State ex rel. Hatfield v. Cummins

• Decision Date: 02 July 1908
• Docket Number: 21,097
• Citation: 85 N.E. 359,171 Ind. 112
• Parties: The State of Indiana, ex rel. Hatfield, v. Cummins et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

85 N.E. 359

171 Ind. 112

The State of Indiana, ex rel. Hatfield, v. Cummins et al

No. 21,097

Supreme Court of Indiana

July 2, 1908

Rehearing Denied October 28, 1908.

From Huntington Circuit Court; William D. Hamer, Judge.

Action by The State of Indiana, on the relation of James M Hatfield, against J. Abijah Cummins and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

J. T Alexander, for appellant.

J. B. Kenner, C. K. Lucas and Sumner Kenner, for appellees.

OPINION

Montgomery, J.

It is alleged that the relator was a member of the religious denomination known as the United Brethren in Christ Church, and of the local society thereof known as Huntington Mission Station, located at Huntington, Indiana; that he was unjustly and irregularly expelled from such membership by the local society for "disobedience to the order of the church;" that he duly appealed to the quarterly conference in pursuance of the laws of the church; that it is the law of said denomination that when such appeal is taken the same shall first be reviewed by a board of arbiters composed of five persons, two of whom shall be chosen by the accused, two by the quarterly conference, and the fifth by these four; that his appeal was allowed by the quarterly conference, and he designated his two members of such board of arbiters, and requested appellees, who composed said conference, to select two members thereof, which was their duty, but they refused so to do, although there were more than one hundred available and eligible persons; that membership in said denomination is a valuable right, of which he has been wrongfully deprived, and for redress of which he will be without remedy, unless said board of arbiters be appointed to hear his appeal. Wherefore relator prayed the issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, commanding appellees to appoint two qualified members of said denomination to serve as such arbiters.

An alternative writ, reciting in substance the facts just stated, was issued as prayed. Issues were joined thereon, and a trial by the court resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of appellees.

A number of intermediate questions have been suggested, which do not require consideration, since, at all events, the judgment below must be affirmed.

Under the statutes of this State "writs of mandate may be issued to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, or a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." § 1225 Burns 1908, § 1168 R. S. 1881. A proceeding by way of mandamus is a legal remedy; and to justify the issuance of this writ it is essential that the relator have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and that it be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. 19 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 725; 26 Cyc., 151.

The thing sought to be compelled by this action is the taking of an intermediate step looking ultimately toward the reinstatement of the relator in the church from which he is alleged to have been wrongfully expelled. There is no allegation that the church at large, the quarterly conference, or the local society has been incorporated under the law. The writ is directed, not against a corporate body, but against certain individuals, who, it is averred, compose the quarterly conference of the church. The statutes of this State do not authorize courts of law to issue writs of mandamus to restore a member who has been expelled from membership in a voluntary unincorporated association which does not hold or exercise any right, privilege or franchise conferred by the sovereign power of the State. Merrill, Mandamus, § 157; Burt v. Grand Lodge, etc. (1887), 66 Mich. 85, 33 N.W. 13; Weidenfeld v. Keppler (1903), 84 (Hun) A.D. 235, 82 N.Y.S. 634; Fritz v. Muck (1881), 62 How. Prac. 69; People, ex rel., v. New York, etc., Hospital (1898), 29 (Hun) A.D. 244, 51 N.Y.S. 420; Wolf v. Commonwealth, ex rel. (1870), 64 Pa. 252; Wolf v. United Daughters, etc. (1870), 1 Phila. (Pa.) 374.

The society, from which the relator alleges he was unjustly and arbitrarily excluded, was purely of a religious character. The right lying at the foundation of this action is one of religious association and worship. No civil or property right is shown to be involved. The only relation between the relator and other members of the congregation and church, from which he was expelled, disclosed by the pleadings, was of a spiritual and ecclesiastical nature. Civil courts have no jurisdiction and will not pass upon such ecclesiastical matters as expulsion from church membership, in cases where no civil or temporal rights are involved. The settled character of this principle, and the fundamental ground upon which it rests, will be most clearly exhibited by quotations from some of the adjudications of our own and other courts.

In the case of Grimes's Executors v. Harmon (1871), 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am. Rep. 690, this court, in substance, held that when the rights of property, or civil rights as contradistinguished from ecclesiastical rights, are involved, and such rights depend upon religious faith or orthodoxy of citizens, or the rules, discipline and practice of churches or religious denominations, the courts may entertain and determine judicially all such questions, so far as they affect the rights of persons or religious denominations to property or civil rights.

In Gaff v. Greer (1882), 88 Ind. 122, 45 Am. Rep. 449, after citing a number of cases, the court, at page 132, said: "These authorities establish the proposition that the decision of one of these judicatories is binding upon the courts where such questions arise. It is said, however, that the appellants had no notice, and for that reason the order is a nullity. This was a question for the presbytery. We cannot revise its judgment or determine its mode of procedure. This must be left to these bodies, otherwise they would be deprived of the power to construe the laws that govern them."

The principle governing the jurisdictions of civil and ecclesiastical tribunals was well summed up in the case of White Lick Quarterly Meet. of Friends v. White Lick Quarterly Meet. of Friends (1883), 89 Ind. 136, where the court, speaking by Niblack, C. J., said: " Civil courts in this country have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They cannot revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, and can only interfere in church controversies where civil rights or the rights of property are involved. Where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right, and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions, out of which the civil right has arisen, as it finds them, and accepting those decisions as matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction. The civil courts act upon the theory that the ecclesiastical courts are the best judges of merely ecclesiastical questions, and of all matters which concern the doctrines and discipline of the respective religious denominations to which they belong. When a person becomes a member of a church he becomes so upon the condition of submission to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and however much he may be dissatisfied with the exercise of that jurisdiction, he has no right to invoke the supervisory power of a civil court so long as none of his civil rights are invaded." The same principle was reaffirmed in the following cases: O'Donovan v. Chatard (1884), 97 Ind. 421, 49 Am. Rep. 462; Dwenger v. Geary (1888), 113 Ind. 106, 14 N.E. 903; Lamb v. Cain (1891), 129 Ind. 486, 14 L.R.A. 518, 29 N.E. 13; Smith v. Pedigo (1896), 145 Ind. 361, 33 N.E. 777, 19 L.R.A. 433.

In Dwenger v. Geary, supra, the court quoted the following language from Shannon v. Frost (1842), 3 B. Mon. 253: [Erroneously quoted in Dwenger v. Geary (1888), 113 Ind. 106, 14 N.E. 903, and in White Lick Quarterly Meet. of Friends v. White Lick Quarterly Meet. of Friends (1883), 89 Ind. 136, as from Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511--Rep.] "The court, having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, cannot revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline or excision. Our only judicial power in the case arises from the conflicting claims of the parties to the church property and the use of it. * * * We cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly, cut off from the body of the church."

In the case of Watson v. Jones (1871), 13 Wall 679, 20 L.Ed. 666, the court most aptly explained the underlying reasons for the principle under consideration, in the following language: "In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of...