Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States

Citation844 F.Supp.2d 1324,34 ITRD 1445
PartiesDECKERS OUTDOOR CORP., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
Decision Date24 April 2012
CourtU.S. Court of International Trade

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Patrick D. Gill and William J. Maloney, of counsel, Rode & Qualey, of New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Marcella Powell, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for Defendant. With her on the briefs were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Barbara S. Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office, and Yelena Slepak, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel for International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of counsel.

OPINION

CARMAN, Judge:

At issue in this case is the proper tariff classification of boots imported by Plaintiff in 2006 and 2007. United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) classified the boots in subheading 6404.19.35, HTSUS as “footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners.” Plaintiff claims the boots should instead be classified in basket provision 6404.19.90 as other footwear valued at more than $12 per pair.

Defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to USCIT Rule 56. For the reasons given below, the motion will be granted and judgment will issue for Defendant.

Background

Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation (Deckers) imported the merchandise at issue, which consists of the UGG Classic Crochet model boot (“Classic Crochet”). (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def.'s Facts”) ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 29.) Both parties agree that the Classic Crochet is footwear intended to be worn on the foot; more specifically, they agree that it is a boot with a rubber sole and knit upper that has no laces, buckles, or other fasteners to hold it to the foot. (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 3–13.) To don the boots, a wearer must grip the top of the woven textile upper with two hands, insert the foot into the opening, and pull the boot up forcefully while adjusting the foot until the foot and calf are securely ensconced in the boot with the heel properly set. (Pl.'s Am. Statement of Genuine Material Facts Which Are at Issue ¶¶ 3, 5 (“Pl.'s Facts”), ECF No. 40–2; Def.'s Resps. to Pl.'s Am. Statement of Genuine Material Facts Which Are at Issue ¶¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 49.)

Customs classified the entries under 6404.19.35, HTSUS:

6404 Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of textile materials:

Footwear with outer soles of rubber or plastics:

6404.19 Other:

Footwear with open toes or open heels; footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners, the foregoing except footwear of subheading 6404.19.20 1 and except footwear having a foxing 2 or foxing-like band wholly or almost wholly of rubber or plastics applied or molded at the sole and overlapping the upper:

6404.19.35 Other

(Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 5; Ans. ¶ 6, ECF No. 8.) Merchandise in 6404.19.35, HTSUS was dutiable at 37.5% ad valorem. Plaintiff had requested that the Classic Crochet boot be categorized instead under subheading 6404.19.90, which differed from the subheading above as follows:

Other:

6404.19.90 Valued over $12/pair

Merchandise in 6404.19.90 was dutiable at 9% ad valorem.

Plaintiff, as importer of record, timely protested liquidation under 6404.19.35 pursuant to section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1514; Customs denied the protests, Plaintiff paid all liquidated duties, and then commenced this lawsuit. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–5; Answer ¶¶ 1–5.)

The Court faces two overarching issues: whether there is any question of material fact that would preclude summary judgment;and, if not, in which subheading of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Plaintiff's merchandise should be categorized. Concluding that no material facts are in issue and that the case is therefore appropriately resolved on summary judgment, the Court affirms Customs' classification of the Classic Crochet boots under 6404.19.35 for the reasons set forth below.

Analysis

I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The Court of International Trade will grant summary judgment where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT Rule 56(c). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court reviews all evidence submitted and draws all inferences against the moving party. SeeMatsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The movant must demonstrate that there is no issue of material fact; otherwise, a trial to resolve factual questions is warranted. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

In a Customs classification case, regardless of the classifications advocated by the parties, the CIT has the responsibility of determining “the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). In finding the correct classification result, the Court rules de novo “upon the basis of the record made before the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1); Universal Electronics, 112 F.3d at 493.3

II. Contentions of the PartiesA. Whether Issues of Material Fact Exist

As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to whether any issues of material fact are in contention. This dispute is easily resolved in Defendant's favor.

The government insists that there is no dispute as to the physical characteristics of the Classic Crochet boots, and explicitly concedes Deckers' factual assertions: that the merchandise is “sold as boots, that the boots can be pulled on with the hands, and that the boots extend above the ankle [.] (Def.'s Reply at 5–6.) Therefore, in Defendant's view, no factual issues require trial and the case is ripe for the Court to decide, as a matter of law, into which tariff subheading the merchandise properly falls. (Def.'s Reply at 7.) Instead of arguing that there are material issues of fact as to the physical characteristics of the Classic Crochet boots, Deckers contends that the differences between the parties over the meaning of the phrase “footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners” in 6404.19.35 constitutes an issue of material fact that must be resolved at a trial. (Pl.'s Brief in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summary J. (“Pl.'s Opp.”) 12–13.) Deckers claims it “should be afforded the opportunity to present evidence to contradict the government's utterly unsupported conclusions with respect to the application of the term [slip-on] to the boots in issue.” ( Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff is mistaken. Determining the correct classification of merchandise requires the Court to first “construe the relevant classification headings,” which is a purely legal question, and then to determine “under which of the properly construed tariff terms the merchandise at issue falls.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1998). Where the nature of the merchandise is not at issue, the question “collapses entirely into a question of law” ripe for disposition on summary judgment. Cummins Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2006) (citations omitted). As Jarvis Clark instructs, the Court bears the obligation to determine the correct classification of the merchandise. 733 F.2d at 878. The Court has a sample of the Classic Crochet boots and has examined that sample. (Def.'s Mem. at Ex. A.) The parties do not dispute any relevant characteristic of the boots, but dispute only the proper construal of the terms in 6404.19.35. There being no dispute as to the nature of the merchandise, the question before the Court has collapsed into a pure question of law and is appropriately decided on summary judgment, as per Cummins, supra. The Court therefore holds that Plaintiff is not entitled “to present evidence to contradict the government's ... conclusions with respect to the application of the term [slip-on] to the boots in issue.” ( See Pl.'s Opp. at 13.)

B. The Meaning of the Phrase “Footwear of the Slip-on Type, That Is Held to the Foot Without the Use of Laces or Buckles or Other Fasteners”

The parties dispute the proper construal of the phrase “footwear of the slip-on type, that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or other fasteners” in the tariff provision. (Def.'s Mem. at 7; Pl.'s Opp. at 13.) While Defendant urges the Court to affirm its decision that the phrase applies to the boots, Plaintiff insists that “footwear of the slip-on type” only denotes footwear that does not extend above the ankle and cannot include Plaintiff's merchandise, which extends above the ankle. ( See Pl.'s Opp. at 4.)

1. Defendant's Construal of the Relevant Language

Defendant asserts that [t]he phrase ‘that is held to the foot without the use of laces or buckles or fasteners' qualifies the phrase ‘slip-on type,’ and the phrase ‘slip-on type’ qualifies the term ‘footwear.’ (Def.'s Mem. at 8.)

The government correctly notes that the term “footwear” is not defined in the HTSUS or Explanatory Notes. ( Id.) The government quotes dictionaries that define the word footwear as “wearing apparel (as shoes or boots) for the feet,” and [a]ny foot covering in the form of shoes, boots, slippers, or hose used for utility and/or dresswear” but [n]ot necessarily synonymous with shoes, which are simply one category of footwear.” ( Id. at 9 ( citing Merriam Webster, http:// merriam- webster. com/ dictionary/ footwear and The Complete Footwear Dictionary (2d Ed. 2000) (excerpted at Def. Mem., Ex. I)).)

Defendant also points to Footwear Definitions, a document consisting of originally internal “footwear definitions used...

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2 cases
  • Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
    • 10 October 2013
    ...6404.19.35 (“Subheading 19.35”) of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). See Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States, 844 F.Supp.2d 1324 (Ct.Int'l Trade 2012) (“Trade Court Decision ”). Because we conclude that the merchandise at issue was correctly classified as “fo......
  • Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States, 2012-1411
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
    • 8 May 2013
    ...6404.19.35 ("Subheading 19.35") of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"). See Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2012) ("Trade Court Decision"). Because we conclude that the merchandise at issue was correctly classified as "......

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