Fears v. Kasich (In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.)

Decision Date30 December 2016
Docket NumberNo. 16-3149,16-3149
Citation845 F.3d 231
Parties IN RE: OHIO EXECUTION PROTOCOL LITIGATION. Angelo Fears, et al., Petitioners–Appellants, v. John Kasich, et al., Respondents–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Erin G. Barnhart, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Charles L. Wille, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Allen L. Bohnert, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio, Randall Porter, Kimberly S. Rigby, Rachel Troutman, OFFICE OF THE OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbus, Ohio, Timothy F. Sweeney, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY FARRELL SWEENEY, Cleveland, Ohio, S. Adele Shank, LAW OFFICE OF S. ADELE SHANK, Columbus, Ohio, Lawrence J. Greger, GREGER LAW OFFICE, Dayton, Ohio, Vicki Werneke, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, Laurence E. Komp, Manchester, Missouri, for Appellants. Charles L. Wille, Thomas Madden, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: NORRIS, SILER, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NORRIS, J., joined. STRANCH, J. (pp. 240–44), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

SILER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs are Ohio death-row inmates challenging Ohio's execution protocol and practice. Defendants include Ohio officials as well as anonymous drug manufacturers, compounders, intermediaries, and others involved in Ohio's execution process. Plaintiffs appeal from a district court's entry of a protective order precluding the disclosure of any information that could reveal the identity of suppliers or manufacturers of Ohio's legal-injection drugs as well as anyone related to carrying out executions in Ohio. During the pendency of this appeal, we affirmed a related appeal from an order dismissing certain constitutional challenges to Ohio's execution protocol. Phillips v. DeWine , 841 F.3d 405 (6th Cir.2016). We now AFFIRM the entry of the protective order because the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendants established good cause for protection from certain discovery.

I.

Starting around 2011, Ohio death-row inmates filed a spate of lawsuits in the Southern District of Ohio to challenge Ohio's protocols for lethal injunction. In 2014, Ohio enacted legislation to amend Ohio Revised Code § 149.43, thereby creating two new statutes, Ohio Revised Code §§ 2949.221 and 2949.222, to address confidentiality of information about lethal injection in Ohio. The secrecy statute precludes, among other things, the release of information that would identify the manufacturer or supplier of drugs for use in Ohio's lethal-injection protocol. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2949.221, 2949.222. In Phillips , the district court dismissed some of the litigation challenging the protocol on grounds of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Phillips v. De W ine , 92 F.Supp.3d 702, 718 (S.D. Ohio 2015).

In the litigation giving rise to this appeal, Defendants moved for a protective order to prevent the release of any information in their possession that could identify the sources of Ohio's lethal-injection drugs. After hearing evidence and testimony from four witnesses, the district court granted the motion and issued the following protective order:

The Court therefore ORDERS that any information or record in Defendants' possession, custody, or control that identifies or reasonably would lead to the identification of any person or entity who participates in the acquisition or use of the specific drugs, compounded or not, that Ohio indicates in its execution protocol it will use or will potentially seek to use to carry out executions is protected and not subject to discovery. This protective order is intended to extend to those persons who or entities that have not waived or forfeited its protection and who manufacture, compound, import, transport, distribute, supply, prescribe, prepare, administer, use, or test the compounding equipment or components, the active pharmaceutical ingredients, the execution protocol drugs or combination of drugs, the medical supplies, or the medical equipment used in carrying out any execution under Ohio Revised Code § 2949.22. This protective order governs discovery only in this litigation and does not apply outside this litigation or (in the increasingly unlikely event) after this litigation concludes.

In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig. , No. 2:11–cv–1016, 2015 WL 6446093, at *9, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144926, at *45–46 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2015). The district court certified the order for interlocutory appeal, and we granted Plaintiffs' petition to appeal. Shortly thereafter, the district court reassigned and consolidated Phillips with this litigation. Several days after the protective order issued, Plaintiffs moved for a modification that would permit limited disclosures to counsel only under the designation "attorney's eyes only." The district court denied the motion, noting that "disclosure of identities subjects the disclosed persons or entities to suit."1

In October 2016, before oral argument, the parties notified the court that Ohio plans to move forward with three scheduled executions, starting with Ronald Phillips's execution in January 2017. Defendants represented that they intend to use a new three-drug protocol: midazolam

hydrochloride, potassium chloride, and one of the following drugs: rocuronium bromide, vecuronium bromide, or pancuronium bromide. The new protocol mirrors the Oklahoma protocol approbated by the Supreme Court in June 2015. See Glossip v. Gross , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2734–35, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015) ("The option that Oklahoma plans to use to execute petitioners calls for the administration of 500 milligrams of midazolam followed by a paralytic agent and potassium chloride

. The paralytic agent may be pancuronium bromide, vecuronium bromide, or rocuronium bromide, three drugs that, all agree, are functionally equivalent for purposes of this case.").2

We affirmed the judgment in Phillips in November 2016 and now address the instant discovery dispute. Phillips v. DeWine , 841 F.3d 405, 432 (6th Cir.2016).

II.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1), a district court may grant a protective order preventing the production of discovery to protect a party or entity from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). We review the grant of a protective order for abuse of discretion. Serrano v. Cintas Corp. , 699 F.3d 884, 899–900 (6th Cir. 2012). "The abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an appellate court's correction of a district court's legal or factual error: ‘A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’ " Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys ., ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1748 n.2, 188 L.Ed.2d 829 (2014) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) ). To that end, "in reviewing a trial court's evidentiary determinations, this court reviews de novo the court's conclusions of law and reviews for clear error the court's factual determinations that underpin its legal conclusions." United States v. Ganier , 468 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

III.

Plaintiffs argue that the protective order prevents the prosecution of their federal and state causes of action. Plaintiffs maintain that the protective order is contrary to law because the order cuts off all discovery on Ohio's execution procedures, including previously produced discovery. They contend that the otherwise barred discovery would assist in identifying the suppliers or manufacturers of Ohio's legal-injection drugs as well as anyone related to carrying out executions in Ohio. Plaintiffs impugn the sufficiency of unknown laboratories using unknown testing protocols to evaluate drugs manufactured or compounded by an anonymous source.

The protective order runs afoul with Rule 26(c), Plaintiffs argue, because Defendants failed to make particular and specific demonstrations of harm. Plaintiffs contend that the district court conflated all groups of Defendants and failed to analyze the particularized harm suffered by each discrete entity. Plaintiffs suggest that the district court immunized the drug manufacturers and their affiliates from litigation by relying on generalized, objective harm suffered from the risk of threats, intimidation, and harassment. Even fear of abusive litigation, Plaintiffs contend, is insufficient to justify a protective order. According to Plaintiffs, the record is devoid of evidence that, but for the protective order, Ohio could not carry out executions because of harm to drug manufacturers upon discovery of their identities. Plaintiffs emphasize that Defendants did not allege Ohio's inability to carry out executions as a basis for the protective order. But even so, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants failed to produce or point to any credible, specific evidence in the record to demonstrate an inability to obtain lethal-injection drugs or to carry out executions in the absence of a protective order.3

Plaintiffs posit that even if evidence exists of harm to Defendants, the harm caused by cutting off discovery in this case outweighs the harms attributed to Defendants. Plaintiffs argue that the protective order violates procedural due process because the order circumscribes their right to vital information to support their claims. Plaintiffs also asperse the protective order as federalizing a state privilege under Ohio Revised Code §§ 2949.221 and 2949.222, which has no foothold under federal law. In the alternative, to mollify Defendants'...

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