850 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1988), 87-8682, O'Neal v. DeKalb County, Ga.
|Citation:||850 F.2d 653|
|Party Name:||George Washington O'NEAL, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. DeKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.|
|Case Date:||July 25, 1988|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
James W. Howard, Howard, Secret & Wilde, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants, cross-appellees.
Albert Sidney Johnson, DeKalb County Attorneys Office, Decatur, Ga., Judson Graves, Alston & Bird, Paul J. Quiner, Wade H. Watson, III, Johnson & Montgomery, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees, cross-appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and NICHOLS [*], Senior Circuit Judge.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
The survivors of a man killed in a police shootout in DeKalb County, Georgia brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the officers involved in the shootout, certain county officials, and the County. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the decedent's constitutional rights had not been violated and therefore no section 1983 action could be maintained, 667 F.Supp. 853. We affirm.
On the evening of December 15, 1983, the decedent, George Washington O'Neal, Sr., a patient at Doctor's Hospital in DeKalb County, Georgia, went on a rampage through the hospital and stabbed seven people with a pocketknife. 1 Officer Steven
Waits, a DeKalb County police officer, arrived at the hospital in response to a police call. Waits, armed with his service revolver, found O'Neal on the second floor, holding a bloody knife. Waits identified himself as a police officer and ordered O'Neal to drop his knife. Ignoring Waits's demand, O'Neal ran away down the hallway. As Waits chased O'Neal through the second floor corridors, he observed "a lot of blood on the floor ... a piece of intral [sic] of some kind" and a person with a severe stomach wound lying on the floor. Deposition of Steven W. Waits, at 54. He also noticed that the nursing supervisor had a stab wound in his back. Police Report, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
After Waits had chased O'Neal for approximately five minutes, Officer Rick Roseberry, armed with a shotgun, arrived at the hospital to assist Waits. Roseberry also saw "blood all over the floor" and walls and "a piece of human tissue lying there in [sic] the floor in front of me." Deposition of Rickie Emmit Roseberry, at 66. Soon after Roseberry's arrival, the two officers cornered O'Neal at the end of one of the second floor corridors so that O'Neal was standing only six feet from Roseberry and between five and six feet from Waits. With their weapons raised, the officers repeatedly ordered O'Neal to drop his knife and lie on the floor. Instead of complying, O'Neal rushed toward Roseberry with the knife raised over his head; in response, both officers fired their weapons at O'Neal. Although struck by both shots, O'Neal did not fall, but rather twisted around from the force of the shots, still waving his knife above his head. Immediately after the first volley of shots, Roseberry fired a second shot, which hit O'Neal in the small of the back and brought him to the ground. O'Neal died as a result of the gunshot wounds.
O'Neal's survivors brought this section 1983 action against Waits, Roseberry, the Director of Public Safety of DeKalb County, the Chief of Police and Assistant Chief of Police of DeKalb County, and DeKalb County. The complaint alleged that Waits and Roseberry had deprived O'Neal of his constitutional rights by using excessive force against him, and that this use of excessive force was the result of a custom or policy of DeKalb County. 2 Concluding that O'Neal's constitutional rights had not been violated because the officers had not used excessive force, the district court granted summary judgment for all the defendants. In a separate order, the district court denied the defendants' motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of excessive force. The defendants cross-appeal from the denial of attorney's fees.
To succeed on their section 1983 3 claim, the plaintiffs must establish that O'Neal was deprived of a constitutional right. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 138, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). The plaintiffs advance two plausible constitutional theories to support their section 1983 action; they assert that the officers' use of force against O'Neal violated his right to substantive due process and his rights under the fourth amendment. 4 We will consider
these assertions separately. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (analyzing claim of excessive force under both substantive due process and fourth amendment), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986).
A. Substantive Due Process
The starting point for any discussion of a substantive due process claim in the context of police abuse is Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), in which the Supreme Court held that incriminating evidence obtained by subjecting a criminal suspect to a stomach pump was inadmissible. As the Court explained, substantive due process is violated when the government engages in actions that " 'offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.' " Id. at 169, 72 S.Ct. at 208 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17, 65 S.Ct. 781, 788-89, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945)). In other words, government conduct that "shocks the conscience," id. at 172, 72 S.Ct. at 209, or "offend[s] even hardened sensibilities," id., 72 S.Ct. at 210, transgresses the bounds of substantive due process.
Since Rochin, the lower courts have developed more definite standards for identifying substantive due process violations. In determining whether force used by police officers amounts to a constitutional deprivation, a court must consider " 'the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' " Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500-01 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033...
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