Stark v. Kirchgraber
Decision Date | 21 February 1905 |
Citation | 85 S.W. 868,186 Mo. 633 |
Parties | MAUD L. STARK et al. v. LIZZIE KIRCHGRABER, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court. -- Hon. James T. Neville, Judge.
Affirmed.
Wright Bros. & Blair for appellant.
(1) The whole title was vested in defendant: First, by the conveyance by Sandy Jarrett; second, by the administrator's deed to defendant. (2) The order of the probate court approving the sale by the administrator to defendant was a judgment that can not be attacked in a collateral proceeding. The same is final. Covington v. Chamblin, 156 Mo. 587. (3) This attack on same is collateral. (4) The judgments of probate courts are entitled to the same favorable presumptions as are accorded to courts of general jurisdiction, and are no more subject to collateral attack. Cox v. Boyce, 152 Mo 583; Covington v. Chamblin, 156 Mo. 587. (5) The probate court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties and proceeded in a lawful manner. Cox v Boyce, 152 Mo. 581; Covington v. Chamblin, 156 Mo. 587. (6) In this proceeding the court has no power to divest and vest title. If the legal title to the four-sixths were vested in defendant, the trial court was powerless to divest her of the same. The action to quiet title is an action at law. (7) Lizzie Kirchgraber was interested in said estate. R. S. 1899, sec. 150.
O. T Hamlin for respondents.
The facts in evidence show that the proceedings in the probate court were under and by virtue of section 150, Revised Statutes 1899, which is as follows: "If such executor or administrator do not make such application, any creditor, or any other person interested in the estate, may make such application, giving twenty days' notice to the executor or the administrator." This statute contemplates an heir in said estate, when it speaks of another person interested, and the interest of Mrs. Kirchgraber, which was the title of Ona and Elias, was not such as to come within the statute. The reasons given in her notice of publication are not good and valid ones, as she was not interested as contemplated by that statute. The petition, the notice, and the order were not sufficient to warrant a sale of the real estate, and the sale under it conveys no title and was utterly and absolutely void, and left these plaintiffs unaffected in their interest. Appellant's title rests solely on the proceedings of the probate court; they being void, her title is void. The authority cited by appellant to sustain the point that the order of the probate court, approving the sale by the administrator to defendant, was a judgment that can not be attacked in a collateral proceeding (Covington v. Chamblin, 156 Mo. 687), does not affect this case, as the decision pointedly holds that the proceedings may be inquired into on two grounds, that of jurisdiction or fraud. Huff v. Land & Imp. Co., 157 Mo. 65; Garrison v. Frazier, 165 Mo. 40.
This cause is here upon appeal from the Greene County Circuit Court.
On the twenty-fourth day of February, A. D. 1901, the respondents, as plaintiffs, filed in the circuit court of Greene county their petition in the above-entitled cause, which said petition, omitting caption and style of case, is as follows:
To this petition the following answer was filed:
"Now comes the defendant in the above-styled cause and by leave of court, for her amended answer to plaintiffs' petition admits that she claims an interest in the land therein described, to-wit: The fee simple title, and further avers and states that she is the owner of the fee simple title in said land; that she is in possession thereof, and denies each and every other allegation therein contained."
Upon the trial of this cause, it was admitted that Sandy Jarrett was the common source of title. The facts, as shown by the testimony, including the documentary evidence introduced, are as follows:
The record is silent as to the date of grant of letters of administration on the estate of Hulda Jarrett, deceased; but it does appear that W. H. Pipkin was the former administrator of said estate, and turned over $ 27.75 to said Jarrett, husband of the deceased, by order of the probate court.
This was the last heard of that administration, so far as the record discloses, until this appellant, who is neither an heir nor a creditor of said estate, commenced the proceedings in the probate court to sell the real estate.
The first step taken in the probate court to sell this real estate was by this appellant; she gave the following notice to the administrator of the estate of Hulda Jarrett, deceased:
After the service of such notice upon the administrator, the appellant in this cause presented to the probate court the following petition:
Upon the foregoing petition the probate court made the following order:
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