Alfano v. Lynch, 16-1914

• Decision Date: 01 February 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-1914,16-1914
• Citation: 847 F.3d 71
• Parties: Peter ALFANO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Thomas LYNCH, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

847 F.3d 71

Peter ALFANO, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.Thomas LYNCH, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 16-1914

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

February 1, 2017

David Milton , with whom Howard Friedman and Law Offices of Howard Friedman, P.C. , Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellant.

Alexandra R. Hassell , with whom Douglas I. Louison and Louison, Costello, Condon & Pfaff, LLP were on brief, for appellee.

Before Kayatta, Circuit Judge, Souter, Associate Justice,^* and Selya, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields from liability public officials, including police officers, whose conduct does not violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights. It is a strong, but not impenetrable, shield. After careful consideration of the record in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that qualified immunity is not available: given the state of the preexisting law, the unconstitutionality of a police officer's actions in taking a person into protective custody, handcuffing that person, transporting him to a police station, and jailing him without probable cause to believe that he is incapacitated should have been apparent. Consequently, we vacate the district court's entry of summary judgment in the defendant's favor and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Inasmuch as the court below resolved this case at the summary judgment stage, we rehearse the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (here, the plaintiff), consistent with record support. See DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 114 (1st Cir. 2005).

On the morning of July 11, 2014, plaintiff-appellant Peter Alfano and two friends set out to attend a concert at the Xfinity Center in Mansfield, Massachusetts. They travelled to Mansfield on a chartered bus that provided round-trip transportation from downtown Boston to the concert venue. The threesome consumed beers both on the bus and at a tailgate party upon their arrival. All told, Alfano (by his own admission) drank between six and eight beers over a span of some four to six hours.

When it came time for the concert to begin, Alfano and his friends made their way to a security checkpoint at the entrance of the amphitheater. Alfano was feeling the effects of the alcohol that he had consumed, but he did not feel out of control. As he reached the checkpoint, two security guards asked him to step out of the line and escorted him to a separate holding area on the Xfinity Center property. There, Alfano was turned over to defendant-appellee Thomas Lynch, a lieutenant from a neighboring town's police department, who was working a security detail at the Xfinity Center. According to Lynch, the security guards told him that they thought that Alfano might be incapacitated and, thus, took him aside for further scrutiny.

Massachusetts law permits police officers to take "incapacitated" persons into civil protective custody. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111B, § 8 ; see id.§ 3 (specifying, as pertinent here, that an "[i]ncapacitated" person is one who is both intoxicated and, "by reason of the consumption of intoxicating liquor is ... likely to suffer or cause physical harm or damage property"). To evaluate whether Alfano was in fact incapacitated, Lynch—acting under color of state law—asked Alfano to perform a series of field sobriety tests. The parties dispute how Alfano performed on these tests. They agree, however, that he refused to take a breathalyzer test. Following that refusal, Lynch handcuffed Alfano and placed him in protective custody.

At first, Alfano was shackled to a bench. He was later transported to the Mansfield police station (some miles away) and confined in a holding cell. Roughly five hours later, he was released. By that time, the concert was over.

The matter did not end there. In July of 2015, Alfano sued in the federal district court.¹ His complaint alleged, in substance, that Lynch lacked probable cause to take him into protective custody and, accordingly, abridged his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. After a course of pretrial discovery, Lynch moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Over Alfano's opposition, the district court granted Lynch's motion. See Alfano v. Lynch, No. 15–12943, 2016 WL 2993615, at *3 (D. Mass. May 23, 2016). The court held that the law was not clearly established as to the need for probable cause. See id. This timely appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court's entry of summary judgment de novo. See DePoutot, 424 F.3d at 117. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record reflects no genuine issue as to any material fact and discloses that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Schiffmann v. United States, 811 F.3d 519, 524 (1st Cir. 2016).

"[Q]ualified immunity shields government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 632–33 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). The doctrine's prophylactic sweep is broad: it leaves unprotected only those officials who, "from an objective standpoint, should have known that their conduct was unlawful." MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Haley v. City of Bos., 657 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) ). Put another way, the doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

The qualified immunity analysis entails a two-step pavane. See Matalon, 806 F.3d at 633 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). The first step requires an inquiring court to determine whether the plaintiff's version of the facts makes out a violation of a protected right. See id. The second step requires the court to determine "whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Id.(citation omitted).

These steps, though framed sequentially, need not be taken in order. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808. A court "may alter the choreography in the interests of efficiency," defer the first step, and proceed directly to the second step. Matalon, 806 F.3d at 633. Because that path seems the most efficacious here, we focus initially on the second step, that is, whether the right at issue was clearly established when Lynch confronted Alfano.

The "clearly established" analysis has two sub-parts. See MacDonald, 745 F.3d at 12. The first sub-part requires the plaintiff to identify either "controlling authority" or a "consensus of cases of persuasive authority" sufficient to send a clear signal to a reasonable official that certain conduct falls short of the constitutional norm. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) ; see Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (asking "whether the state of the law at the time of the putative violation afforded the defendant fair warning that his or her conduct was unconstitutional"). The second sub-part asks whether an objectively reasonable official in the defendant's position would have known that his conduct violated that rule of law. See Wilson v. City of Bos., 421 F.3d 45, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2005). The question is not whether the official actually abridged the plaintiff's constitutional rights but, rather, whether the official's conduct was unreasonable, given the state of the law when he acted. SeeAmsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 751–52 (1st Cir. 1990).

The first sub-part of this analysis "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam) (citation omitted). In other words, the clearly established law must not be gauged at too high a level of generality; instead, it must be "particularized" to the facts of the case. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Even so, there is no requirement of identicality. In arguing for clearly established law, a plaintiff is not required to identify cases that address the "particular factual scenario" that characterizes his case. Matalon, 806 F.3d at 633. "[G]eneral statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning" to public officials, United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) ; rather, the existence of fair and clear warning depends on whether, "in the light of pre-existing law" the unconstitutionality of the challenged conduct is "apparent," Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the last analysis, it is enough if the existing precedents establish the applicable legal rule with sufficient clarity and specificity to put the official on notice that his contemplated course of conduct will violate that rule. See Matalon, 806 F.3d at 633 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) ).

In applying the test for clearly established law, the focus must be on federal precedents. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-95, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). Courts may consider state precedents, though, to the extent that they analyze the relevant federal issue. See Wilson, 421 F.3d at 56-57 ; Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 143–44 (1st Cir. 2001).

Here, the initial question reduces to whether—as of the parties' encounter in July of 2014—controlling and persuasive precedent provided fair and clear notice that the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause before a police officer, acting under a state protective custody statute, can take an...