Floyd v. Lee

Decision Date31 March 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No.: 11–01228 RC
PartiesMona K. Floyd, Plaintiff, v. Office of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Ari Micha Wilkenfeld, The Wilkenfeld Law Group, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Kimberly Carey Williams, Gloria Lett, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

Re Document Nos.: 49, 53

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Denying Defendant's Motion To Dismiss and To Revoke Plaintiff's in Forma Pauperis Status; Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Mona K. Floyd served as Legislative Director and Chief Counsel in the office of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee.1 In this action, Ms. Floyd, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, alleges that Rep. Jackson Lee's office failed to accommodate her monocular vision, subjected her to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation, all in violation of the Congressional Accountability Act. She also alleges that the office's deliberate failure to accommodate her impairment resulted in her constructive discharge. The office of Rep. Jackson Lee moves to dismiss the action on the basis that the “allegation of poverty” in Ms. Floyd's application for in forma pauperis status is “untrue,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), and, in the alternative, for summary judgment on all claims. Because the Court concludes that Ms. Floyd's “allegation of poverty” is not “untrue” and that misstatements in her in forma pauperis application were neither material nor made in bad faith, it denies the motion to dismiss. But because Ms. Floyd has failed to create genuine disputes of material fact as to certain elements of each of her claims, the Court grants Rep. Jackson Lee's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

From birth, Ms. Floyd has suffered from monocular vision, which is the inability to use one eye. See Floyd Dep. at 150:6–22.3 This condition reduces her reading speed and causes her eye strain, eye fatigue

, and headaches when reading for longer periods. Id.

In January 1998, Ms. Floyd obtained her first and only medical documentation of her impairment: To support her request for a testing accommodation for the 1998 California bar examination, Ms. Floyd had Dr. Mitchell C. Shultz, an ophthalmologist, complete the State Bar of California's physical disability verification form. See id. at 152:6–10, 154:20–22; see generally Cal. bar exam form, Def.'s Ex. 5, ECF No. 53–4. On the form, Dr. Shultz indicated that Ms. Floyd's disability is “monofixation syndrome,” another term for monocular vision. Cal. bar exam form 1, Def.'s Ex. 5; see also Floyd Dep. at 150:18–20. In explaining the impairment's impact, Dr. Shultz wrote that “this deficiency in binocular vision may be impacting [Ms. Floyd's] ability to read fast secondary to alternation between the eyes and fatigability.” Cal. bar exam form 1, Def.'s Ex. 5. He also indicated that Ms. Floyd's impairment is “permanent.” Id.

On the form's final page, Dr. Shultz recommended that Ms. Floyd be allowed specific amounts of additional time on certain portions of the bar examination. Explaining his [r]easons and basis,” he wrote that Ms. Floyd “has a disability in reading secondary to alternation between eyes which prevents fluidity in reading thereby decreasing her speed of reading between 20–30 percent.” Id. at 3. When questioned about the figures “20–30 percent” during her deposition, Ms. Floyd candidly testified:

Oh, I wasn't measuring whether [sic] 20 percent or 30 percent less. The doctor is making the estimate here. I can't judge how much faster or slower I may be reading because of my vision. I just know that, in general, if I'm in a group and we're asked to read certain things, I see that others are finished and I'm still reading. That's what made me say to [Dr. Shultz], “I'm not finishing things.” He said, “You're relying on the one eye, and that's causing you to slow down.” When I am sitting, working ..., I don't say I'm reading 20 percent slower here or 30 percent slower here. I just never did anything like that.

Floyd Dep. at 168:5–17.

In September 2006, Ms. Floyd joined the Washington, D.C., office of Rep. Jackson Lee as a Congressional Black Caucus Foundation fellow. See id. at 40:9–18. About a month before Ms. Floyd's fellowship began, the Foundation informed the office by memorandum that Ms. Floyd had “a vision disability” and would “need to take special precautions to reduce the strain on her eyes.” Musgrove memo of Aug. 1, 2006, Def.'s Ex. 7, ECF No. 53–5; see also Floyd Dep. at 50:2–14. The memorandum listed specific accommodations that Ms. Floyd had requested, including voice recognition software and text enlargement capabilities. See Musgrove memo of Aug. 1, 2006, Def.'s Ex. 7. In support of these requests, Ms. Floyd had submitted to the Foundation a copy of the disability verification form completed by Dr. Shultz. See Floyd Dep. at 57:2–6.

During her time as a fellow, Ms. Floyd's need for accommodations was satisfied, and she had a positive relationship with the Representative. See id. at 66:2–22. Soon after joining the office, she received the voice recognition software, and her computer had zoom capabilities. See id. at 53:12–17, 55:6–10. Although Ms. Floyd had expected the voice recognition software to enable her to type without using her eyes to read both the keyboard and screen, see id. at 54:2–9, 55:15–20, she soon determined that the software was more hindrance than help and had it uninstalled, though she continued to use the zoom function for at least part of the fellowship, see id. at 53:19–24, 56:6–24. Because the software did not work as expected, Ms. Floyd instead verbally requested of her direct supervisor, then-Legislative Director Gregory Berry, that she be given rest breaks and additional time to perform assignments, and he granted her request. See id. at 44:14–18, 63:8–16. Ms. Floyd rested whenever she started experiencing eye strain and headaches; by her estimate, on a daily basis, she rested about ten minutes for every three hours of intensive reading. See id. at 64:4–20, 65:3–6.

After completing her fellowship, Ms. Floyd was hired in August 2007 as the office's Director of Health Policy and Senior Legislative Assistant. See Chastang email of Aug. 6, 2007, Def.'s Ex. 10, ECF No. 53–5. She continued to have her needs accommodated, see Floyd Dep. at 87:17–25, and to enjoy a “very positive” relationship with the Representative, see id. at 85:25–86:4. Ms. Floyd observed, however, that the Representative sometimes communicated in a “very harsh” manner to other staffers and mounted “personal attacks” when she was dissatisfied with an individual's work. Id. at 86:12–23. In late 2007, Ms. Floyd resigned to pursue another professional opportunity. See id. at 90:16–19, 92:2–6.

In February 2010, Rep. Jackson Lee's Chief of Staff Leon Buck recruited Ms. Floyd to be the Representative's Legislative Director and Chief Counsel. Id. at 102:14–103:6; Buck Dep. at 8:11–16. As they discussed the position, Ms. Floyd informed Mr. Buck of her “vision limitation” and “the fact that it takes [her] longer to read.” Floyd Dep. at 104:6–7. Moreover, she explained that she would accept the job only under certain conditions. See id. at 103:12–22. First, Ms. Floyd requested that the office employ at least one additional Legislative Assistant; at the time, it had two. See id. at 107:18–110:16.4 Second, she requested that she not have primary responsibility either for issue areas assigned to other staffers or for events occurring in Houston, where the Representative's district is located; she considered such duties “nonessential,” based on her understanding of the “scope of the position,” “priorities in the office,” and “past practices of the office.” Id. at 112:14–117:15. Mr. Buck verbally agreed to these terms, id. at 106:13–111:9, and Ms. Floyd joined the office as Legislative Director and Chief Counsel in February 2010, see Jackson Lee letter of Feb. 22, 2010, Def.'s Ex. 13, ECF No. 53–5.

In her new post, Ms. Floyd had a wider range of legislative and supervisory responsibilities than she had in previous roles in the office. See Floyd Dep. at 119:10–21. She not only had a greater volume of work, see id. at 120:16–19, but also reported to the Representative and regularly received assignments directly from her, see id. at 124:2–13. Mr. Buck's earlier promises, moreover, did not materialize. Although there was no formal policy against taking rest breaks, Ms. Floyd's “additional work” for issue areas assigned to other staffers and for functions taking place in Houston prevented her from taking ten-minute rest breaks as she had previously done. Id. at 138:2–9. As a result, she often read “continuously” for periods longer than three hours. Id. at 136:2–139:18. Initially, however, Ms. Floyd did not personally inform the Representative of her need for accommodation. See id. at 128:19–129:11.

Ms. Floyd first mentioned her monocular vision to the Representative on April 26, 2010. See id. at 129:19–131:16. That day, after Rep. Jackson Lee assigned Ms. Floyd several tasks with a specific deadline, Ms. Floyd explained that she would delegate certain education-related tasks to the Legislative Assistant with primary responsibility for education matters. Id. at 129:19–130:7. When the Representative made clear that Ms. Floyd needed to perform the tasks herself, Ms. Floyd explained her “vision disability,” her inability to use one eye, and her need for “more time” to complete the tasks and for “time to take a break.” Id. at 130:8–18. In response, the Representative stated that she didn't care anything about [Ms. Floyd's] vision disability,” reiterated that she was not to delegate any work, and told her not to “take ten years to get it done.” Id. at 130:19–23.

That evening, Ms. Floyd decided that although Rep. Jackson Lee had shown...

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