and several lower court cases. Mosko's resort to federal law is irrelevant, however, since Fed.R.Civ.P. 64 requires us to...
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