In re Samantha C.
| Citation | 268 Conn. 614,847 A.2d 883 |
| Decision Date | 27 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16890). |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | IN RE SAMANTHA C. |
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Brian Hole, certified legal intern, with whom were Paul Chill, and, on the brief, Julia Ulrich, Monique Rubb, Jennifer Milici, Anne Marshall and Kelly Flahive, certified legal interns, for the appellants (respondents).
Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, with whom were Nina F. Elgo, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Joseph Rubin, associate attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
John J. Klikna filed a brief for the minor child.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether then existing Practice Book, 2001, § 34-1 (f)2 allowed an adverse inference to be drawn against the respondents, without prior notice, for their failure to testify in a proceeding in which the petitioner sought to terminate their parental rights. The respondent parents, Jeffrey C. (father) and Shellie C. (mother), appeal from the judgment of the trial court, granting the petition of the commissioner of children and families (petitioner) to terminate their parental rights with respect to their minor daughter, Samantha C. They claim, among other things, that the trial court improperly drew an adverse inference against them, without prior notice, in violation of Practice Book, 2001, § 34-1 (f), for their failure to testify at the termination proceeding. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner filed this petition, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112,3 seeking to terminate the respondents' parental rights with respect to Samantha. The respondents elected not to testify at the termination proceeding. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondents had failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation as required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii), and, accordingly, that court granted the petition. In doing so, however, the trial court expressly drew an adverse inference against the respondents for their failure to testify at the termination proceeding, stating that "the court infers from [the respondents'] silence that they are continuing their volatile relationship and are unable to care for Samantha's needs." This appeal followed.4
The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. Samantha was born on April 24, 1996, and was the respondents' first child. The respondents were married on April 15, 1999, shortly before the birth of their second child, Lewis C., on June 4, 1999. Although Lewis has remained in the respondents' care throughout his life, Samantha has been in the care of the department of children and families (department) since December 20, 1997.
The respondents have been involved with each other since 1994, but they have separated several times over the years. Moreover, their relationship has been marked by frequent domestic disputes, to some of which the police have been called to respond. The department began assisting the respondents in early 1997, and assigned an in-home parent aide to help the couple with basic child care tasks and safety concerns.
Following a particular dispute to which the police were called,5 the department investigated the respondents' home. On December 20, 1997, dissatisfied with Samantha's environment, particularly the uncleanliness of the home, the department exercised a ninety-six hour administrative hold over twenty month old Samantha. The department subsequently was granted an order of temporary custody over Samantha, allowing the respondents supervised visitation.
After two brief placements, Samantha was placed in the care of her maternal great aunt. The respondents rarely visited Samantha while she resided with her great aunt.6 As a result, on April 9, 1999, the court adjudicated Samantha a neglected child. Thereafter, on January 24, 2000, Samantha was placed in another foster home, after the department had concluded that the great aunt's home was an inappropriate environment for Samantha.7 It was later discovered that Samantha also had been sexually abused by another relative while she was residing with her great aunt.
Samantha's new foster parents tried to facilitate reunification and allowed the respondents to visit her. Nonetheless, the department noted that neither respondent had been following through with the department's referrals to service providers, the mother was not interacting with Samantha during visits, and the father, who remained unable to control his anger, seemed ambivalent about reunifying the family. For those reasons, in February, 2000, the petitioner filed the first of two petitions to terminate the respondents' parental rights with respect to Samantha.8
Thereafter, the respondents began to make progress toward reunification. The father maintained employment, attended anger management counseling and participated in a fatherhood initiative group. The respondents both made good progress in their individual counseling sessions. Additionally, the respondents engaged in couples therapy. Accordingly, on April 28, 2000, the petitioner withdrew that first termination petition.
In the fall of 2000, the department began to attempt to reunify the family. The respondents were now having overnight visits with Samantha at their home. During this time, however, the respondents were having marital problems. The department learned that the mother had taken Lewis and had left the father. Also around this time, Samantha's foster mother noticed a large bruise on the mother's neck. The foster mother also reported that Samantha had said her father was "`bad,'" and that the mother had admitted that there were problems with the marriage. The mother had little contact with Samantha during this time, and she was uncertain whether she would seek a marital dissolution or continue with the reunification plan. The father expressed a desire to take Samantha on his own, but also made it clear that he would be unable to perform basic parenting functions, such as giving the child a bath. The department subsequently referred the respondents to couples counseling.
In December, 2000, the respondents resumed living together as a couple. A few weeks later, in January, 2001, after a long weekend, the respondents returned Samantha to her foster parents. She was filthy and had a bruise on her leg. Although the respondents maintained that the bruise had been caused when Samantha had been playing with a calf, the petitioner contended that the bruise was caused when the father had stepped on the child with his boots. The department investigated the respondents' home and found it unclean, noting that there were dog feces on the floor in an area where Lewis played. In February, 2001, the petitioner filed this second petition to terminate the respondents' parental rights with respect to Samantha.
During 2001, the respondents continued to visit Samantha, albeit in a supervised setting. The respondents' relationship, however, was not going well, and the mother reported that she had again separated from the father. Meanwhile, Samantha began to withdraw from her father and avoid interaction with him during his visits. The father admitted that his visits with Samantha were not going well. Additionally, Samantha's behavior had become worse. She began urinating and defecating in inappropriate places. As a result of her behavior, Samantha's foster mother requested that Samantha be placed elsewhere. On April 24, 2001, Samantha was placed in a preadoptive home, where she was residing at the time of the termination proceeding that is the subject of this appeal.
At the termination hearing, the petitioner presented the testimony of seven witnesses: one of Samantha's former foster mothers; a police officer; two department caseworkers; two therapists who treated Samantha; and a court-appointed psychologist, Robert Meier, who evaluated both Samantha and the respondents. The respondents presented no witnesses, and both elected not to testify at the proceeding.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court first concluded that the petitioner had proven by clear and convincing evidence, as required by § 17a-112 (j) (1),9 that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify Samantha with the respondents. The court next turned to the issue of whether the petitioner had proven that the respondents had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation,10 as required by § 17a-112(j) (3) (B) (ii).11 On the basis of the testimony before it, and the thirty documents in evidence, the court noted that the petitioner had proven the following facts by clear and convincing evidence. 12 ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Luis N.
...... " As a general matter, the trial court may . . . draw. all fair and reasonable inferences from the facts and. circumstances [that] it finds established by the evidence . . .' (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal. quotation marks omitted.) In Re Samantha. C. , 268 Conn. 614, 635-36, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) . . . [An] inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather,. the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an. inference.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.). Curran v. Kroll , 303 Conn. 845, 857, 37 ......
-
State v. West, No. 16627.
...specific testimony that might have been adduced from Francis or Settachatgul had they been called to testify. See In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 638, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) ("[a]n adverse inference... does not supply proof of any particular fact; rather, it may be used only to weigh facts a......
-
In re Emerald C., (AC 28573) (Conn. App. 7/1/2008)
...all of the evidence in the record, it is clearly erroneous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632, 847 A.2d 883 (2004). "A finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing court......
-
In re Avia M.
...protection proceedings, including this petition for termination of parental rights, are civil matters. See also In re Samantha C. , 268 Conn. 614, 634, 847 A.2d 883 (2004), and In re Shonna K. , 77 Conn. App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003). As in other civil matters, the entry of a default ......