Holloway v. United States
Decision Date | 11 January 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 16-1402,16-1402 |
Citation | 845 F.3d 487 |
Parties | Errol HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Thomas M. Libbos , Springfield, MA, Katherine L. Lamondia-Wrinkle , and Thomas M. Libbos PC on brief for appellant.
Carmen M. Ortiz , United States Attorney, and Karen L. Goodwin , Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
Before Lynch, Selya, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Errol Holloway appeals the grant of summary judgment to the United States in this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Spying no reversible error, we affirm.
We reconstruct the chronology of events giving rise to this litigation:
An unhappy Holloway sued the United States in federal court in February 2015, seeking damages under the FTCA. Convinced that Holloway's failure to provide a timely sum-certain demand deprived the court of jurisdiction, the United States moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Holloway responded with a double-pronged argument: first, that he timely presented his claim because his submissions satisfied HHS's investigatory needs; second, and alternatively, that the limitations period should be tolled. The district judge referred the motion to a magistrate judge.
After noting that the Supreme Court had recently held that the FTCA's limitations period is nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling, see United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 1638, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015), the magistrate judge treated the motion as one for summary judgment and recommended that judgment enter for the United States. Her reasoning ran this way. For starters, she concluded that Holloway had neither timely specified a sum certain nor timely provided documents from which "such a sum could be ascertained" and so had not properly presented his claim to HHS. And then she found that nothing that took place here qualified as extraordinary circumstances meriting equitable tolling, particularly since Holloway conceded that he did have constructive or actual knowledge of the filing requirements. Holloway objected, attacking only the magistrate judge's untimeliness conclusion. Agreeing that Holloway "did not timely satisfy" the FTCA's requirements, the district judge later adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation on de novo review.
Which brings us to today, with Holloway asking us to reverse and send the matter to trial. But before tackling his many arguments, we pause to give a quick tutorial on the relevant aspects of the FTCA.
The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for certain tortious acts and omissions of federal employees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. And like other sovereign-immunity waivers, the FTCA gets a strict reading. See, e.g., Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 622 (1st Cir. 2011). What that means is that judges "must faithfully enforce" the FTCA's "requirements, neither ‘extend[ing] the waiver beyond that which Congress intended [nor assuming] authority to narrow the waiver.’ " Id.(quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) ).
A key FTCA requirement is that a person cannot sue under it unless he first presents his "claim" to the relevant administrative agency "within two years after such claim accrues"—failure to present a claim within that period "forever bar[s]" the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). An essential element of a claim is "notification of the incident," via "an executed" SF 95 or "other written" document, "accompanied by" a demand "for money damages in a sum certain ." See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (emphasis added). The purpose behind the sum-certain requirement is to tip the government off as to its "possible liability" so that it can " ‘investigate the alleged negligent episode’ " to see " ‘if settlement would be in the best interests of all.’ " Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Corte – Real v. United States, 949 F.2d 484, 486 (1st Cir. 1991), in turn quoting Lopez v. United States, 758 F.2d 806, 809 (1st Cir. 1985) ); see also Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 173 (1st Cir. 1988) ( ). And because the FTCA ties "both the authority to settle a claim and the source of settlement funds to the amount of the underlying claim,"2 not having a sum certain obviously makes it harder for the government to determine the claim's value and to "handl[e]" the claim "efficiently." Kokotis, 223 F.3d at 279.
Having said all this, we must acknowledge that we "approach[ ] the notice requirement leniently, ‘recognizing that individuals wishing to sue the government must comply with the details of the law, but also keeping in mind that the law was not intended to put up a barrier of technicalities to defeat their claims.’ " Santiago–Ramírez v. Sec'y of Dept. of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Lopez, 758 F.2d at 809 ). Perhaps that is why our cases suggest that the failure to specify a sum certain on the SF 95 may not be fatal if the claimant provides documents (e.g. , medical bills) that "lend" themselves "to determination of a sum certain or even an approximate total of damages claimed." See Kokaras v. United States, 980 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1992) ; see also Coska, 114 F.3d at 323 ( ).
With this legal primer in place, we turn to the particulars of Holloway's challenges.
Conceding—as he must—that his SF 95 did not include a sum certain, Holloway raises several arguments for reversal. None has merit, as the United States is quick to point out.
Quoting Santiago–Ramírez's language about our taking a "lenient" view of the FTCA's claim-presentment requirements, Holloway argues first that we should reverse the lower court's untimeliness ruling because his sum-certain omission was (emphasis his) "inadvertent ": as he sees things, an inadvertent omission—in and of itself—excuses him from having to satisfy the sum-certain requirement. But the cases of ours that he talks about—Kokaras and Corte – Real, for example—do not support his argument.
The Kokaras plaintiffs filed an SF 95 with the United States Post Office following a collision with a mail truck. See 980 F.2d at 21. In box A of the form, labeled "Property Damage," plaintiffs wrote "$2,906.61" and in box B, labeled "Personal Injury," they wrote "to be determined." Id. They left box C, labeled "Total," blank. Id. Later—but still within the two-year statute of limitations—they hired a lawyer who, during unsuccessful settlement talks, handed over medical records and bills. Id. Ultimately, we upheld the dismissal of the personal-injury claim, holding that plaintiffs did not timely state a sum certain—"[n]owhere on form SF 95 is a sum certain for the personal injuries stated," we wrote. Id. at 22–23. We also held that they did not timely provide the agency with documents with enough info to otherwise satisfy the sum-certain requirement (we did let the property-damages claim proceed because their SF 95 did specify a sum certain). Id.
The Corte – Real plaintiff filed an SF 95 that had "$100,000 plus because still treating and out of work" written in the box requiring him to state the dollar amount attributable to his personal injury. See 949 F.2d at 485. But he wrote "$100,000"—without any qualifying language—in the box requiring him to list the total dollar amount of his claims. Id. Emphasizing "the importance and absolute...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Maldonado-Peña
...deem waived claims not made or claims adverted to in a cursory fashion, unaccompanied by developed argument."); Holloway v. United States, 845 F.3d 487, 491 n.4 (1st Cir. 2017) (stating an argument was waived when party failed to provide any legal citations to support its argument)).Finally......
-
Zell v. Ricci
...doom it. See, e.g., Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 932 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2019) ; see also Holloway v. United States, 845 F.3d 487, 491 n.4 (1st Cir. 2017) (refusing to consider an argument due to its lack of development when the party did not make any legal citations su......
-
Hoolahan v. IBC Advanced Alloys Corp.
...Access Ctr., 932 F.3d at 12 (citing Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir. 2011) ; Holloway v. United States, 845 F.3d 487, 491 n.4 (1st Cir. 2017) ; Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 (stating that litigants must develop their own arguments rather than "leaving the court t......
-
United States v. Chan
...deem waived claims not made or claims adverted to in a cursory fashion, unaccompanied by developed argument."); Holloway v. United States, 845 F.3d 487, 491 n.4 (1st Cir. 2017) (stating an argument was waived when party failed to provide any legal citations to support its argument).5 In the......