Nichols v. Atnip

Citation844 S.W.2d 655
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
Decision Date02 October 1992
PartiesWilliam Edward NICHOLS and wife Donna Nichols, as next of kin and surviving parents of Andrew Edward Nichols, deceased, Plaintiffs/Appellants, and Ray Thomas Murphy and wife Mary Helen Murphy, as next of kin and surviving parents of Bryan Thomas Murphy, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Robert Roy ATNIP, Sr. and Guylene Mathis Atnip, Defendants/Appellees.

Marshall E. Duggin, Woodbury, for plaintiff/appellant William and Donna Nichols.

Douglas S. Hale, for plaintiff/appellant Ray and Mary Murphy.

David A. King, Nashville, Cornelius & Collins, Daniel H. Rader, III, Moore, Jones, Rader & Clift, Cookeville, Frank Buck, Smithville, for defendants/appellees.

OPINION

KOCH, Judge.

This appeal involves two parents' liability for the negligence of their teenage son. The parents of two teenage boys who were killed by an intoxicated eighteen-year-old driver filed separate wrongful death actions against the driver's parents in the Circuit Court for DeKalb County alleging negligent supervision, negligent entrustment, and statutory parental liability. The trial court granted the driver's parents' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaints. We affirm.

I.

Robert R. Atnip, Jr. lived with his parents in Smithville. He began drinking and experimenting with drugs before he entered high school and "stayed drunk through most of his adolescence." By October 1985 when he became old enough to obtain a driver's license, he was a consistent, habitual abuser of alcohol and marijuana. His substance abuse impaired his performance in school and caused him to lose several part-time jobs.

Mr. Atnip's parents were aware of his substance abuse problem but viewed it as part of the maturation process. They permitted him to purchase and operate a car and even assisted him by paying several of his insurance premiums, occasionally buying him tires, and giving him money from time to time for gas and oil. They also controlled his use of the car by withdrawing or threatening to withdraw his driving privileges when he misused his car. Within the first two or three years after Mr. Atnip obtained his driver's license, his parents revoked his driving privileges approximately five times.

The young man's driving record reflected his substance abuse. Within four months after his sixteenth birthday, he was involved in his first property damage accident. During 1987, he received nine citations for speeding or other moving violations and one citation for driving while intoxicated. He was also involved in his second property damage accident. His third property damage accident occurred in February 1988.

Dr. and Mrs. Atnip did not totally curtail their son's driving despite his conduct. In fact, after the boy destroyed his car in July 1987 by driving it into a ditch, Dr. Atnip found another car for his son to buy and continued to help him by paying for his insurance, buying him tires, and providing him money for gas and oil.

Mr. Atnip spent the morning of June 28, 1988 working on his grandfather's farm. After returning home, he picked up a friend and began to drive around drinking beer and vodka. They picked up two girls and drove to a rendezvous called "Redneck Beach" where they planned to spend the rest of the day and evening drinking and passing the time. Their idyll was cut short when one of the girls insisted on being driven home. Even though he had been drinking heavily, Mr. Atnip agreed to drive her home.

Several minutes after dropping off his companion at her home, Mr. Atnip slammed his car into the rear of a car being driven by Bryan Murphy. Mr. Murphy and Andrew Nichols, one of his passengers were killed, and Richard McFerrin, another passenger, was seriously injured. Mr. Atnip was speeding when the accident occurred and did not notice that Mr. Murphy had slowed and was preparing to turn right. Mr. Atnip's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident was .21%. 1

Mr. Atnip was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication and one count of aggravated assault. In addition, his victims' parents filed wrongful death actions against him. Mr. Atnip pled guilty to the criminal charges in August 1989. In June 1990, Mr. Murphy's and Mr. Nichols's parents also filed suit against Dr. and Mrs. Atnip, alleging that they were also liable for the deaths of their children. In October 1990, a DeKalb County jury returned a judgment against Mr. Atnip for $150,000 in actual and $150,000 in punitive damages. In April 1991, the trial court filed an order granting Dr. and Mrs. Atnip's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Nichols' and the Murphys' complaint. This appeal followed.

II.

The trial court did not explain its reasons for granting Dr. and Mrs. Atnip's motion for summary judgment. Consistent with Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56.03, the trial court must necessarily have concluded that no material factual issues existed and that the Atnips were entitled to a dismissal of each of the plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law.

A.

Summary judgments provide an appropriate way to dispose of claims that can be decided based on legal issues alone. Bellamy v. Federal Express Corp., 749 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tenn.1988); Brookins v. The Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tenn.1981); Hemlick v. Northway Ctr. Assocs., 817 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991). Thus, they may be used in negligence cases where the dispositive issue is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff since the existence of a duty is always a question of law for the court. Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990); Kelley v. Johnson, 796 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990); Dill v. Gamble Asphalt Materials, 594 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tenn.Ct.App.1979).

The grounds for the Atnips' summary judgment motion are somewhat unclear since they failed to heed Tenn.R.Civ.P. 7.02(1)'s admonition that motions must "state with particularity the grounds therefor." Their motion states only that "the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against them upon which relief can be granted under the circumstances of this case." The memorandum of law supporting the motion does little to bring this overly broad allusion to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) into sharper focus.

The most reasonable interpretation of the Atnips' motion is that they were challenging the legal, as opposed to factual, basis for the complaints. Accordingly, we will examine each of the three causes of action contained in the Murphys' and Nichols's complaints to determine whether the Atnips were entitled to summary dismissal of the complaints as a matter of law.

B.

The Claims Based on Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-10-103 (1991)

The plaintiffs first assert that the Atnips are liable for their son's negligent acts under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-10-103 because he was unemancipated when the accident occurred. We disagree. Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-10-103 has no application to this case because Robert Atnip, Jr. was fully emancipated as a matter of law when he reached his eighteenth birthday.

Parents were not liable for their children's torts at common law. Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 201, 373 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1963); Stanley v. Joslin, 757 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987). However, the General Assembly imposed liability on parents twenty-five years ago by statute. Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-10-103(a) now provides that

A parent or guardian shall be liable for the tortious activities of a minor child that causes injuries to persons or property where the parent or guardian knows, or should know, of the child's tendency to commit wrongful acts which can be expected to cause injury to persons or property and where the parent or guardian has an opportunity to control the child but fails to exercise reasonable means to restrain the tortious conduct.

In going about determining the General Assembly's intent when it enacted this statute, we must give the words their natural and ordinary meaning. State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 529 (Tenn.1985). We should also keep in mind that the courts should not displace the common law any more than is necessarily required, In re Deskins' Estate, 214 Tenn. 608, 611, 381 S.W.2d 921, 922 (1964), and should take care not to restrict the statute's coverage unduly or to expand it beyond its intended scope. United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 800-01, 89 S.Ct. 1410, 1419, 22 L.Ed.2d 726 (1969).

Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-10-103(a) applies only to parents of minor children. Tenn.Code Ann. § 1-3-105(1) (Supp.1992) defines a "minor" as "any person who has not attained the age of eighteen (18) years." Robert Atnip, Jr. was over 18-years-old when he caused the deaths of Bryan Murphy and Andrew Nichols. Since he was not a minor at the time of the accident, his parents cannot be held liable for his conduct under Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-10-103(a) as a matter of law.

Even though Robert Atnip, Jr. had reached the age of majority when the accident occurred, the Murphys and the Nichols argue that he should be considered to be a minor for the purpose of Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-10-103(a) because he was not fully emancipated and because his substance abuse had rendered him emotionally equivalent to a 15-year-old. We disagree.

These arguments overlook Tenn.Code Ann. § 1-3-113(a) (Supp.1992) which provides:

Notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, any person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall have the same rights, duties, and responsibilities as a person who is twenty-one (21) years of age, except as provided in subsection (b) relative to the rights to purchase, possess, transport, and consume alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer as those terms are defined in title 57.

Emancipation may occur by operation of law. Glover v. Glover, 44 Tenn.App. 712, 720, 319 S.W.2d 238, 241 (1958). The enactment of Tenn.Code Ann. § 1-3-113(a) completely emancipated those...

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