McLain v. Meier

Decision Date08 July 1988
Docket NumberNos. 86-5290,86-5386,s. 86-5290
Citation851 F.2d 1045
PartiesHarley McLAIN, Appellant, v. Ben MEIER, individually and in his capacity as Secretary of State, Allen Olson, individually and in his capacity as Governor, Robert Wefald, individually and in his capacity as Attorney General, Rick D. Johnson, individually and in his capacity as Solicitor of the Attorney General, Appellees. Charles E. PERRY, Appellant, v. Ben MEIER, Secretary of State, Nicholas Spaeth, Attorney General, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Sterling James Smith, Port Arthur, Tex., for appellants.

Nicholas J. Spaeth, Atty. Gen., Bismarck, N.D., for appellees.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Harley McLain (No. 86-5290) and Charles E. Perry (No. 86-5386) appeal from final judgments entered in the District Court for the District of North Dakota. In McLain v. Meier, Civ. No. A1-84-237 (D.N.D. June 16, 1986) (McLain ), the district court 1 granted summary judgment in favor of appellees because it concluded that McLain lacked standing to assert his claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 that various North Dakota ballot access laws are unconstitutional. In Perry v. Meier, Civ. No. A1-86-188, slip op. at 1 (D.N.D. Oct. 15, 1986) (Perry ), the district court 2 dismissed Perry's claim for a writ of mandamus and for injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of the North Dakota ballot access laws, finding that the laws "are not facially unconstitutional" and "provide liberal access to the ballot." The judgments in McLain and Perry have been consolidated for appellate review. For reversal, McLain argues that the district court erred in concluding that he lacked standing; Perry argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because the North Dakota ballot access laws are unconstitutional. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's judgment in McLain in part on other grounds, reverse in part, and remand with instructions, and affirm the district court's judgment in Perry.

I

We consider McLain's appeal first. Because McLain is no stranger to North Dakota politics and ballot access laws, a brief review of the historical background of the suit is appropriate. McLain first ran for elective office in North Dakota as an independent candidate for the United States Congress in the November 1978 election. McLain organized the "Chemical Farming Banned" Party during the 1978 election but was unable to garner the required 15,000 signatures by June 1 of the election year in order to appear on the ballot as a candidate of his party. McLain instead qualified as an independent non-party candidate by collecting three hundred signatures before forty days prior to the general election in November. McLain received only 1.5 percent of the votes cast in the general election. He then brought suit challenging the constitutionality of North Dakota's third party ballot access laws.

After the district court dismissed McLain's suit, this court reversed. We concluded that the combined requirements of 15,000 signatures to be collected by June 1, ninety days before the primary election and one hundred and fifty days before the general election, unduly burdened McLain's right of access to the ballot as a third party candidate. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1162-65 (8th Cir.1980) (McLain I ). While we noted that McLain had been able to run as an independent candidate, we held that this option was not always a satisfactory alternative to a third party candidacy. Id. at 1165.

The North Dakota legislature responded to McLain I by enacting more liberal third party ballot access laws. These provisions require only 7,000 signatures to be collected not later than fifty-five days before the primary election. N.D.Cent.Code Sec. 16.1-11-30(4) (1981). 3 North Dakota also moved its primary date from September to June. Id. Sec. 16.1-11-01 (1981). At the same time, however, the legislature increased the number of signatures required to run as an independent candidate for a state-wide office or for President of the United States from three hundred to one thousand, to be collected not later than fifty-five days prior to the general election. Id. Sec. 16.1-12-02(5)(a) (1981). 4

In 1980 McLain unsuccessfully campaigned in North Dakota for the offices of President of the United States and United States Senator from North Dakota. In 1984 McLain again mounted a campaign in North Dakota for the office of President of the United States. Shortly before the 1984 general election, McLain filed his original complaint in this action alleging that the ballot access laws had been made unconstitutionally restrictive by (1) moving the primary date from September to June, thus causing the deadline for third party signatures to be moved from one hundred and fifty days before the general election to two hundred and five days before the general election, and (2) increasing the number of signatures needed to appear on the ballot as an independent candidate for President of the United States from three hundred to one thousand.

McLain subsequently sought leave to file a proposed amended complaint which alleged that (1) the Chemical Farming Banned party had been unable to gain ballot access as a third party for the 1978, 1980, and 1984 general elections; (2) the North Dakota Secretary of State "discouraged" write-in votes during the 1984 general election by failing to provide writing instruments in voting booths; (3) the Secretary of State unlawfully refused to count write-in votes cast in the 1984 general election; (4) the North Dakota election laws unconstitutionally "chill" the formation of new political parties and "maintain" the Republican and Democratic parties; and (5) McLain intended to run for office in 1986.

The district court, noting that McLain was only thirty-three years old when the winner of the 1984 presidential election was inaugurated, concluded that McLain lacked standing to complain of any restrictions on access to the ballot for the Presidency of the United States because to hold that office one must be at least thirty-five years old. McLain v. Meier, Civ. No. A1-84-237, slip op. at 7-9 (citing U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 1). The district court also concluded that none of the allegations in McLain's offered amended complaint would confer standing on him. Accordingly, the district court denied McLain's motion to amend his complaint and entered summary judgment against him and in favor of the officials for the State of North Dakota.

A

We are unable to agree that McLain lacked standing to challenge North Dakota's ballot access laws. The purpose of the standing requirement is to ensure that the parties have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). To this end, the Supreme Court has established that:

at an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758-59, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (citations omitted). Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we conclude that McLain, in his capacity as a voter, has sufficiently alleged an injury traceable to the North Dakota ballot access laws which would be redressed if these laws were declared unconstitutional.

McLain's allegations, if true, would cause him injury as a voter because the ballot access laws would restrict his ability to vote for the candidate of his choice or dilute the effect of his vote if his chosen candidate were not fairly presented to the voting public. Although the primary impact of restrictive ballot access laws is on the candidates, "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters." Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (Bullock ). Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that the "primary concern is not the interest of [the] candidate ..., but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to associate together to express their support for [his or her] candidacy and the views [he or she] espoused." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1579, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (Anderson ). We conclude that McLain has alleged a cognizable injury in fact. It is also clear that McLain's alleged injury can be traced to the North Dakota ballot access laws and that his injury could be redressed by granting the relief he seeks.

Several decisions have found voter standing to challenge ballot access restrictions on the candidate of their choice. See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786, 103 S.Ct. at 1568 (supporters of independent candidate have standing to challenge Ohio ballot access laws); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56 (voter has standing to challenge constitutionality of filing fee requirement which directly affects candidate); Bachur v. Democratic National Party, 666 F.Supp. 763, 770-72 (D.Md.1987) (voter has standing to assert claims as voter and on behalf of candidates for delegate). We thus conclude that McLain has standing as a voter to assert his claim that the North Dakota ballot access laws are unduly restrictive.

B

Having concluded that McLain has standing to...

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