851 A.2d 576 (Md. 2004), 114, Arroyo v. Board of Educ. of Howard County
| Docket Number | 114,Sept. Term,2003. |
| Citation | 381 Md. 646,851 A.2d 576 |
| Date | 10 June 2004 |
| Parties | Robert ARROYO v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HOWARD COUNTY. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
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[381 Md. 648] Francis A. Pommett, III (Law Offices of Nathanson & Pommett, P.C., Baltimore), on brief, for Appellant.
Michael S. Molinaro (Reese & Carney, LLP, Columbia), on brief, for Appellee.
Argued Before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
[381 Md. 649] CATHELL, Judge.
This case concerns a decision by the Board of Education of Howard County ("County Board"), respondent, to terminate the employment of Robert Arroyo, petitioner, a guidance counselor employed by the Howard County Public School System ("HCPSS"), 1 and whether the later affirmance of that decision by the Maryland State Board of Education ("State Board") constituted an exhaustion of petitioner's administrative remedies.
Prior to the instant case, petitioner had previously contested his termination through the administrative procedures available to him under Md.Code (1978, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 6-202 of the Education Article. After a May 28, 1998 decision by the State Board that affirmed the County Board's decision to terminate petitioner's employment, petitioner sought judicial review of the State Board's decision under Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article. Upon judicial review, the State Board's decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court for Howard County on April 8, 1999, and by the Court of Special Appeals on June 14, 2000. 2 On February 8, 2002, petitioner then filed this separate civil complaint sounding in tort against the County Board and Howard County, Maryland, alleging wrongful termination from his employment with HCPSS. 3
In the present case, the County Board filed an answer to petitioner's February 8, 2002 complaint and, on May 29, 2002, moved for summary judgment, arguing that petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. On April 15, 2003, the Honorable Lenore Gelfman of the Circuit Court for Howard County held a hearing on the motion. On May 5, 2003, Judge Gelfman issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the County Board's motion for summary judgment, holding that petitioner's lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner then appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals. On February 2, 2004, prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a Writ of Certiorari. Arroyo v. Board of Education, 379 Md. 224, 841 A.2d 339 (2004). Petitioner presents one question for our review:
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"Was [the Circuit Court] legally correct in determining that [petitioner's] administrative remedies were exhausted following the decision of the Maryland State Board of Education rather than after judicial review as provided in Sections 10-222 and 10-223 of the State Government Article, so as to start the statute of limitations running on his tort claim for wrongful discharge on the earlier date?" [Alterations added.]
We hold that the State Board's May 28, 1998 decision affirming petitioner's termination from his employment with HCPSS was the final decision of the administrative body and constituted an exhaustion of petitioner's administrative remedies and, as such, he was free to have his separate action in tort alleging wrongful termination adjudicated at least by that time, and perhaps could, as we note infra, have filed it even sooner subject to the separate action being stayed during the administrative proceedings. 4 Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations on this claim, as provided under § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, began to run no later than May 28, 1998. 5 Petitioner's action of waiting to file [381 Md. 651] a separate action in tort until February 8, 2002, more than three years after the State Board's final decision, was thus barred by the statute of limitations.
I. Facts
Petitioner was a tenured guidance counselor at Oakland Mills High School ("Oakland Mills") in Columbia, Maryland, and had been employed by HCPSS since 1985. On January 31, 1997, petitioner was terminated from his employment by the County Board on the grounds of "willful neglect of duty" and "insubordination."
The incident that set in motion the events leading to petitioner's termination occurred on May 11, 1995, when petitioner had a physical altercation with a teacher at Oakland Mills. As a result of the injuries that he suffered at the hands of this teacher, petitioner had to be taken to a hospital emergency room for treatment. After being released from the hospital's care, petitioner received a disability certificate from his treating physician for the period of May 12-30, 1995. Petitioner did not work during this period and he did not return to work at Oakland Mills after May 30th.
During the summer of 1995, petitioner was transferred to Mt. Hebron High School ("Mt.Hebron") so as to alleviate any concerns he might have about working in the same building with the other teacher involved in the physical altercation. Petitioner, allegedly still traumatized by the physical altercation that previous May, did not report to work at Mt. Hebron in August 1995 and remained absent from work even after an independent medical examination was conducted at the behest of HCPSS by Dr. Steven W. Siebert, M.D., a psychiatrist. Dr. Siebert declared, in pertinent part, that "[t]here is no medical basis, from a psychiatric perspective, to support [petitioner] [381 Md. 652] remaining out of work
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provided [petitioner] is working in another location."
On October 23, 1995, Dr. Michael E. Hickey, the superintendent of HCPSS, concerned with petitioner's failure to return to work, and also aware of Dr. Seibert's report, informed petitioner that if he did not return to work by October 30 th, the superintendent would recommend to the County Board that petitioner be terminated from his position. Although petitioner reported to work on October 30, 1995, after that brief one-day return he proceeded to be absent from work for the remainder to the 1995-96 school year. 6
In a letter dated March 22, 1996, Superintendent Hickey informed petitioner that if he did not report to Mt. Hebron by April 1, 1996, or obtain an approved leave of absence, he would recommend to the County Board that petitioner be terminated for neglecting his professional duties. After petitioner failed to report to work on April 1, 1996, or, in the alternative, obtain an approved leave of absence, Superintendent Hickey did exactly as he had indicated he would do and recommended that petitioner be terminated.
Following an evidentiary hearing conducted by the County Board's hearing examiner, 7 who found that there was sufficient cause to recommend petitioner's termination, the County Board adopted the hearing examiner's recommendation and issued a decision, dated January 31, 1997, that stated that petitioner was to be terminated for "willful neglect of duty" and "insubordination."
Thereafter, petitioner appealed the County Board's decision to the State Board, which assigned the matter to an administrative [381 Md. 653] law judge (ALJ). After conducting a de novo hearing, the ALJ recommended that petitioner be terminated. Based on the ALJ's findings and recommendation, the State Board issued an "opinion" on May 28, 1998 that concluded that petitioner was lawfully terminated for "willful neglect of duty."
Petitioner then sought judicial review of the State Board's decision in the Circuit Court for Howard County. After a hearing, the Circuit Court issued a memorandum opinion and order on April 8, 1999, affirming the administrative decision of the State Board. Petitioner then filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On June 14, 2000, in an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
On February 8, 2002, petitioner filed this separate civil complaint against both the County Board and Howard County, Maryland. In his complaint, petitioner alleges that he was wrongfully terminated from employment with the County Board because of his action of filing, on August 7, 1995, a workers' compensation claim. 8
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The central dispute at issue, however, is, as presented to this Court, whether this complaint is barred by the general statute of limitations.
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we are concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists. Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154-55, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 144, 642 A.2d 219, 224 (1994); Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, [381 Md. 654] 1011 (1993); Arnold Developer, Inc. v. Collins, 318 Md. 259, 262, 567 A.2d 949, 951 (1990); Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 408, 559 A.2d 365, 366 (1989); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 110-11, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985) (citations omitted). "A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case." King, 303 Md. at 111, 492 A.2d at 614 (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974)). "[A] dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment." Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40, 300 A.2d 367, 374 (1973).
This Court also has stated that "the standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is whether the trial court was legally correct." Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996); see also Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525...
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