Blake v. State, 81
Decision Date | 12 May 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 81,81 |
Parties | Leeander Jerome BLAKE v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Kenneth W. Ravenell (Erin C. Murphy, Schulman, Treem, Kaminkow, Gilden & Ravenell, P.A., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Anabelle L. Lisic, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
This case is an interlocutory appeal filed by the State1 from an Order in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granting Leeander Jerome Blake's motion to suppress his incriminating statements on the grounds that the police elicited his statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the Circuit Court, and in an unreported opinion, reversed. This Court granted Blake's petition for writ of certiorari to consider the single question of whether the police actions in question constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation following petitioner's invocation of his Miranda rights, thereby violating petitioner's right against compelled self-incrimination. Blake v. State, 378 Md. 176, 835 A.2d 1103 (2003). We shall hold that the police actions constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation, thereby violating petitioner's rights, and, under the circumstances presented herein, the trial court properly suppressed petitioner's statements.
Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Anne Arundel County for the offenses of first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter, in violation of former Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.), Article 27 § 407, § 411, and § 387.2 Straughan Lee Griffin, a resident of Annapolis, was shot and killed in front of his home on September 19, 2002. His assailant[s] shot him in the head, stole his automobile, and ran over his body as they fled from the scene.
Petitioner filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence seized by the State. We focus here on his motion to suppress his incriminating statements. The Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion to suppress. We set forth the facts as developed at the suppression hearing.
On October 25, 2002, Terrence Tolbert was arrested in connection with the murder of Straughan Lee Griffin. Tolbert implicated petitioner in the crime. Between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on the following day, the Anne Arundel County police arrested petitioner at his home. Petitioner was wearing boxer shorts and a tank top and no shoes. He was handcuffed and transported by uniformed officers to the Annapolis Police Department.
The police took petitioner to a room identified as an "intake room" or "booking room." Detective William Johns, the lead detective, advised petitioner of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. Petitioner invoked his right to counsel, indicating he did not wish to speak with the police officers without an attorney, and after signing the police advice of rights form, he then was placed in a holding cell at approximately 5:25 a.m.
At 6:00 a.m., Detective Johns, accompanied by uniformed Officer Curtis Reese, went to petitioner's cell and gave him a copy of the arrest warrant and statement of charges.3 Detective Johns explained the charges to petitioner and told him that they were serious charges, and that he needed to read the document carefully and make sure he understood it.
The statement of charges that Detective Johns gave to petitioner was a District Court of Maryland computer print-out listing the charges. The statement of charges indicated that petitioner was charged with first degree murder, second degree murder, armed robbery, armed carjacking, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence. The penalty stated on the document for the offense of first degree murder was, in all capital letters, "DEATH." Petitioner's date of birth, reflected on the statement of charges, was June 1, 1985; he was seventeen years of age. As a person under the age of eighteen years at the time of the offense, petitioner was not eligible for the death penalty. See Md.Code (2002, 2003 Cum.Supp.) § 2-202(b)(2)(i) ( ).
Detective Johns testified that after he handed petitioner the charging document and turned to leave, Officer Reese, apparently having followed Detective Johns to the cell block area, appeared and said, in a tone Detective Johns characterized as loud and confrontational, "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" Detective Johns said that he was surprised by Officer Reese's statement, that it was unexpected, and that Detective Johns said, very loudly within petitioner's hearing, Detective Johns testified that he was concerned that "Officer Reese's outburst would violate Mr. Blake's request for counsel prior to being questioned" and, as a result, he told Officer Reese that petitioner had asked for an attorney and they could not reinitiate any kind of conversation with him.
Petitioner remained in the cell block, wearing only his boxer shorts and t-shirt. Approximately one-half hour after the earlier contact, Detective Johns went back to petitioner's cell to give petitioner his clothing which had been brought to the station by another police officer. Detective Johns opened the exterior door, walked in front of petitioner's cell, and handed him the clothing. Petitioner then said, "I can still talk to you?" Detective Johns responded: "Are you saying that you want to talk to me now?" Petitioner responded "yes." Detective Johns left the cell area and returned after a few minutes. He told petitioner that he would have to read him his rights again and that he would be back in a few minutes. Petitioner then was taken back to the intake room, was re-advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived, and agreed to provide a statement in the absence of an attorney.
Petitioner made certain incriminating statements to Detective Johns as he explained his involvement in the events of September 19, 2002. Detective Johns asked him if he would be willing to take a polygraph exam and petitioner agreed. He was transported to Maryland State Police Barracks J in Annapolis, where Corporal Lloyd E. White again advised petitioner of his Miranda rights. After the test was administered, petitioner made further statements.
Petitioner testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He testified that he was at home watching television in the early morning hours of October 26, 2002, when he was arrested at approximately 4:30 a.m. Wearing only a tank top, boxer shorts, and no shoes, he was handcuffed and taken outside, where it was cold and wet, and transported to the police station. He was placed in a room and was told by an officer that Terrence Tolbert had identified him as the shooter of Mr. Griffin. He said he wanted a lawyer and was placed in a cell. He said that when Detective Johns and Officer Reese gave him a copy of his charges and Officer Reese made the statement to him, he had just seen that he was facing the death penalty and he was scared. The two officers left, Detective Johns brought him his clothing and then left, and then Detective Johns returned. Petitioner's description of what ensued next differed from that of Detective Johns.4 Petitioner's version is that the detective initiated the conversation again, stating: "Mr. Blake, do you wish to still talk to me?" In response, petitioner said, "May I still talk to you?" The detective allegedly responded, "Yes." Petitioner denied first asking Detective Johns if he could talk to him.
In response to a question asking petitioner what caused him to speak to Detective Johns after he had invoked his Miranda rights, petitioner stated:
The Circuit Court granted petitioner's motion to suppress his statements. Judge Pamela North began by noting that petitioner had invoked his right to counsel and that pursuant to Miranda, no further interrogation could ensue. Judge North found the following:
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