U.S. v. Pinckney

• Decision Date: 23 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1511,D,1511
• Citation: 85 F.3d 4
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Melvin PINCKNEY, Defendant, and Fundador Cuevas, also known as Powerhouse, Defendant-Appellant. ockets 95-1181(L), 95-1317.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 4

85 F.3d 4

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Melvin PINCKNEY, Defendant and Fundador Cuevas, also known as Powerhouse, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1511, Dockets 95-1181(L), 95-1317.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued March 22, 1996.

Decided March 22, 1996.

Filed May 23, 1996.

Marjorie M. Smith, Englander & Smith, Tappan, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Fundador Cuevas.

Frank McClain-Sewer, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, New York (Zachary Carter, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Peter A. Norling, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, New York, of counsel), for Appellee.

Before MAHONEY, McLAUGHLIN, and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge:

After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Charles P. Sifton, Chief Judge ), Fundador Cuevas was convicted of: (1) operating a chop shop, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2322; and (2) conspiring to operate a chop shop, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.

Cuevas appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Specifically, he argued that the government: (1) failed to prove a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to support his conviction under either the substantive crime, 18 U.S.C. § 2322, or the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (2) also failed to prove that any conspirator believed that vehicle parts would enter interstate commerce to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371. We agreed and reversed Cuevas's convictions by summary order dated March 22, 1996, and indicated that this opinion, explaining the rationale for our decision, would follow.

BACKGROUND

The government charged Fundador Cuevas and others with conspiracy to operate a chop shop, and operation of a chop shop. During the six-day trial, the government produced evidence that, during the first six months of 1994, Cuevas and others participated in a less-than-legitimate enterprise in an abandoned lot in Brooklyn, New York. The defendants surrounded the lot with fencing and other blockades, preventing access from the street and obstructing pedestrians' view of the defendants' bustling business.

The government proved that Cuevas's co-workers would bring stolen cars to the Brooklyn lot, where Cuevas and his helpers would remove vehicle identification numbers from the cars and dismantle the cars in a process commonly known as "stripping." Strippers disassemble the car to get its parts for resale to garages and auto body shops. Cuevas taught others the art of stripping, and helped to coordinate the enterprise.

The government presented evidence that the car parts were sold to local garages and auto body shops, placing significant emphasis on the testimony of one of the workers, Howard Rubenfeld. Rubenfeld testified that, before he worked at the Brooklyn lot, he worked for ARN Scrap Processing. ARN had a contract with the New York City Department of Sanitation to remove the abandoned car carcasses that litter the city streets and to transport them to scrap dealers in the tri-state area. Rubenfeld testified that, when he worked for ARN, he would transport the carcasses to various scrap dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, bringing his business to the dealer who paid the most for the scrap.

Addressing his employment at the Brooklyn lot, Rubenfeld testified that, after workers stripped the stolen cars, he would load the stripped hulks onto his truck and haul them to scrap dealers. When asked by the prosecutor where he took these stripped vehicles, Rubenfeld replied, "I took it to the scrap processing company that I always do business with." Significantly, the prosecutor did not ask Rubenfeld where this scrap processing company was located.

Other testimony established that the Brooklyn workers knew that stripped car parts were brought to auto body shops in Brooklyn, New York. Still others testified At the close of the government's case, Cuevas moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The court reserved decision on the Rule 29 motion and the defendant rested.

                that, while they saw vans leave the Brooklyn lot laden with car parts, they did not know the destination of those vans.   The government produced no testimony from anyone who knew of or participated in the delivery of car parts to points outside New York.   Finally, there was evidence that all the cars stripped in the Brooklyn lot bore New York license plates
                

In the court's charge on the substantive count, it explained that the government had to prove that the distribution or sale of the cars or their parts occurred in interstate commerce. Similarly on the conspiracy count, the court charged that there had to be an agreement to join an enterprise in violation of the chop shop statute, and that the enterprise "must be of a sort to have as its impact an impact on interstate commerce."

The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. Cuevas now appeals.

DISCUSSION

To "reduce auto theft significantly by taking the profit away from car thieves," Congress passed the Anti Car Theft Act ("the Act"), Pub.L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (1992). H.R.Rep. No. 102-851(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. pp. 2829, 2830, 2903. In the Act Congress criminalized (a) "car-jacking" and, (b) to remove the profit motive for car-jackers and car thieves, the knowing operation of a "chop shop." See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 ("car-jacking" statute); 18 U.S.C. § 2322 ("chop shop" statute).

The "chop shop" statute provides, in pertinent part:

(a) In general.--

(1) Unlawful action.--Any person who knowingly owns, operates, maintains, or controls a chop shop or conducts operations in a chop shop shall be punished by a fine under this title or by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or both....

(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term "chop shop" means any building, lot, facility, or other structure or premise where one or more persons engage in receiving, concealing, destroying, disassembling, dismantling, reassembling, or storing any passenger motor vehicle or passenger motor vehicle part which has been unlawfully obtained in order to alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy, disguise, falsify, forge, obliterate, or remove the identity, including the vehicle identification number or derivative thereof, of such vehicle or vehicle part and to distribute, sell, or dispose of such vehicle or vehicle part in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 2322 (emphasis added).

There are several essential elements to this crime and the government must prove each of them beyond a reasonable doubt. One of those elements is that the defendant dispose of vehicles or vehicle parts in interstate commerce. Both sides devote much effort to resolving an apparent ambiguity regarding the interstate commerce element of the crime: whether the element is "jurisdictional" only, or whether it is an element of the crime with a corresponding mens rea.

The government concedes that the interstate commerce element is a sine qua non of federal jurisdiction, but contends that it was included by Congress only to insulate the federal chop shop statute from constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Cuevas argues that the interstate element goes beyond jurisdiction, and is a mens rea element of the crime. Thus, the defendant contends that the government must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant stole and dismantled the cars "in order to" distribute car parts in interstate commerce. In short, Cuevas believes that the government must prove that the defendant knew that the criminal enterprise had some connection with interstate commerce.

I. The Substantive Count

There is some ambiguity in the statute. We need not resolve this ambiguity The government contends that it established a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce in two ways. Both arguments lack merit.

however, because we hold that under either party's theory the government failed to prove that the defendant disposed of vehicle parts in interstate commerce.

First, the government contends, without citation to any authority, that proof of the introduction of the car parts into the "normal flow of commerce" in Brooklyn is enough to prove the interstate commerce element of the chop shop statute because a juror could reasonably infer that it was inevitable that vehicle parts entered interstate commerce. The government contends that this unique theory of inevitability is enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cuevas distributed vehicle parts in interstate commerce. We disagree.

While it is true that a conviction may be based solely on reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, United States v. Fermin, 32 F.3d 674, 678 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1145, 130 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1995), a conviction cannot rest on mere speculation or conjecture. United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1256 (2d Cir.1...