U.S. v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 07 September 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 87-5100,s. 87-5100
• Citation: 850 F.2d 1038
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry HAMILTON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Geraldine HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ethel HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles BLAKE, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony Jerome WASHINGTON, a/k/a Kojak, Defendant-Appellant. to 87-5105.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1038

850 F.2d 1038

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry HAMILTON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Geraldine HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ethel HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles BLAKE, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony Jerome WASHINGTON, a/k/a Kojak, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 87-5100 to 87-5105.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 5, 1988.

Decided June 29, 1988.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Sept. 7, 1988.

Capers Gamewell Barr, III, John Frank Hardaway (Lionel S. Lofton, Michael P. O'Connell, Stuart A. Feldman, David P. McCann, on brief), for defendants-appellants.

John Michael Barton, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Vinton D. Lide, U.S. Atty., J. Anthony Mabry, Third Year Law Student, on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HALL, MURNAGHAN and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges.

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

This is a consolidated appeal from the district court's determination that the government met its burden of presenting racially neutral explanations for the use of its peremptory challenges during the selection of the jury for defendants' trial. The district court, after an evidentiary hearing, found that the defendants had established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, but that the government's reasons for using its peremptory challenges satisfied the standards expressed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We affirm.

I.

The background of this controversy has been set out in our earlier opinion in this case. United States v. Blake, 819 F.2d 71, 72-73 (4th Cir.1987). A brief review, however, may be helpful for this discussion.

Henry Hamilton, Jr., Geraldine Hamilton, Ethel Hamilton, Charles Blake, Thomas Brown, and Anthony Jerome Washington, all of whom are black, were indicted with eight other black individuals for various drug-related violations in the early part of 1985. During the voir dire proceedings prior to their trial, the government used seven of its eight peremptory challenges to strike black persons from the venire. The district court denied defendants' motion for mistrial, ruling that the defendants had failed to show the systematic exclusion of blacks from juries in a number of cases as required by Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). Trial proceeded and all defendants were convicted.

While defendants' case was pending on appeal, Swain was substantially modified by Batson. In Swain, the Supreme Court had recognized that a "State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U.S. at 203-204, 85 S.Ct. at 826. Swain suggested that an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised when there was evidence that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." 380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 837. Batson rejected this harsh evidentiary formulation as being "inconsistent with standards that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause." 106 S.Ct. at 1721.

This Court heard oral arguments on the case in June, 1986, but delayed a decision pending the Supreme Court's ruling in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), on whether Batson was to be applied retroactively. In Griffith, the Supreme Court held that Batson applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal at the time Batson was issued. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded this case to the district court with instructions that it determine:

whether the appellants have established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. If so, the court should conduct an evidentiary hearing on the Government's reasons for using its peremptory challenges to exclude the seven black veniremen. If the Government's reasons fail to satisfy the Batson standards, appellants must be granted a new trial. If the reasons satisfy Batson, appellants' convictions should be reinstated.

On remand, the district court determined that the government's exercise of its seven peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury created a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. After an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded, however, that the government's reasons for challenging these jurors was racially neutral. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, appellants contend that (1) the district court erred in holding that the government met its burden to present a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors; (2) the Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted in Batson, prohibits peremptory challenges against jurors because they are women; and (3) a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude women from a criminal petit jury, because of their sex, violates the rights of a defendant to an impartial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. We disagree with each contention and address them seriatim.

It is clear today that, after Batson, a black defendant may make out a case of purposeful discrimination "by showing that the totality of the relevant facts [in his particular case] gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." 106 S.Ct. at 1721. "Once the defendant makes the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion." Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that, while the prosecutor "must articulate a neutral explanation [for challenging black jurors] related to the particular case to be tried ... the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." Id. at 1723. Moreover, the presence or absence of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact ordinarily entitled to great deference by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

At the evidentiary hearing held on June 23, 1987, the trial court determined that a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been established by the government's exercise of seven peremptory challenges on black jurors. After the trial court found an inference of purposeful discrimination, the government came forward and offered its explanations for all seven peremptory strikes. After weighing the credibility of the United States Attorney who had exercised the strikes, the district court then found that the government had offered legitimate, racially neutral explanations for challenging these black jurors. We see no basis for disturbing these conclusions.

In this case, the jury of twelve was drawn from a panel of fifty. Of those fifty jurors, nineteen were white males, nineteen were white females, eleven were black females, and one was a black male. For the selection of the primary jury, the government was allowed eight peremptory strikes, while the defendants were given fourteen peremptory challenges. ¹ At the time the jury was selected, nine of the defendants were male and five defendants were female. During the jury selection process, the government exercised seven of its eight available strikes on blacks, while the defendants used thirteen of their fourteen peremptory challenges to strike whites from the panel. Neither the government nor the defendants exercised their last peremptory strikes. Of the twelve jurors which were eventually seated, six were white females, three were black females, and three were white males. The appellants have conceded that the first four strikes exercised by the government were based on reasons unrelated to race. Therefore, our inquiry is limited to the propriety of the fifth, sixth and seventh peremptory challenges.

The government offered the same explanation for exercising all three strikes: it wanted more men on the jury; therefore jurors Nos. 54, 53 and 56 were struck because they were female. The government explained that since five of the fourteen defendants were women, it wanted to take steps to insure that a jury would not be overly sympathetic to the female defendants who allegedly participated in the illegal drug distribution network.

At the time juror No. 54, a black female, was presented, five females and one male had been seated. The government's explanation that it struck this juror because it felt it needed more men on the jury is certainly reasonable. Although the government then accepted two white females, Nos. 38 and 31, it had independent information that these two individuals would be good jurors.

The composition of the jury when juror No. 53, also a black female, was presented, was seven females and one male. According to the government, it had no independent information on this juror and knew, by this time, that the defendants had established a pattern of striking white jurors while seating blacks. ² Again, the government's contention that this juror was struck because she was female is reasonable.

The government's last peremptory challenge was exercised to remove juror No. 56, still another black female. By this time, the composition of the jury was nine females and one male. Moreover, the record shows that counsel for the defendants had exercised 13 of their 14 strikes on whites. Certainly the government was justified in believing that it was unlikely that defendants would strike this juror. The government's explanation that it struck juror No. 56 ...