85 Hawai'i 197, Coyle v. Compton
| Decision Date | 28 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 18837,18837 |
| Citation | 85 Hawaii 197,940 P.2d 404 |
| Parties | 85 Hawai'i 197 Rita A. COYLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Todd P. COMPTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Court of Appeals |
Earle A. Partington, Honolulu, on the brief for defendant-appellant.
Rita A. Coyle, Kailua, plaintiff-appellee, pro se, on the brief.
Before BURNS, C.J., and ACOBA and KIRIMITSU, JJ.
We hold in this appeal by Defendant-Appellant Todd P. Compton (Defendant), from the first circuit family court (court) February 16, 1995 Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 586 protective order barring Defendant's contact with Plaintiff-Appellee Rita A. Coyle (Plaintiff), that (1) the court did not err when it applied the preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof under HRS § 586-5.5 (1993); (2) the court did not violate Defendant's equal protection or due process rights when it applied a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof; (3) the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant a continuance despite a temporary absence of Defendant's counsel; and (4) the court did not err when it excluded evidence of alleged harassment of Defendant's witnesses by Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's brother, evidence of Plaintiff's visits to Defendant's abode after she had filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO), and evidence of Defendant's co-ownership of the property on which Defendant and Plaintiff had been living.
The following is the relevant factual background of this case.
On October 8, 1994, Plaintiff and Defendant separated after Defendant was alleged to have physically abused Plaintiff by throwing his wallet in her direction and in the process, hitting her in the face with it. Defendant moved out of their joint residence on October 10, 1994 and moved in with a friend, Matthew Boone (Boone).
On November 22, 1994, Plaintiff sought and obtained a domestic abuse TRO against Defendant under HRS Chapter 586. Domestic abuse is defined in HRS § 586-1 (1993) as:
(1) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the threat of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, extreme psychological abuse or malicious property damage between family or household members; or
(2) Any act which would constitute an offense under section 709-906 [], or under part V [sexual offenses] or VI [child abuse] of chapter 707 committed against a minor family or household member by an adult family or household member.
(Emphasis added.) HRS § 586-1 defines "family and household members" as "spouses or former spouses, parents, children, persons related by consanguinity, and persons jointly residing or formerly residing in the same dwelling unit." The TRO was issued pursuant to HRS § 586-4 (1993) which provides as follows:
Upon petition to a family court judge, a temporary restraining order may be granted without notice to restrain either or both parties from contacting, threatening, or physically abusing each other, notwithstanding that a complaint for annulment, divorce, or separation has not been filed. The order may be granted to any person who, at the time such order is granted, is a family or household member as defined in [HRS § ] 586-1.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff's ex parte petition for a TRO had stated in relevant part:
2. I am applying for protection
3. I have the following relationship with the Defendant named above:
....
E. [X] we used to live together;
....
4. The following type of domestic abuse exists:
A. [X] recent past acts or acts of abuse have occurred. The Defendant has hurt me by (circle all that apply)
1. [circled] throwing something at me.
2. [circled] pushing, grabbing or shoving me.
....
This happened most recently on [Handwritten] October 8, 1994.
B. [X] threats of abuse make it probable that acts of abuse may be imminent. The Defendant threatened to do the following to me (circle all that apply);
....
2. [circled] hurt me physically.
....
This happened most recently on [Handwritten] October 8, 1994.
C. [X] extreme psychological abuse or malicious property damage is imminent because:
[Handwritten] Since June of 1994 [he] has verbally abused me, ex. [sic] bitch, drunk, lush, slut, Due to This abuse I went to the doctor and have very high Blood pressure. 1
5. The Defendant:
....
On November 23, 1994, Defendant filed a verified answer, denying all of Plaintiff's allegations except admitting that he had lived with Plaintiff.
On February 6, 1995, the matter was called for hearing at 2:25 p.m. Plaintiff moved, pursuant to HRS § 586-5.5, for a protective order extending the period of the TRO. HRS § 586-5.5 provides as follows:
If after hearing all relevant evidence, the court finds that the respondent has failed to show cause why the order should not be continued and that a protective order is necessary to prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence of abuse, the court may order that a protective order be issued for such further period as the court deems appropriate, not to exceed three years from the date the protective order is granted. However, the court may terminate the protective order at any time with the mutual consent of the parties.
(Emphasis added.)
The parties were unable to agree on whether or not the protective order was to be mutually imposed. Therefore, in order to hear other pending cases and to enable the parties to meet and resolve the mutuality matter, the court ordered that the case be passed to the end of its trial calendar. At this point, defense counsel informed the court that he was due to argue a motion before the federal district court at 3:30 p.m. The case was recessed at 2:39 p.m.
At 3:12 p.m., court reconvened, but defense counsel had not returned from federal district court. Defendant informed the court that his counsel had told him he would be back in fifteen minutes. Accordingly, the court recessed at 3:12 p.m. and reconvened at 3:45 p.m. Although defense counsel was still absent, the court ordered the trial to proceed. Defendant made the following objection:
I don't feel very comfortable representing myself. I hired an attorney for a reason. I'm sorry, we were called in here at 1:30 and we were here with all of our people and I just--I don't feel it's really fair to me to represent [sic] at this point.
At that point, Plaintiff's counsel examined two witnesses, Steven Applegate (Applegate) and Kari Yankish (Yankish). Defendant conducted cross-examination of Applegate and had begun cross-examination of Yankish when his counsel returned. Defendant's counsel appeared in court at 4:13 p.m. The court provided Defendant with a five-minute recess in order to allow him to confer with his counsel. Prior to the recess, the court informed defense counsel that Applegate had The court also informed defense counsel that Yankish had "testified regarding an alleged violation of the restraining order by [Boone] coming by to receive--retrieve [Defendant's] personal property from the garage."
When court reconvened, Defendant's counsel objected to the court commencing the trial without him. The court noted the objection but directed defense counsel to proceed with cross-examination of Yankish. Defense counsel's motion to strike Yankish's testimony as irrelevant was denied by the court. Later, defense counsel moved to strike Yankish's testimony as hearsay. The court denied this motion on the ground it came too late.
Defense counsel questioned the court regarding the applicable standard of proof to be applied at the hearing. The court requested that defense counsel file a written brief concerning the standard of proof. After listening to further arguments, the court recessed and ordered that all parties return the following day at 3:00 p.m.
When trial commenced the next day, February 7, 1995, defense counsel renewed his objection to the court's having commenced the previous day's trial without him. The court noted the objection and then entertained argument regarding the applicable standard of proof for Plaintiff's protective order motion because HRS § 586-5.5 did not specify that any particular standard be applied. Defense counsel argued that the standard of proof for HRS § 586-5.5, which addresses "domestic abuse," should mirror HRS § 604-10.5 (1993), which imposes a "clear and convincing" standard of proof for the issuance of a TRO against harassment "by any person." Defense counsel argued there was neither a rational basis nor a compelling state interest for applying different standards of proof under the two statutes. The court ruled that the applicable standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. Trial then continued with defense counsel's cross-examination of Yankish.
After Joanne Garcia, a neighbor, testified about the October 8, 1994 incident, Plaintiff testified. Plaintiff stated that from September to October 1994, her arguments with Defendant became "more and more frequent and more and more violent." Plaintiff recounted that Defendant had "massive mood swings," and she "never knew if he was going to be happy or sad or angry or violent." Also, Plaintiff reported that "[t]he day [Defendant] left after he hit [her] he told [her] he was going to burn the house down with [her] in it." Finally, Plaintiff related that after the TRO was issued, she received twelve letters from Defendant.
Defense counsel called Douglas Leandro (Leandro), Boone, Nancy Kini (Kini), and Defendant to testify. During the examination of Boone and Kini, defense counsel attempted to present evidence that Plaintiff's brother had threatened Boone and that Plaintiff had threatened Kini. Defense counsel argued that the evidence was critical for discrediting Plaintiff. The court, however, ruled that the testimony was irrelevant and thus...
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