Ramsey v. Ross

• Decision Date: 06 July 1936
• Docket Number: No. 6586.,6586.
• Citation: 85 F.2d 685,66 App. DC 186
• Parties: RAMSEY v. ROSS et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

66 App. DC 186, 85 F.2d 685 (1936)

RAMSEY v. ROSS et al.

No. 6586.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Decided July 6, 1936.

Alvin L. Newmyer, David G. Bress, and Byron G. Carson, all of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Charles S. Baker and Benjamin L. Tepper, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee Ross.

H. Clay Espey, of Washington, D. C., for appellee Beard.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and VAN ORSDEL, GRONER, and STEPHENS, Associate Justices.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

In May, 1934, Marjory T. Ramsey, as administratrix of the estate of Jessie M. Townsend, deceased, filed a declaration in the lower court against Charles S. Ross and Walter H. Beard claiming damages in the sum of $10,000 from defendants upon the charge that on January 13, 1934, defendants, while severally driving automobiles upon the streets of Washington, D. C., had negligently caused the death of plaintiff's decedent, Jessie M. Townsend. The plaintiff alleged that the wrongful acts and negligence of the defendants in causing the death of the deceased were such as would have entitled plaintiff's intestate to maintain a suit for damages against defendants had she lived, and that the intestate was and is survived by her sister, who is the plaintiff, personal representative, and sole next of kin of the decedent.

This action was brought under the provisions of section 1301, D.C.Code (title 21, § 1, D.C.Code 1929), which reads in part as follows:

"Chapter 1. — Negligence Causing Death.

Section 1. — Liability. — Whenever by an injury done or happening within the limits of the District of Columbia the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person or corporation, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured, or if the person injured be a married woman, have entitled her husband, either separately or by joining with the wife, to maintain an action and recover damages, the person who or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages for such death, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, even though the death shall have been caused under circumstances which constitute a felony; and such damages shall be assessed with reference to the injury resulting from such act, neglect, or default causing such death, to the widow and next of kin of such deceased person: Provided, That in no case shall the recovery under this title exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars: * * *

"3. Distribution of damages. — The damages recovered in such action shall not be appropriated to the payment of the debts or liabilities of such deceased person, but shall inure to the benefit of his or her family and be distributed according to the provisions of the statute of distribution in force in the said District of Columbia."

The defendants severally filed their pleas to the declaration denying the charge of negligence.

The case came on for trial, and after hearing the testimony and the charge of the court the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1 against both defendants, to which verdict the plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for a new trial upon the grounds "that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and to the instructions of the court on the measure of damages and because the verdict is grossly inadequate and for other reasons apparent of record." This motion was overruled with an exception to the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon appealed the case to this court.

The sole issue presented to the court by the appellant is the charge that the verdict for $1 was grossly inadequate and was contrary to the evidence and to the instructions of the court on the measure of damages.

On the subject of damages to the plaintiff because of her sister's death the court instructed the jury as follows:

"You are also instructed that before Mrs. Ramsey, the plaintiff in this case, may recover, she must show pecuniary or money loss to her through Miss Townsend's death. In this regard you are further instructed that the law does not allow recovery based upon sickness of the plaintiff or for physical or mental suffering endured either by Miss Townsend, the decedent, or by Mrs. Ramsey, the plaintiff.

"You are instructed that in the event either or both defendants are found guilty of negligence, the plaintiff's right to damages is confined to a calm, dispassionate calculation of money value; that damages cannot be allowed properly to the plaintiff for wounded feelings and sorrow in consequence of the death of her sister, nor on account of the suffering, mental or physical, of the decedent, by reason of the accident, and that plaintiff would be entitled to recover only such sum as will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff, decedent's sister, for any financial loss sustained by plaintiff by reason of the decedent's death, which is the amount that the plaintiff had reasonable ground to expect from the decedent had she lived, considering what material assistance of money value was received by the plaintiff from the decedent during her lifetime.

"Again, if your verdict be in favor of the plaintiff, then the damages to be awarded will be the money value of the life of the decedent had she not been killed as aforesaid, to her surviving sister, as may be shown by the evidence. In estimating these damages the jury have the right to consider all of the testimony with reference to the age, health, expectancy in life, earnings and employment of the decedent and her sister and their relationship toward each other, as bearing on any money or things of money value which the testimony may show the surviving sister to have been receiving from the decedent and to consider from the evidence how much the surviving sister might reasonably have expected to receive in the future, as shown by the evidence, if any, which she has been or may be precluded from receiving by reason of her sister's death, not to exceed the sum claimed in the declaration."

No exception was taken by any of the parties to this charge.

For the purpose of showing her pecuniary loss by reason of the death of her sister, plaintiff introduced the following evidence:

The plaintiff as a witness testified in substance that she had lived in the District of Columbia with her sister since 1917 and up to the time of her sister's accident on January 13, 1934, wherein her sister was killed; that during this entire period the witness and her deceased sister did not live apart from each other at any time; that she and her deceased sister were the only two remaining members of their family; that the decedent was 47 years of age at the time of her death and witness at that time was 37 years of age; that the decedent was in good health up to the time of her death and was employed by the Internal Revenue Bureau; that when witness and decedent came to Washington they lived with their parents; that their father died in 1918 and their mother in 1928, and from 1928 to the deceased's death decedent and witness resided together; that witness is in good health and was at the time of her sister's death and still is employed by the Internal Revenue Department in the capacity of a stenographer; that at the time of her sister's death witness was earning $1,320 per year and her sister was earning $1,866 per year and at no time did the witness earn as much as her deceased sister did; that they were very devoted to each other and spent a great deal of time together.

That with reference to the contributions made by the decedent to the witness, the witness testified that the decedent contributed a great deal to the furnishings, furniture, and made the home comfortable; that the deceased contributed more to the witness' home in money than did the witness, and that the witness did not contribute as much as did the decedent to the ordinary expenses of their household; that the decedent contributed to the witness in money about $300 a year; that witness had no other income except her earnings; that there were times when witness was compelled to remain at home on account of illness, and upon such occasions her sister was always very thoughtful to see if there was anything she could do for the witness to help her, and her sister was always concerned about the witness whenever she did not feel well; that whenever her sister went off on a vacation she would always bring back gifts.

On cross-examination the witness testified that her sister contributed to her about $300 per year in money, which sum was given to the witness at various times, but not for payment of household...