Mercer v. Rodriquez

• Decision Date: 08 June 2004
• Docket Number: (AC 24280)
• Citation: 849 A.2d 886,83 Conn. App. 251
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: EUGENE P. MERCER v. HECTOR RODRIQUEZ ET AL.

83 Conn. App. 251

849 A.2d 886

EUGENE P. MERCER v. HECTOR RODRIQUEZ ET AL.

(AC 24280)

Court of Appeals of Connecticut.

Argued January 16, 2004.

Officially released June 8, 2004.

Dranginis, DiPentima and Hennessy, Js. Eugene P. Mercer, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

Lynn D. Wittenbrink, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

DRANGINIS, J.

This appeal requires that we decide whether the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs federal claims because he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a). Although we conclude that the plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, we also conclude that his failure to exhaust such remedies did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Nonetheless, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action, as a prisoner may not bring an action seeking federal relief until the prisoner has exhausted available administrative remedies.

The pro se plaintiff, Eugene P. Mercer, commenced this action in 2002 when he was in the custody of the commissioner of correction (commissioner) at the correctional institution at Cheshire.¹ In a five part complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, employees of the department of correction (department),² had failed to assign him to the motor vehicle marker shop (marker shop) at Cheshire on the basis of his physical disability, which violated his rights under titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (disabilities act), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (rehabilitation act), and the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.³ He sought compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a)⁴ because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. They also argued that sovereign immunity barred the court's jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims for damages under the rehabilitation and disabilities acts, and that the plaintiffs claims were moot because he was no longer confined to the facility at Cheshire.

The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, agreeing that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a). The court found that the plaintiffs claims were "grievable" and that he had failed to avail himself of the department's grievance process. The court added, in its memorandum of decision, that the rationale of the exhaustion requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) is consistent with this state's jurisprudence on subject matter jurisdiction.⁵ The plaintiff appealed to this court.

The essence of the plaintiffs appellate claims is that the court improperly dismissed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) because there were no administrative remedies available to him and, further, that the court improperly determined that he had not exhausted the available administrative remedies.⁶ In their brief, the defendants argued that the court's judgment of dismissal on jurisdictional grounds should be affirmed under both 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) and Connecticut law. Prior to oral argument in this court, however, the defendants brought the case of Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 2003), to our attention, which informs our decision as to how, not whether, the plaintiffs claims are dismissed.

Our standard of review governing an appeal from a judgment granting a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction concerns a question of law and is plenary. Bailey v. Medical Examining Board for State Employee Disability Retirement, 75 Conn. App. 215, 219, 815 A.2d 281 (2003). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 429, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). "[I]t is axiomatic that this court has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction." First National Bank of Chicago v. Luecken, 66 Conn. App. 606, 610, 785 A.2d 1148 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 915, 792 A.2d 851 (2002).

"A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide.... Our Supreme Court has determined that when ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bailey v. Medical Examining Board for State Employee Disability Retirement, supra, 75 Conn. App. 219. We are mindful that "[t]he power of the court to hear and determine, which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused with the way in which that power must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the statute." Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 601, 87 A.2d 388 (1952). "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. St. John, 80 Conn. App. 767, 771, 837 A.2d 841 (2004).

Because the allegations of the complaint determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction, our first step is to examine the allegations of the plaintiffs amended complaint. The complaint, at first blush, is unusual in that it is styled in the federal fashion, which, by itself, is not a fatal defect. The plaintiff alleges that the court had jurisdiction to hear the action pursuant to title II of the disabilities act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.,⁷ the rehabilitation act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.,⁸ and the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. A party, however, cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction merely by alleging it; see Fleet National Bank v. Nazareth, 75 Conn. App. 791, 793, 818 A.2d 69 (2003); as the allegations of the complaint are controlling. The plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations invoke the sources of the remedies he seeks.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint because he had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available pursuant to the department's grievance procedures. The court, however, did not state its factual findings underlying that conclusion in its memorandum of decision and the plaintiff failed to seek an articulation.⁹ See Practice Book § 66-5. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants addressed the plaintiffs claims as an employment issue and argued that the department did not offer employment opportunities, but rather employment programs to facilitate prisoners' reentry into society. During argument on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff asserted that his claims were based on his classification assignment. The court found that the plaintiffs claims were grievable without identifying the department administrative directive or other remedies the plaintiff had failed to exhaust. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly determined that his claims were grievable. He claims that under department administrative directive 9.6, classification assignments are not grievable. The defendants argue that not only did the plaintiff fail to exhaust the remedies available within the department, but also that he failed to avail himself of the remedies afforded by the state commission on human rights and opportunities and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

We therefore examine the plaintiffs allegations of wrongdoing to determine the nature of his claims, which, in turn, will guide our identification of the administrative remedy or remedies the plaintiff was required to exhaust, if any. "[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court .... We have pointed out that [t]he burden [is] upon the pleaders to make such averments that the material facts should appear with reasonable certainty; and for that purpose [the pleaders] were allowed to use their own language. Whenever that language fails to define clearly the issues in dispute, the court will put upon it such reasonable construction as will give effect to the pleadings in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties.... But essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 236, 502 A.2d 410 (1985).

The plaintiff alleged that he is "a qualified individual with a disability who is mobility impaired and uses a walker and cane for ambulation .... Although mobility impaired the plaintiff can perform the essential function of the employment position he desires." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In identifying the various defendants, he used two terms to allege their various responsibilities: inmate classification and work industries program. In 2001, the plaintiff asked to be assigned to a clerical position in the marker shop. His application was denied...