State v. Greenwood

Decision Date04 February 1993
Docket Number57233-0 and 57318-2,Nos. 57208-9,s. 57208-9
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Wallace J. GREENWOOD, et al., Petitioners. The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Warren Earl THOMPSON, Petitioner. The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Brian K. LANDEY, Petitioner.

John J. Sinclair, Olympia, for petitioner Weyland.

Rakow & Hansen, Rick L. Hansen, Goldendale, for petitioner Thompson.

Mr. Warren Earl Thompson Pro Se.

Mark V. Watanabe, Seattle, for petitioner Landey.

Patrick D. Sutherland, Thurston County Prosecutor, Kenneth L. Nichols, Deputy, Olympia, Gerald A. Matosich, Klickitat County Prosecutor, Richard Lynn Walker, Deputy, Goldendale, Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Lee D. Yates, Sr. Deputy, Seattle, for respondent State.

JOHNSON, Justice.

The common issue in these four consolidated cases is whether State v. Striker, 87 Wash.2d 870, 557 P.2d 847 (1976) continues to apply to Superior Court Criminal Rule (CrR) 3.3. CrR 3.3 provides time limitations that must be We will first explain why Striker continues to apply to CrR 3.3, and we will then apply this conclusion to the facts of the four consolidated cases.

                observed for ensuring criminal defendants are brought to trial in a timely manner.  In Striker, the court held CrR 3.3 could be violated if a long and unnecessary delay occurs in initially bringing a defendant who is amenable to process before the court to answer for a charge.  Striker, at 875, 557 P.2d 847.   We hold Striker continues to apply to CrR 3.3, and we take this opportunity to clarify how Striker applies in light of CrR 3.3's post-Striker amendments
                
I

Striker

and CrR 3.3

This case presents a simple question in the complex context of CrR 3.3. CrR 3.3 has a gap in its time for trial provisions: the text of CrR 3.3 does not address the time requirements for initially bringing defendants before the court who are not in jail or subject to conditions of release. Striker corrected this problem under a prior version of CrR 3.3, which also had a similar gap, to bring this time period within the rule's time for trial requirements. We now analyze whether Striker continues to correct this problem under the present CrR 3.3.

Under the present CrR 3.3, defendants who are not detained in jail or subject to conditions of release pending arraignment:

shall be arraigned not later than 14 days after that appearance in superior court which next follows the filing of the information or indictment.

CrR 3.3(c)(1). CrR 3.3 further provides defendants who remain out of custody must then be brought to trial not later than 90 days after their arraignment date. CrR 3.3(c)(1). The text of CrR 3.3 thus allows for a total of 104 days before these defendants must be brought to trial: a 14-day period from the defendant's first appearance before the court to the defendant's arraignment date, and then an additional 90-day period from this arraignment date to the day of trial.

When a defendant is not arraigned within CrR 3.3(c)(1)'s time limits, the court will establish a constructive arraignment date based on "the last day the defendant could properly have been arraigned." CrR 3.3(c)(4). The last day defendants who are neither in custody nor subject to conditions of release can properly be arraigned is 14 days after their first appearance in court. CrR 3.3(c)(1). If these defendants remain out of custody pending trial, they must then be brought to trial within 90 days of this constructive arraignment date. CrR 3.3(c)(4). The constructive arraignment date for such defendants thus depends on the date these defendants make their first appearance in court. If individuals are not informed in a timely manner that they have become criminal defendants, and not directed to appear in court to answer for the charge, a long delay could occur before they ever make their first appearance in court. CrR 3.3 addresses the problem of untimely arraignments, but it does not address the problem of long and unnecessary delays in initially bringing defendants before the court. 1

This brings us to the question of whether this court's decision in Striker continues to apply to CrR 3.3. In Striker, the State charged the defendants with crimes, but it did not promptly inform them of this fact even though both defendants were amenable to process. A long delay occurred before these defendants first appeared before the court to answer for the charges, and this delay was not attributable to any fault or connivance on the defendants' part.

The version of CrR 3.3 in effect at the time the court decided Striker provided: "[a] criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 90 days following the [defendant's] preliminary appearance". Striker, at 871, 557 P.2d 847 (quoting former CrR 3.3(b)). The rule was silent, however, regarding the effect of long and unnecessary delays in informing individuals that charges The court in Striker noted while CrR 3.3 was silent regarding the applicable time limits during this period, the criminal rules explicitly require defendants be promptly arraigned once charges have been filed. Striker, at 871, 557 P.2d 847 (citing CrR 4.1). Individuals will not be promptly arraigned unless they have first been informed in a timely manner that they have become criminal defendants and that they must appear in court as a result. The court in Striker accordingly reasoned the rules did not authorize a period of delay in initially bringing defendants before the court to answer for the charges filed against them. Striker, at 871-72, 557 P.2d 847.

had been filed against them. Former CrR 3.3 was thus virtually identical to the present CrR 3.3 in this respect: neither version specifies the applicable time limits for initially bringing defendants before the court to answer for the charges filed against them.

In order to provide a remedy for this problem, the court in Striker held where a long and unnecessary delay occurs in bringing a defendant who is amenable to process before the court, CrR 3.3's 90-day trial period is deemed to commence at the time the information was filed, instead of when the defendant finally appeared before the court to answer for the charge. State v. Striker, 87 Wash.2d 870, 875, 557 P.2d 847 (1976). The delay that occurred in Striker prevented the defendants from receiving a trial within this 90-day time period. Striker, at 875, 557 P.2d 847. CrR 3.3(i) requires a court to dismiss a charge with prejudice where the defendant has not been brought to trial within CrR 3.3's time limitations, and the court accordingly dismissed with prejudice the charges against the defendants. Striker thus provides an incentive for the prosecution to bring defendants who are amenable to process before the court in a timely manner to answer for the charges filed against them.

CrR 3.3 has been amended several times since this court's 1976 decision in Striker. See 87 Wash.2d 1102 (1976); 90 Wash.2d 1149 (1978); 93 Wash.2d 1123 (1980); 106 Wash.2d 1114, 1116 (1986); 117 Wash.2d 1106 (1991). Division Two of the Court of Appeals held CrR 3.3's 1980 amendment superseded When interpreting court rules, the court approaches the rules as though they had been drafted by the Legislature. State v. McIntyre, 92 Wash.2d 620, 622, 600 P.2d 1009 (1979). We thus apply principles of statutory construction in interpreting CrR 3.3. McIntyre, at 622, 600 P.2d 1009; State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett Dist. Justice Court, 90 Wash.2d 794, 797, 585 P.2d 1177 (1978).

                this court's decision in Striker.   See State v. Greenwood, 57 Wash.App. 854, 857, 790 P.2d 1243 (1990).  Divisions One and Three, however, continue to apply Striker principles to CrR 3.3.  See State v. Landey, 57 Wash.App. 527, 789 P.2d 314 (1990);  State v. Thompson, 57 Wash.App. 688, 790 P.2d 180 (1990).  While CrR 3.3 was also amended in 1986 and 1991, these amendments did not materially alter CrR 3.3 for the purpose of our present analysis.  This case thus involves interpretation of the present CrR 3.3, and the effect of the rule's 1980 amendment on this court's decision in Striker
                

In Striker, the court construed the version of CrR 3.3 in effect in 1976. Once a court rule has been construed by this court, that construction operates as if it were originally written into the rule. See In re Moore, 116 Wash.2d 30, 37, 803 P.2d 300 (1991) (quoting State v. Darden, 99 Wash.2d 675, 679, 663 P.2d 1352 (1983)). The court's decision in Striker thus operates as if it were originally written into the 1976 version of CrR 3.3.

The 1980 amendment to CrR 3.3 altered the rule by providing a defendant's time for trial calculation begins when the defendant is arraigned, rather than when the defendant first appears before the court. See former CrR 3.3(c)(1). The amendment also added the constructive arraignment provision mentioned above. The 1980 amendment does not contain any provisions regarding the period of time prior to a defendant's first appearance in court when the defendant is not in jail or subject to conditions of release. Nor does the amendment make any reference to Striker.

When interpreting an amendment, a material change in the language of the original act is presumed to indicate a an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or necessary or unmistakable implication, and the language employed [in the amendment] admits of no other reasonable construction....

                change in legal rights.  1A N. Singer, Statutory Construction § 22.30 (4th ed. 1985).  However, courts do not favor the repeal of settled principles of law by mere implication.   State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 351, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984).  The intent to overturn settled principles of law will therefore not be presumed unless
                

(Italics ours.) Ashenbrenner v. Department of Labor & Indus., 62 Wash.2d 22, 26, 380 P.2d 730 (1963) (quoting 50 Am.Jur....

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